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Sustainable infrastructure operation assumes consideration of interrelated elements 
and problems within interacting industries in which the decisions made for one 
industry may affect those in interrelated industries. Problems related to global climate 
change and resource scarcity are main concerns for a society trying to build a 
sustainable infrastructure. These problems are targeted from many perspectives, 
including government-enforced policies and regulations that call for energy efficiency 
and transportation efficiency to build a sustainable infrastructure.  
There is a growing interest among engineers in accounting for sustainability 
under the impact of climate change policies that limit the amount of pollutants being 
released from projects and facilities. While specific problems can be targeted by 
  
specialists in each industry or field, an optimal sustainable solution will be very 
difficult to find if considered separately.  
Despite that directions for improvement are defined, the methods and 
techniques for reaching these specified goals are not yet well developed. Decision-
makers do not have the necessary models to evaluate the impact of proposed carbon 
policies supporting sustainable infrastructure development. Yet, it is important to 
analyze the problem in a systematic fashion to find cost-efficient, technically well-
designed and constructed and sustainable solutions.  
In this dissertation, an interdisciplinary approach is used with the aim of 
analyzing programs geared at reducing emissions and costs, and determining optimal 
allocation of resources along with profit maximization by developing and employing 
optimization, regression and game-theoretic models for the construction, energy and 
transportation industries. These models can be used by national, state, local and 
private agencies for assessing carbon-mitigation policies and low-cost carbon policy 
developments.  
Concepts from integer programming, multi-objective decision-making, bi-
level programming, simulation and regression are employed in the development of 
models to support informed decision-making and policy analyses in the construction, 
transportation and energy sectors. The models incorporate industry-specific details 
covering engineering, economic and environmental aspects of sustainable practices.  
The application of these models to real-world case studies provides insights that will 
allow defined specific goals to be achieved in a cost-efficient way. Results of case 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides background information about sustainability and the industries 
considered in this dissertation. It also illustrates related problems encountered in each of 
these industries, provides brief information about the defined solution approaches and the 
findings. Specifically, the rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.1 presents 
background information about the importance of sustainability and how the considered 
industries in this dissertation are interrelated. Section 1.2 describes the importance and 
significance of the construction industry, provides details of identified problems and 
describes the developed approaches for solving the problems. Section 1.3 describes the 
natural gas industry where the importance of strategic investments for supply network is 
presented followed by Section 1.4 for transportation sector, with similar structural 
organization. Section 1.5 uses the same structure as the previous three sections and 
provides information about carbon cost pricing policy analysis on the natural gas 
industry. Section 1.6 summarizes the contributions and possible extensions. 
1.1 Background 
 
Sustainability is an important concept given depleting natural resources in both 
developed and developing countries. Establishing and maintaining sustainability of a 
given industry is a complex problem that includes decisions for both current and future 
time periods. Sustainability assumes the most optimal resource usage with minimum 
pollution levels. Sustainable development as defined by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (1987) is: “Development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
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This means that if present decisions for optimal operation of infrastructure are made 
sustainably, then the current environment will be cleaner and also can provide better 
conditions for future generations. Therefore, there is a need for further research in the 
area of sustainability that may help in informed decision-making for optimal resource 
allocation/usage and minimization of emissions. 
The implementation of sustainability practices is a subject that is of interest to 
many people, but it is particularly of interest to members of firms and industries that are 
polluting the environment (Avetisyan 2008). To help decision-makers analyze possible 
outcomes of certain developments and make informed decisions, there is a need for 
decision-support models. In this dissertation, decision-support models are developed for 
selected sectors of the economy, namely, construction, natural gas, and on-road 
transportation. These industries are interrelated and interdependent. For instance, the 
construction industry is important for building the infrastructure of almost any industry, 
including the transportation and the energy sectors, but it cannot operate by itself if 
energy supply is not provided or resources are not transported. Likewise, the 
transportation sector may not operate efficiently without the infrastructure of roads or the 
energy supplied. A similar dependence also exists in the energy industry that may not 
exist or operate without the construction industry that builds its facilities and 
transportation sector that supplies the necessary combination of fuels and other supplies. 
Figure 1-1 schematically illustrates the relation and dependence among these three 
sectors of the economy. The figure shows that the decisions in one industry may affect 
the operation of other industries.  
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Since one of the important aspects of sustainability is the amount of released 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), the developed models treat GHGs in these units and their 
costs as major components in decision-making. The developed optimization and 
regression models in this dissertation minimize and estimate the amount of released 
emissions by analyzing carbon cost effects for informed decision-making in addition to 
cost minimization or profit maximization.   
 
Figure 1-1: Relation and dependence between considered industries 
 
While these three industries are closely related, a scenario justifying the 
connection among those industries can be considered. For instance a continuous 
economic growth creates the necessity for more energy supply to satisfy the needs of the 
society. A growing economy requires transporting more people through existing and yet-
to-be-built roadways and needs new facilities for normal operation of the society. It also 
follows that the number of vehicles will grow on the roads increasing energy usage, and 
accordingly generating more emissions. This also means that a construction projects 
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would be carried over to build the facilities and roads, and allow economic growth. So, 
none of these can be accomplished if any of the considered industries fail to provide 
services for others. More specifically, when a construction project (for example, an 
energy supply network expansion) interacts or passes by an existing road, the traffic on 
that road might be affected. Such instances may increase the chances of traffic incidents 
and road blockages. In general, this example indicates that the construction industry is 
interconnected with the energy industry, and the projects interact with the transportation 
sector. Finding a low-cost and environmentally friendly approach for each of these three 
industries is a complex problem that is regulated by a variety of carbon policies that tax, 
cap or grant allowance for related emissions. Since the regulatory platform for 
environmental policies is still in its development stage, further research that may help in 
the policy-making process would benefit all these industries. 
The following problems for each industry were considered for further analyses. In 
the construction industry, emissions and cost minimization from construction equipment 
was chosen to comply with project-level requirements. This is due to the fact that the 
largest portion of emissions from construction activities is related to the construction 
equipment usage that burns large amounts of fuel. In the energy industry, the natural gas 
sector was chosen, since natural gas is the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel, 
which gradually replaces or complements other fossil fuels used by society. In this sector, 
the problem selected for further analyses was the development of a model for strategic 
investment decisions regarding gas supply network expansions. The supply network 
expansions are directly related to the optimal usage of resources and investments, while 
minimizing the adverse impact of those projects on the environment. Since the goal is to 
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make environmentally sound decisions, the impact of shared carbon costs between 
suppliers and consumers of natural gas was also investigated. This approach may help in 
informed policy-making and assessing the impact of policies on the natural gas market. 
For the transportation sector, the problem chosen for further analysis is the emission 
estimation from on-road traffic for which a set of regression models were developed.    
The following sections present the details about importance of each industry, the 
identified problem and developed solution approach for each selected industry. 
1.2 Construction Industry 
1.2.1 Importance and Significance of the Construction Industry 
 
The construction industry is a vital part of any country, since without it no economy can 
progress. Until recently the process of construction did not consider any of the concerns 
related to sustainability, but was directed to profit maximization by having the job 
completed on time and within the budget, sometimes even sacrificing the quality due to 
time pressure and financial obligations. Construction firms began to consider some 
aspects of sustainability within the last two decades (USGBC 2003). Some companies are 
pioneers in sustainable practices, while others only try to comply with regulations and 
requirements by state or federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (CFR 2013).  
1.2.2 The Problem 
 
A significant portion of construction-related emissions is related to the operation of 
construction equipment. Even though there are more environmentally-friendly equipment 
pieces available in the market, which produce fewer emissions per unit of work, the cost-
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benefit ratio does not seem to be favorable for contractors purchasing completely new 
equipment fleets or retrofitting existing equipment. A variety of programs exist to support 
efforts to produce such emission reductions. Additional strategies have been proposed for 
reducing emissions from equipment use and materials production. Moreover, a number of 
calculators have been developed for assessing emissions from construction projects. 
However, it appears that no tools exist to aid contractors in making optimal construction 
management plans with the goal of reducing emissions while minimizing the impact on 
costs.  
1.2.3 The Developed Approach 
 
An optimization-based methodology was developed to allow a construction firm or a 
decision-maker to assess equipment needs for a project, while taking into account the 
GHG emissions resulting from equipment use. The problem of limiting the amount of 
emissions from construction equipment is regulated by a variety of policies and 
regulations. These policies are being improved continuously, but the existing models do 
not allow for analyses that may reflect the impact of policies and regulations at a project 
level. The developed decision-support model seeks to fill this gap and allows for 
informed decision-making. The developed model may also help policy makers to set 
carbon prices, caps and penalties for noncompliance. More specifically, the problem of 
optimal selection of construction equipment for project completion and simultaneous 
minimization of emissions and project costs (given project duration, workload, 
compatibility, working conditions, equipment availability and regulatory constraints) is 
formulated as a multi-period, bi-objective, mixed integer program (MIP).  
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Details of this analysis including model development and its application to a case 
study are presented in Chapter 2. The next section describes the development of the 
strategic investment decision-support model for the natural gas supply network expansion 
projects. 
1.3 Energy Industry (natural gas) 
1.3.1 Importance and Significance of the Natural Gas Industry 
 
Similar to the construction industry, the energy sector is a vital part of the modern world. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century (BC), people have started using energy sources 
other than sun and wood, and have been dependent on these for making stronger tools 
and cooking food (Need 2011). Nowadays, the dependence is much higher and can even 
trigger energy wars (McKillop 2008). This means that decisions made for or within this 
industry are of strategic importance. In particular, since natural gas is the cleanest fossil 
fuel, it is frequently cited as a bridging fuel for future renewable energy sources. Natural 
gas emits less carbon than any other fossil fuel, and, hence, environmentally it is more 
attractive to industries that have a built infrastructure that allows switching from other 
fossil fuels to natural gas. More important, when environmental or sustainability 
regulations are considered, (such as described in “US Clean Air Act Amendments 1990,” 
“US EPA NOX SIP Call,” “US EPA Clean Air Interstate Rule” (Dewees 2008) or 
“Effluent Guidelines: Iron and Steel – Regulations” (EPA 2002) and others) the largest 
consumers of highly polluting energy sources such as coal try to comply with regulations 
and prefer cleaner energy options. Therefore, decision-support models for strategic 
investment decisions are important for decision-makers.  
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1.3.2 The Problem 
 
Since natural gas is expanding its share in global energy markets, the gas supply network 
needs to be expanded and updated for efficiency reasons. Therefore, there is a need for 
huge financial investments with strategic importance.  
In natural gas markets, some suppliers have better geographic and political 
positions (i.e. they may force their political power and will into decisions made for the 
market, which makes them leaders and the rest of the market followers). The leader-
follower structure is more important when the decisions are related to investments for 
supply capacity expansions. Varieties of models, such as the World Gas Model (WGM) 
(Gabriel et al. 2005a, 2005b), GASMOD and GASTALE (Gabriel et al. 2010; Holz et al. 
2006; Lise and Hobbs 2009), AMIGA (Huntington 2005), and EUGAS (Perner and 
Seeliger 2003) to name a few, were developed to help in the decision-making for the 
natural gas industry. These models mostly analyze the market for maximizing profits or 
minimizing costs, while meeting the demand in the market, considering social welfare or 
looking into the detailed engineering aspects of the problem. These models have 
endogenous data for capacity expansions, but none take into account the bi-level leader-
follower approach for capacity expansion analyses, where the leader may decide on its 
capacity expansions and supply levels by taking into account the followers’ market 
behavior. The developed model seeks to fill this gap. The bi-level approach in decision-
making focuses on the leader-follower interaction, where the leader decides on its actions 
and followers move according to the leader’s decision. This structure is not used for 
natural gas supply network expansions and as shown by case studies may provide a great 
benefit for both suppliers and consumers. Since the leader can practice its political will 
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on the followers as well as on the consumers, the decisions also consider security of the 
gas supply. It should be mentioned that previous studies did not consider the security of 
supplies in the natural gas industry. The developed two-level leader-follower model seeks 
to fill this gap. 
1.3.3 The Developed Approach 
 
A decision-support model for strategic investments for the natural gas network capacity 
expansions was developed as a two-level leader-follower problem known as a 
Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg 2011). In this model, the lower level is an 
equilibrium problem, which when combined with the upper-level problem is known as a 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Stackelberg games are used 
for analyses of regulations of the economy or a particular industry (Dimitriou et al. 2008; 
Bard, 1998). The model developed in this dissertation decides on natural gas supply 
network capacity expansions and supply levels for the leader’s profit maximization. In 
most cases, the leader represents the private sector that might have a power in decision-
making in the given market, compared to other players representing the followers.  
A novel feature of the proposed Stackelberg model is the consumers’ dependence 
on suppliers and their willingness to accept a maximum supply share from different 
suppliers. In the current global market, where decisions go beyond cost effectiveness, 
supply security plays a significant role in identifying the most preferable solution from 
the leader’s perspective. In addition, the model considers costs from GHG emissions due 
to capacity expansions and from the gas supply.  
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Details of this analysis including model development and case scenarios are 
presented in Chapter 3. The next section presents the work related to the on-road 
transportation sector. 
1.4 Transportation Industry (on-road transportation) 
1.4.1 Importance and Significance of the Transportation Industry  
 
The transportation industry is another important sector providing mobility to people 
around the world. Like the energy sector in some parts of the world it is expanding at an 
increasing rate. At the same time, due to its expanding nature, the transportation industry 
became one of the most polluting industries. As of 2011, in the U.S., the on-road 
transportation sector was responsible for 28% of total greenhouse gas emissions (DOT 
2011).  
The transportation industry consists of a variety of transportation modes and the 
mode that is highly integrated into people’s everyday life is the on-road transportation. 
Factors including speed, acceleration, frequent stop-and-go driving conditions, 
congestion, and driving behavior impact the amount of emissions generated from vehicles 
operating on a road network.  
1.4.2 The Problem 
 
Continued economic growth around the world is expanding the transportation network 
and consequently the miles traveled are increasing. In some countries such as the U.S., 
the road network is not expanding much, but the increase in emissions still occurs due to 
increasing number of vehicles. Following this growth, the amount of emissions increases, 
and, therefore, there is a need to estimate the amount of generated emissions for further 
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informed decision-making for on-road traffic emissions reductions. There are many 
assessment tools that measure the amount of emissions by using the output of traffic 
micro-simulation platforms. The simulation and design of roads on simulation platforms 
is a resource intensive and computationally expensive process.  
When the regular traffic flow is altered by road congestion resulting from rush 
hour, incidents, and work zones, the impact on emissions becomes much more noticeable 
when serving the same number of vehicles on the roads. To reduce emissions, the 
government agencies provide incentives that tend to improve vehicular composition on 
roads by supporting a purchase of much “cleaner and greener” vehicles. Since congestion 
might be caused by construction activities, it is thought that the contractor or project 
owner should be held responsible for compensating some or all of the incentives helping 
to minimize the adverse impact on the environment from their projects or be incentivized 
for scheduling its activities in a timely manner that generates lower emissions. Analyses 
capturing all mentioned specifics of the problem require considerable efforts on traffic 
micro-simulation platforms, which is time intensive and expensive process. It is known 
that the amount of emissions is related to the vehicle type, age, engine power, road type, 
road grade and many other factors, and, therefore, the decision-makers would benefit 
from the development of quick decision-support models that disclose expected impact 
from congestion causing activities, namely: traffic incidents and construction activities.  
A set of regression models was developed that can help analyze the necessary 
changes in vehicular composition to minimize the released amount of emissions and 
hence help in deciding on the magnitude of financial support for incentives. The models 
can also help analyze impact of road blockage duration due to work zones and traffic 
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incidents. Existing methods do not allow such analysis from emission mitigation 
incentive perspectives, and therefore such models are necessary for informed decision-
making or quick analysis of given road traffic conditions. 
1.4.3 The Developed Approach 
 
To provide decision-makers with a set of models for major road types, analyses of 
emission estimation were conducted for freeway and arterial roadways located in 
Montgomery County, Maryland. The VISSIM traffic micro-simulation platform was used 
for scenario analyses. Scenarios consider systematic changes in vehicular composition 
and volume, incident and work zone related road blockage and blockage durations. The 
data was later used in an emission estimation tool ORSEEM. The output from ORSEEM 
was used for development of regression models for on-road traffic emissions estimation.  
Details of this analysis including model development, extension and case 
scenarios are presented in Chapter 4. The next section presents the CO2e pricing analyses 
for the gas industry.  
1.5 Carbon Dioxide Pricing Analyses for the Global Natural Gas Industry  
1.5.1 Importance and Significance of Carbon Pricing 
 
Carbon pricing is considered an efficient measure for environmental assessment from a 
GHG emissions perspective. Carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) are selected for 
measuring the variety of GHGs as one unit of measure allowing carbon taxation, 
allowances or caps to be applicable to most polluting sectors. The impact of carbon 
pricing might have severe results for some market players in any industry, while others 
would still be able to continue their operation and generate profits. The issue of 
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environmental taxation is aimed at reducing negative externalities or external costs. From 
an economic perspective such costs can be considered as economic rents, which do not 
change the production-related industry decisions. The negative impact of such taxation is 
the increased overall price for the consumer that may minimize the suppliers’ profits 
(Pigou 1920). This effect is true for any industry. The emissions tax or the Pigouvian tax 
is discussed in many areas of modern economics. It can be shown that if the tax is applied 
to the amount of emissions generated by a plant, then there is an incentive for the 
producer to reduce the production of goods. If the tax is applied as a percentage of 
emissions per unit of produced good, then there would be an incentive for the supplier to 
improve the technologies. Baumol (1972) stated that the impact of any externality is 
difficult to measure and hence there is a need for further analysis to understand the 
impact of carbon policies.  
Since GHG emissions in the construction and transportation sectors are 
extensively related to the use of energy, the carbon pricing analyses allowing both the 
suppliers and consumers to be responsible for carbon costs are conducted directly in the 
energy sector (i.e. the natural gas sector). Specifically, the natural gas sector is selected, 
since it is the least polluting of all the fossil fuels (relative to CO2e) and hence likely to 
expand its market share more than other hydrocarbon-based fuels when CO2e-type 
regulations are imposed nationally or regionally. The market expansion is related not 
only to direct preferences by major consumers, such as electricity producers or cement 
and steel manufacturers, but also to gradual and steady technological changes, such as 
switching to compressed natural gas-fueled vehicles. Since there are not many choices 
available for efficient emissions reduction from burning fuels (due to the scale of users), 
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where the supplier might be held responsible for the related emissions, the carbon cost is 
applied to the amount of emissions generated from the use of one unit of natural gas. 
1.5.2 The Problem 
 
As energy consumption increases, environmental concerns rise. To minimize the impact 
of GHG policies, carbon taxes, and cap and trade, and emission allowances have been 
proposed. These policies aim to act as incentives for consumers switching to cleaner 
energy sources and improved technologies. As stated earlier, the impact of carbon pricing 
might have severe results for some market players in any industry, while others might 
still be able to continue their operation and generate profits. The existing decision-
support models do not provide such choices for analysis and, therefore, there is a need to 
develop techniques that will support analysis of the dynamics of the natural gas market 
under carbon policies.  
1.5.3 The Developed Approach 
 
An extension of an already well-designed World Gas Model is selected to analyze the 
impact of carbon pricing policies. The World Gas Model is a long-term, game-theoretic 
model of global gas markets with representation of the Nash-Cournot market power 
originally based on a North American version of the model (Gabriel et al. 2005a, b) and 
eventually extended to a global version (Gabriel et al. 2012). Analyses were conducted in 
accordance to carbon policy scenarios suggested by the Global Change Assessment 
Model (GCAM), a multi-industry general equilibrium model (developed by the Joint 
Global Change Research Institute) that was specifically developed for large-scale 
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analyses of industries all over the world with consideration of carbon policies and other 
economic factors.  
Details of this analysis including model extension formulation and case scenarios 
are presented in Chapter 5. 
1.6 Summary of Contributions and Organization of the Dissertation 
1.6.1 Summary of Contributions  
 
Contributions derived from this dissertation are summarized below. 
1. The construction equipment selection decision-support model provides solution 
from multiple perspectives, including the minimization of construction 
equipment-related costs and emissions, and the completion of projects in a timely 
manner.  
2. The strategic investment model for the natural gas supply network expansion 
leader-follower formulation is given for the leader’s profit maximization, but with 
consideration of emissions associated with construction activities and the 
combustion of supplied natural gas. The security of energy supplies is also 
included, which is a major factor not considered in other decision-support models 
for such decisions. 
3. A set of on-road traffic-related emissions estimation regression models was 
developed allowing consideration of vehicular and road parameters (such as road 
grade that affect the amount of emissions) during analyses. A post-run 
comparison of results obtained from the regression models supports cost-benefit 
analyses of impacts from vehicular composition and volume changes along with 
lane blockage durations, emissions savings and insights for policy development.  
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4. The impact of application of carbon pricing on suppliers and consumers was 
analyzed. The extended version of the existing World Gas Model was used, which 
made it a more powerful model for analyzing the impact of carbon policies in the 
global gas market. This improvement in the model allows analyses of detailed 
policy implications, which also allow consideration of shared responsibility for 
emissions generated from the use of natural gas. Contribution to this extension of 
the World Gas Model was done gradually; first, analyzing the impact of carbon 
cost on the supply side, and, then, on the consumer side. At the final stage, the 
combination of both supplier and consumer sides was considered.  
Overall, this dissertation provides a set of optimization and regression models that 
allow industry-wide (construction, natural gas, transportation) analyses for sustainability 
with consideration of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions and their pricing impacts.  
1.6.2 Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The first chapter of the dissertation is dedicated to the details relating the considered 
industries to each other and why the decisions need to be made considering sustainability. 
Each section in the first chapter indicated the importance of the considered industry, 
discussed why selected problems are important and why there is a need for further 
analyses, and also presented the solution developed for identified problems. 
 The next chapter introduces the details of the problem identified and solved for 
the construction industry. The chapter starts with a short description of the defined 
problem, considered solution approach and general results. This is followed by an 
extensive presentation of the model development. The chapter also presents a case study 
and the overall benefits of using the developed model.  
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 Chapter 3 and succeeding Chapters 4 and 5 follow the same structure as Chapter 2 
for consistency. Chapter 6 summarizes conclusions, contributions along with possible 




CHAPTER 2: DECISION MODELS TO SUPPORT 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTION FROM 




In this chapter, an optimization-based methodology is proposed to permit a construction 
firm to assess its equipment needs while accounting for the GHG emissions resulting 
from equipment use and policy makers to set carbon price, caps and penalties for 
noncompliance. Specifically, the problem of optimally selecting equipment for project 
tasks so as to simultaneously minimize emissions and project costs given project 
duration, workload, compatibility, working conditions, equipment availability and 
regulatory constraints is formulated as a multi-period, bi-objective, mixed integer 
program (MIP). Two techniques are considered for its solution: a weighting technique, 
which seeks to create the Pareto-frontier, and a constraint approach whereby costs are 
minimized while maintaining an emissions cap. Off-the-shelf MIP solvers, such as 
CPLEX, can be used to provide solutions once the model input data and parameters are 
specified for a particular application. These techniques are applied on a case study 
involving construction of a roadway in Maryland. The developed approach
1
 is generic 
and can be applied over varying geographic locations, site elevations, soil properties and 
other factors that affect equipment operation and productivity. 
  
                                                 
1 
The analysis and results of this study have been published in Hakob Avetisyan, Elise Miller-Hooks, 
Suvish Melanta “Decision Models to Support Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction from Transportation 






It is known that Greenhouse Gases (GHG) are vital for maintaining the earth’s 
temperature, however, excessive presence of these gases can be harmful. In recent years, 
national and international support has grown for reducing the activities that cause climate 
change and, thus, many restrictions have been imposed to minimize carbon footprint on 
the earth (IPCC 2007).  
 The construction sector plays a significant role in GHG emissions in the U.S. 
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), approximately 1.7% of 
U.S. GHG production (as of 2003), or 6% of total U.S. industrial-related GHG emissions, 
can be attributed to this sector, placing the construction industry in the list of top emitters 
in the country (EPA 2009a). While each project may not produce large quantities of 
GHGs compared with operations in other sectors, because there are consistently a large 
number of on-going construction projects, the aggregate product of these projects is large. 
Given that the U.S. produced 5,839.3 million metric tons (MTs) of CO2 in 2008 from 
fossil fuel usage (EIA 2009), one can estimate that this sector produces on the order of 
100 million MTs of CO2 per year. In fact, the construction industry is the third largest 
GHG emitter, following only the oil/gas and chemical industries (Truitt 2009). In 
addition, the construction industry ranks third for its CO2 emissions per unit of energy 
used as input. Cement and steel production industries are first and second (Amano and 
Ebihara 2005) and these industries supply construction projects with needed materials.  
The construction industry’s contribution to GHG emissions is, in large part, like 
on-road traffic, due to its dependence on fossil fuel for energy required to operate heavy 
equipment. The burning of fossil fuel generates carbon, which when combined with 
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oxygen from the atmosphere yields CO2, the most abundant of the GHGs. However, the 
average rate of production of emissions is much greater for construction equipment (i.e. 
non-road vehicles) as compared to passenger vehicles (see Report MS-12 1997 for more 
detail) due to differences in fuel type (i.e. diesel versus gasoline), engine technology, and 
horse power. With continuing demand for fossil fuel, sustained increase in GHG 
emissions is predicted (EPA 2009a).  
To foster mitigation efforts to reduce industrial and construction-related 
environmental impact associated with GHG emissions, improvements in technologies to 
aid in monitoring, and methods to encourage individual and institutional accountability 
towards emissions reductions, are being developed (ARB 2010a). Construction 
equipment manufacturers are working to improve engine efficiency, and many 
construction companies have switched to the use of low-sulfur diesel, reducing the 
amount of sulfur-oxides produced (Lewis 2009). Additionally, governments are 
considering instituting limitations, in the form of caps, on carbon emissions. Such caps, 
once enforced, will require companies to either comply with national or regional 
regulations, and/or pay a penalty for noncompliance or excessive GHG emissions 
production. While carbon markets that permit the buying and selling of carbon 
allowances between companies, industries and countries exist internationally, the 
establishment of such markets in the U.S. is likely to have a significant effect on all 
sectors of the economy (ARB 2010a).  
Within construction projects in the transportation sector, the operation of 
equipment on-site accounts for the majority of project emissions. Equipment 
categorization, age, and horsepower, as well as the type of fuel used, can greatly affect 
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rates of emissions. For example, backhoes, bulldozers, excavators, motor graders, off-
road trucks, track loaders, and wheel loaders produce significantly more emissions than 
other construction equipment pieces per hour of use (Lewis 2009). However, such 
projects often offer flexibility in the choice of equipment assigned for each task. Thus, it 
may be possible to reduce project emissions through careful assignment of equipment 
from a pool of available equipment for specific jobs. This can be accomplished with little 
or no increase in project costs. In this chapter, an optimization-based methodology is 
proposed to aid construction firms in making profitable decisions in terms of equipment 
choice and usage while minimizing project emissions or satisfying emissions cap 
requirements. Specifically, the problem of optimally selecting equipment for project tasks 
so as to simultaneously minimize emissions and project costs given project duration, 
workload, compatibility, working conditions, equipment availability and regulatory 
constraints is formulated as a multi-period, bi-objective, mixed integer program (MIP) 
and is referred to as the Optimal Equipment Selection Problem (OESP). Two techniques 
are considered for its solution: a weighting technique, which seeks to create the Pareto-
frontier, and a constraint approach whereby costs are minimized while maintaining an 
emissions cap. The proposed approach as developed is generic and can be applied over 
varying geographic locations, site elevations, soil properties and other factors that affect 
equipment operation and productivity.  
The application and benefits of using the developed methodology is demonstrated 
on a case study involving construction of a major new roadway facility, a 7.2-mile 
portion of Maryland’s InterCounty Connector (ICC) (ICC 2010). The developed 




Agencies, such as state departments of transportation (DOTs), manage and fund 
enormous construction projects. Contractors compete for these projects based on 
estimated costs, project duration and reputation. Given the high cost of new, more 
efficient equipment, older, more emissive equipment is often used on construction jobs. 
In fact, off-road diesel equipment have a lifespan of 20 to 30 years, or even longer. To 
encourage construction contractors to improve their fleet mix, new jobs often require that 
the equipment mix meet EPA Non-road Diesel Tier System requirements, and suggest the 
limitation of the number of older, less efficient equipment on a job site during specified 
periods of time. The developed approach permits a construction firm to optimize its 
equipment usage so as to minimize resulting GHG emissions or meet a GHG cap and, 
thus, compete for the project based not only on cost, but also on environmental 
stewardship.  
The main contribution of this work is an optimization-based methodology to 
permit a construction firm to assess its equipment needs while accounting for the GHG 
emissions resulting from equipment use and policy makers to set carbon price, caps and 
penalties for noncompliance. While many works in the literature promote the need for 
construction firms to reduce their impact on the environment, few provide tools to enable 
such reduction. This chapter seeks to aid in filling this gap.  
2.2 Related Works in the Literature 
2.2.1 Emissions Reduction in Construction 
 
Numerous works proclaim the need for emissions reduction in the transportation 
construction sector. Toenjes (2010), for example, recognizes the need for construction 
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firms to prepare for changes in local and national clean-air regulations. The U.S. EPA 
and many related state agencies not only espouse the need for environmental 
consciousness, but offer incentives to promote emissions reduction from this sector. For 
example, incentives are offered for retrofitting equipment with exhaust after-treatment 
devices, repowering (engine replacement), engine repairs and rebuilds, scrapping and 
replacing of older equipment, and use of alternative fuels to maximize performance. The 
Voluntary Diesel Retrofit Program (Bailey 2005) is an example of such an incentive 
program. Such programs recognize that even as more stringent emissions standards are 
created for new equipment, it will take years until older equipment are phased out. 
Another program, the Carl Moyer Program, funds efforts to reduce nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) emissions with a goal of reducing such emissions by 5,100 MTs per year (ARB 
2010b). A related effort to reduce emissions from diesel fueled vehicles is the Texas 
Emissions Reduction Plan, which allocates approximately 33% of its funds to reduce 
emissions from construction equipment (TERP 2010). 
A number of papers and reports suggest low-cost emission reduction strategies, 
including, for example: reducing equipment idling time and power usage; preventative 
maintenance; operator training; use of ultra-low sulfur diesel, biodiesel or other low-
emitting fuel sources; mechanical changes to the equipment engine or engine upgrade; 
and electrification of equipment (Bailey 2005; EPA 2007; Toenjes 2010; ARB 2010b; 
TERP 2010). These suggested reduction strategies are often expensive and simpler 
actions (e.g., reducing idle time) may not result in significant improvements. Other works 
(e.g., EPA 2008a) recommend minimizing construction-related emissions through the use 
of alternative materials, such as fly ash produced by coal-fired power plants and 
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supplementary bonding materials in concrete and asphalt manufacturing, in construction. 
The use of waste products is especially beneficial and can be a win-win for all involved 
industries (ACAA 2010).  
Several tools have been developed to estimate GHG emissions and air pollutants 
from construction equipment use. These tools include the NONROAD model developed 
by the EPA in 2005 and updated in 2008 (EPA 2009), the OFFROAD model developed 
by the California Air Resources Board (ARB 2007), the Road Construction Emissions 
Model (Lewis 2009), the URBEMIS2007 model for general land development projects 
(Rimpo 2007; Lewis 2009), and the Carbon Footprint Estimation Tool (CFET) (Melanta 
et al. 2013). CFET takes a more holistic approach than the earlier tools, accounting for 
not only emissions from equipment use, but also emissions from materials, the impact of 
deforestation, and potential offsets due to reforestation efforts. These tools provide an 
estimate of GHG emissions for a given input. They are not intended for use in equipment 
choice.  
To obtain an optimal equipment choice using such a tool, one would need to 
consider every possible, feasible combination of inputs and then choose the combination 
which results in a best compromise solution in terms of emissions and cost. The tool 
would be applied only to measure the emissions that would be produced for any given 
combination. Enormous computational effort would be required to enumerate all 
combinations. Consider the case study discussed in the Practical Application Section 
herein. With 26 time periods, 55 work activities, and between 4 and 44 pieces of 
equipment that can be assigned to each activity, there would be 39,000 initial 
combinations and the factorial of 39,000 solutions that would need to be considered. This 
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number of potential solutions is so large that it cannot even be computed on a calculator, 
let along generated. Moreover, the feasibility of each of these solutions would need to be 
evaluated and each feasible solution would need to be entered as input to such a tool to 
produce an estimate of emissions production for the given input. The cost of the option 
would be evaluated separately. Trade-offs between options could be assessed manually. 
The methodology proposed herein eliminates the need for such a complete and 
unfathomable enumeration and manual manipulation of output.  
2.2.2 Equipment Selection in Construction 
 
Selection of equipment is typically made by matching equipment in a fleet with tasks.  
Such matching accounts for equipment productivity, equipment capacity and cost (see 
Glansberg et al. 2006, for example). More sophisticated decision tools that rely on 
optimization methodologies for equipment selection have been proposed in the literature 
since the 1970s. An overview of such techniques can be found in (Glansberg et al. 2006).  
 Optimization models have been proposed for equipment selection for specific 
construction activities. For example, Peurifoy (2002) proposed a mathematical model that 
seeks an equipment selection for hauling loads that maximizes equipment productivity at 
a given point in time. Phelps (1977) similarly considered productivity maximization in 
the context of cut and fill; although, Phelps considered decision-making over a time 
duration. Shapira and Goldenberg (2005) proposed the use of the analytical hierarchy 
process (AHP) to capture human preferences in construction equipment selection. Similar 
AHP-based approaches have been suggested in (Cheung et al. 2001; Hastak and Halpin 
2000; and Skibniewski and Chao 1992). While optimization has also been employed in 
equipment purchasing or replacement, the authors know of no works in the literature that 
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propose decision support through optimization in equipment selection over an entire 
construction project. Such an optimization approach supports efficient and objective 
decision-making. Neither could any prior work that considers emissions in equipment 
selection be found. This chapter seeks to fill this gap. 
There is agreement about the need to reduce emissions from construction efforts 
(EPA 2005b). A myriad of programs exist to support efforts to make such reductions, and 
additional strategies have been proposed for reducing emissions from equipment use and 
materials production. Moreover, a host of calculators have been developed for assessing 
emissions from construction projects. However, it appears that no tools exist to aid 
contractors in making optimal construction management plans with the goal of reducing 
emissions while minimizing the impact on costs.  
2.3 Mathematical Model and Solution 
 
A multi-period, bi-objective, linear, integer program is presented for the OESP. The 
objective is to choose equipment from a pool of available equipment for each stage of a 
construction project so as to meet task, regulatory and temporal requirements while 
minimizing the total cost of equipment from ownership and operation, rental, lease or 
purchase and emissions abatement over the project’s duration. The construction period is 
considered at a set S of discrete times t={t0+n}, where n=0,1,2,…,I.  may be any 
increment of time, e.g., one minute, hour, day, week, or even longer. It should be noted 
that the number of selected pieces of equipment should be based on the specified amount 
of work that needs to be completed in each period t.  
Many states have begun to require contractors working on large state roadway 
construction projects to ensure their equipment fleet follow the EPA’s Non-road Diesel 
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Engine Tier System. The designation of a tier to a particular piece of equipment is a 
function of fuel-usage type, engine efficiency (horse power and year of production), and 
whether or not the equipment has been retrofitted to reduce emissions. Also, many 
federal projects recommend guidelines for construction fleets, based on the EPA Tier 
System classification, to encourage emissions reduction from equipment usage. For 
example, Maryland’s requirements associated with the ICC case study described in the 
next section (herein referred to as the Tier System Guidelines) specify that no more than 
a small percentage of all equipment present on the construction site fall under one of 
several tiers associated with high rates of emissions. The mix given as a percentage of 
equipment located on site at any point in time permitted within each predesignated tier is 
described in Table 2-1, where the highest tier, Tier 3, includes the least emissive 
equipment. These Tier System requirements are included within the proposed model. For 
other locations these percentages can be modified according to EPA guidelines or based 
on any other policies or regulations. 
Table 2-1. Maryland’s Tier System Guidelines for Equipment on Construction Sites 
EPA Tier Equipment limitations by percentage on site 
Tier 0 must not exceed 10% 
Tier 1 must not exceed 70% (combined with Tier 0) 
Tier 2 must not exceed 90% (combined with Tiers 0 and 1) 
Tier 3 must be no less than 10% 
 
2.4 The Model 
Notation  
Additional notation employed in the mathematical formulation of the OESP are defined 
next. 
A = set of activities, i, to be completed 
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X = {0,1,2,3}, the set of tier levels 
Y = set of equipment types (e.g., excavators, tractors, loaders) 
Yi = subset of equipment in Y that can be used for activity iA,  Yi  Y.  
Yi
C 
= subset of equipment in Y compatible with equipment in Yi, iA,  Yi
C
 Y.  
Nt = number of pieces of equipment permitted on site in each period t S. 
xyc  = 
cost of operating (renting, leasing or owning) each type of equipment yY 
in tier xX. 
itV  = 
amount of work (in terms distance, surface area, volume, or weight, 
depending on the activity) associated with task iA, that must be 
completed in period t 
wt = number of working days in period tS 
yv  = daily capacity of work that can be completed by equipment type yY, 
computed as a function of cycle time (time period required by piece of 
equipment to complete task and return to its original position). 
itD  = calculated or assigned duration of task iA,  in period tS 
xyg  = GHG emissions rate for equipment type yY, in tier xX, expressed in 
CO2e 
xytP  = 
quantity of available equipment of type yY, belonging to tier xX, in 
period tS 
f = leniency factor for each Nt assumed constant over all tS 
q = adjustment factor for equipment compatibility, limits differences in 
capacities of equipment that must operate together for any task 
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βt = discounting factor for inflation by period tS 
   
Decision variables 
xyt  = quantity of equipment of type y, yY, belonging to tier x, xX, to be used 
during period tS 
 
Formulation OESP 
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yt xyt3 1.0      tS      (2-11) 
xyt  
+     
tS, xX, yY  (2-12) 
 
The OESP contains two objectives. The first, objective (2-1a), seeks the selection 
of equipment so as to minimize the total cost associated with completing the construction 
tasks over the construction period. The second, objective (2-1b), aims to minimize 
emissions in terms of CO2e released during the construction's duration. The functional 
constraints of the model fall into two general categories: those that address construction 
activity requirements and those that address emissions regulations. 
Equipment availability for project use through a construction firm’s fleet or local 
rental or leasing office stocks is enforced through constraints (2-2). Workload 
requirements are enforced through constraints (2-3) and (2-4). Constraints (2-3) ensure 
that equipment is selected for a given period so as to guarantee that all work required for 
the given activities can be completed. To illustrate, consider a specific task involving cut 
and fill that requires soil compaction. Thus, the equipment to be assigned to complete this 
work must be chosen so that the total capacity of the equipment in terms of an ability to 
cover the required surface area exceeds the amount of work associated with the 
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compaction activity for the period. Constraints (2-4) ensure that selected equipment can 
efficiently handle the activities to be accomplished in a specified duration. Note that each 
piece of equipment has its own work rate (productivity rate) that is a function of its 
horsepower and other technical characteristics, as well as conditions associated with the 
site, including soil type, elevation, and weather. Constraints (2-5) and (2-6) ensure 
compatibility between chosen equipment pieces in terms of productivity and ability that 
are paired for the completion of specific tasks. These constraints limit the difference in 
the capacities of equipment to be operated together. They apply, for example, where a 
loader is paired with a truck: a loader to move dirt or other materials into a vessel and a 
truck to act as the vessel to move the material within or off the site. The effect of cycle 
time difference between such paired equipment must be considered and is handled in the 
constraints accordingly. The total number of pieces of equipment in the construction site 
during a given period must be restricted so as to permit sufficient working space within a 
construction site. This restriction is satisfied through the inclusion of constraints (2-7). A 
leniency factor f allows for a small increase in Nt for any tS and is set to a value greater 
than one as desired. Constraints (2-8) through (2-11) apply the Tier System Guidelines. 
Integrality constraints are given in (2-12). 
Ideally, a single solution would simultaneously satisfy the cost and emissions 
objectives of the OESP. However, as these objectives are conflicting in nature, it is not 
likely that such an ideal solution will exist. Thus, the set of non-inferior solutions can be 
generated, where no solution exists that is better than a non-inferior solution in terms of 
both objectives simultaneously. This set of non-inferior solutions is often referred to as 
the set of Pareto-optimal solutions and can be plotted on a graph with x-y coordinates 
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corresponding to each objective to show the Pareto-frontier.  
Numerous methods exist to generate the Pareto-frontier. In this chapter, a 
weighting method is employed whereby the objectives are combined (and weighted) so as 
to reduce the problem to a single objective MIP that can be solved using off-the-shelf 
optimization software. Specifically, objectives (2-1a) and (2-1b) are replaced by new 











xytxyttxy gwcccMin  .    (2-1') 
 Since objectives (2-1a) and (2-1b) are not in common units, a conversion factor, 
tcc  is applied to change emissions to a monetary value
2
. 
tcc  is an assumed value for the 
price set for one MT of carbon in time period t  in a carbon market. Objective (2-1') 
assumes a linear preference function. Each component is weighted by   (or 1 ), 
where 10  . When   is set to 1, only the cost objective is considered. Likewise, 
when it is set to zero, only the emissions objective is active. By varying the value of   
over its range and solving the resulting MIPs, the Pareto-frontier can be identified. 
Alternatively, a decision-maker can set   as a function of preference for one component 
over the other and solve the MIP only once to generate a preferred solution. Generation 
of the entire frontier aids decision-makers in evaluating trade-offs between the objectives. 
This can also be particularly helpful when a decision-maker is uncertain as to how to set 
the weights either due to lack of certainty in preference for one objective over the other or 
how to set the weights so as to reflect his/her preference. 
 In generating the Pareto-frontier by a weighting method, an appropriate increment 
                                                 
2
 The cost term is added in the emissions minimization objective to allow cost tradeoff analyses between 
objectives, where one cost increases if another cost is lowered, as suggested by WebFinance (2013) and 
Flanagan (2010).  
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for adjusting   from one run to the next must be chosen. In applying this technique 
herein, solutions are plotted as they are derived and the increment is adjusted so as to fill 
in voids such that the Pareto-frontier is fully visualized. Thus, some portions of the curve 
may be developed through coarser analyses, while other portions may be developed from 
very fine increments. 
 A second method is considered for approaching the OESP in which only the cost 
objective (2-1a) is included and the emissions objective (2-1b) is reformulated as a 
constraint. The objective here is merely to minimize cost from the selection of 







    tS ,    (2-13) 
where tG  is a cap on GHG emissions expressed in CO2 equivalents (CO2e) for period t, 
tS. The use of CO2 equivalents is aligned with recommendations of the International 
Panel of Climate Change. 100 year global warming potentials (GWPs) were employed 
herein for expressing individual GHGs in this common metric (IPCC, 2007; EPA, 2005a 
for more information on GWPs). Such a cap would be set to be consistent with existing 
emissions regulations (e.g., a carbon cap) or policies. Thus, (2-1) is replaced by its 











xytxycMin   subject to constraints (2-2)-(2-13). This 
constrained-version of formulation (OESP) (i.e. constrained-OESP) can be solved 
directly. Alternatively, one might consider generating solutions over a wide array of 
values of Gt. A comparison of solutions in which constraints (2-13) are binding for one or 
more time periods can provide additional insight.  
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In summary, the proposed decision models require input related to the amount of 
work for each type of activity, daily capacity of available equipment pieces, list of 
construction equipment available for use on the project, time duration available for each 
activity, equipment compatibility, equipment suitability for tasks, operational and 
maintenance costs by equipment type and tier, and specifications to enable assignment of 
equipment to tier-level. The emission rate per equipment piece must be obtained next. As 
described in the following section, these rates can be computed (formulae (2-14) and (2-
15)). These data can be stored in a spreadsheet. The models can be replicated for the 
specific application in an off-the-shelf optimization software product, such as CPLEX or 
Xpress, and runs can be conducted as necessary to produce the Pareto-frontier. 
Description of this procedure and the process of choosing from among Pareto-optimal 
solutions, as demonstrated on a real-world case study, is provided in the following 
section.  
2.5 Practical Application 
2.5.1 Case Study Design 
 
The proposed problem formulation and solution approach is illustrated on a case study 
involving a 7.2-mile segment (known as Contract A) of an 18-mile roadway named the 
ICC. The case study is designed to demonstrate the utility and potential benefits of the 
proposed methodology.  
Contract A broke ground in November of 2007. Data from the period of 
November of 2007 through January of 2010 was provided for use in this study. The time 
period was broken into one-month intervals for |S|=26. A list of data provided by the 
contractor for conducting the case study analysis is given in Table 2-2.  
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Table 2-2. Information Provided by Contractor 
Data Type Details of Included Information  
Gantt chart: Percent completion and duration of tasks 
Quantities of materials 
used: 
Provided data was categorized by structure type such as: substructure, 
bridge girder and superstructure concrete; graded aggregate base 
course; miscellaneous aggregate hot mix asphalt pavement; steel 
girders and reinforcing steel; pipes 
On-site equipment list: 




The equipment assignment for major tasks completion were specified 
by general categories, such as articulated trucks, crawler loaders, 
wheel loaders, excavators, cranes, compactors, etc. 
Major tasks: 
Clearing and grubbing; earthwork cut and fill; installation of piles and 
retaining walls; placement of substructure concrete, steel/concrete 
bridge girders, superstructure concrete, and reinforcing steel, culverts, 
culvert wing-walls/headwalls, water/sewer pipes, drainage pipes,  
structures, and noise walls 
 
In addition to the information supplied by Contract A, numerous calculations and 
assumptions were required. Specifically, equipment cycle times and, thus, the amount of 
work each piece of available equipment could complete in a given day were estimated 
from equipment specifications assuming 75% “duty days” and eight-hour workdays. The 
amount of work to be completed in each work category was calculated from provided 
total work estimates prior knowledge of construction processes, categories of equipment 
assigned to task, and equipment productivity. The productivity of each piece of 
equipment when employed on a particular task depends in part on its cycle time, which is 
a function of its speed and the distance over which it must work. Equipment cycle times 
are subject to many factors, such as soil properties, water content, geographic location, 
and rolling resistance. Since this information was not provided by the contractors, 
estimates were made. Estimation of the work required to complete cut and fill tasks 
illustrates the procedures used. Articulated trucks, excavators, smooth drum rollers, track 
loaders, compactors, dozers, and scrapers were assigned to this task in Contract A. It was 
presumed that the articulated trucks are used to move the entire volume of soil from cut 
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areas to fill areas. Excavators and loaders are employed in loosening and loading soil, 
respectively. Assuming that the quantity of soil to be cut is equivalent to the quantity to 
be filled, the amount of work supported by compactors and rollers in this stage of the 
project is assumed to be half of the surface area of the project. Given the local terrain and 
its impact on maneuverability, scrapers were assumed to conduct their work over 40% of 
the project area. Dozers serve in leveling the project area and loosening the soil for 
loaders. It was assumed that half of the cut volume of soil is handled by dozers. Thus, the 
amount of soil to be moved, the types of equipment involved in completing the move, 
and the area over which the activity takes place are predicted. With this knowledge and 
information pertaining to the characteristics of available equipment, cycle times and 
ultimately productivity can be estimated. 
Similar estimates were made to capture other activities on the construction site. 
For example, the number of trees that needed removal during the clearing and grubbing 
phase was discerned from information available through the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (Zhu 1994), where the average forest density mapping is provided by region. 
An average tree diameter was assumed based on the forest type and age. Tonnage of trees 
to be removed was thus assessed from forest density and expected tree weights. Work (in 
terms of volume) required to cut and move these trees was approximated based on 
presumed types of equipment that would be involved in these processes.  
In an application of the proposed methodology to such a construction project, 
more accurate information pertaining to the required amount of work for each task is 




The types of equipment that can be used for a given task were specified based on 
field experience. Work completed by each piece of equipment will produce emissions. To 
estimate daily emissions of CO, CO2, CH4, NOx, and SOx by equipment piece, the EPA's 
formula (2-14) for emissions calculation was used.  
EmissionsGHG = AF × Power × Load Factor × Activity hours per day × Emission 
FactorGHG,  for GHG ϵ {CO, CO2, CH4, NOx, SOx},  (2-14) 
where 
AF: adjustment factor 
Power: by equipment, in horsepower 
Load Factor: measure of equipment efficiency 
Activity hours: assumed to be 6 hours per day 
Emission Factor: Amount in emissions in grams per horsepower per hour; 
sources: EPA 2001; DieselNet 2010; Lewis 2009 
An adjustment factor of 0.85 is employed here to account for inaccuracies in load 
factor and fuel type. This value was chosen so as to reflect recent reductions in the sulfur 
content of diesel fuel and inaccuracies in estimates of load factors. The load factors were 
obtained from (EPA 2004); however, more accurate values can be obtained from the 
manufacturer. Likewise, Contract A uses low-sulfur diesel only; however, formula (2-14) 
presumes the use of more emissive regular diesel. Emission data collected from 
equipment use in prior projects or from information supplied in equipment performance 
handbooks can be employed in daily emissions estimation for equipment usage and 
emission factor setting.  
For CO, CH4, NOx, and SOx, the emission factors were obtained directly from 
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the EPA (2004). An emission factor is not provided in relation to CO2; however, a 
formula (2-15) for its computation, based on brake-specific fuel consumption (BSFC), is 
provided in (EPA, 2005a). One will note that hydrocarbon (HC) emissions are removed 
to avoid their being double counted, as they include CH4.  
Emission FactorCO2 = (BSFC×453.6-HC)×0.87×(44/12),   (2-15) 
where 
BSFC: fuel consumption in lb/hp-hr 
453.6: conversion factor from pounds to grams 
HC: in-use adjusted hydrocarbon emissions in g/hp-hr 
0.87: carbon mass fraction of gasoline and diesel fuel 
44/12: ratio of CO2 mass to carbon mass 
To illustrate, consider a Tier 2 excavator with 128 horsepower manufactured by 
Caterpillar (model 320CL). To determine the total emissions in terms of CO2e per 
workday using one such excavator, the following computations can be made. The Cat 
Performance Handbook indicates that this equipment model consumes five gallons of 
fuel per hour of medium-level work. The EPA NONROAD suggests using a BSFC equal 
to 0.367 (EPA 2005a) for a power rating between 100 and 175 horsepower. Alternatively, 
one can calculate the BSFC (NASA 2008) specific to this piece of equipment. Assuming 
each gallon of fuel weighs seven pounds, the BSFC is calculated as 5×7/128 = 0.2734. 
The HC value for non-road engines can be set to 0.15 g/hp-hr (DieselNet 2010). By 
equation (2-15), using the exact calculation for BSFC, Emission Factor CO2 is 395.2 g/hp-
h for this equipment model. Equation (2-14) can then be applied to obtain the total 
emissions of CO2. This equation involves an adjustment factor, AF, which is assumed to 
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be 85% based on the relative emission rates of the three most likely used fuels (petroleum 
gasoline, petroleum diesel and soybean biodiesel) and a 4% safety factor (AFDC 2011). 
With this information, along with a 0.59 load factor for this piece of equipment (EPA 
2004) and an assumed six hour duty day (75% duty day of eight hour workday),  
EmissionsCO2 is estimated at 0.15 tons per day. Similar computations can be completed to 
obtain the total amount of emissions of other GHGs for a six hour duty day of this 
equipment model. EmissionsCO of 0.0014 tons/day, (with Emission FactorCO = 3.7 g/hp-
h), EmissionsCH4 of 0.000058 tons/day (with Emission FactorCH4 = 0.15 g/hp-h), and 
EmissionsNOx of 0.001 tons/day (with Emission FactorNOx = 2.85 g/hp-h) are found. SOx 
emissions are negligible and are omitted. Given global warming potentials for CO of 3, 
CH4 of 21 and NOx of 310, the total CO2e emissions sums to 0.498 tons/day. Similar 
calculations must be computed for each equipment model.  
Other categories for which calculations were made or approximation schemes 
were devised are listed in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3. Additional Information Used as Model Input Not Provided by Contractor 
Data Type Details of Information 
Amount of work to be 
completed by each type of 
equipment: 
Based on assignment of equipment types to task types and 
construction stages for each task. 
Assignment of specific 
equipment to tasks: 
Based on assignment of equipment types to task types and specific 
capabilities of equipment. 
Compatibility of 
equipment: 
This is a daily capacity difference between coupled equipment that 
need to be operated together for task completion which is set to be 
less than 10%. 
Cost for equipment by 
tier:  
For a given piece of equipment,  the cost of equipment falling 
within Tiers 0, 1 and 3 are assumed to be 15% less expensive, 10% 
less expensive and 20% more expensive than the same equipment 









tG  tG  is set for 
each period to vary over the construction period according to a beta 
distribution, ~β(A, B, p, q) (p>0,q>0, A<B), with p=2, q=1.2, A=0, 
and B=1.2.  
Total number of 
equipment pieces allowed 
on site simultaneously:  
This value was set based on actual number of pieces on site in each 
period. 
Equipment productivity: 
Set based on known capacities and estimated cycle times, where 
cycle time estimates are based on the roadway profile where 
appropriate and equipment characteristics; an average productivity 
was computed over all time periods based on required travel 
distances per period. 
 
As it is possible for the contractor to use equipment from his/her own fleet or to 
purchase, rent or lease equipment externally, it was assumed that all equipment listed on 
the supplied list of on-site equipment was available for every tier level. Ownership and 
operating expenses for equipment were set based on information available from the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers for Region II (Hill 2009).  
The price for CO2e (i.e. carbon credit) used herein is based loosely on the carbon 
price on the Chicago Climate Exchange, one of the best organized carbon markets in the 
U.S. The price ranges between pennies and a few dollars per MT of carbon credit. Carbon 
price on this market reflects the amount a company or individual might be willing to pay 
on a voluntary basis, since carbon allowances are not currently imposed within the U.S. 
Assuming that once carbon allowances are enforced the carbon price will rise steeply, 
and given that the price is close to $30/MT in Europe where carbon allowances exist in 
certain sectors, in this case study, three values are used for the price of carbon on a 
carbon market: $5/MT, $30/MT and $50/MT. $50/MT is considered because economists 
estimate that this price is required to pay for 65% emission reductions to be reached by 
2030 in developing countries (World Bank 2010). 
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2.5.2 Case Study Results and Analysis 
 
The problem once formulated was solved with EXPRESS-MP running on a desktop with 
2.27 GHz Intel Duo Core CPU P8400, 3.00 GB of RAM on a 32 bit Windows 7 operating 
system. Ω was set between 0 and 1 in 5% increments, generating 25 problem instances. 
The component objective function values were plotted against each other to produce the 
Pareto-frontier. Typical runs of EXPRESS required approximately 35 minutes in real-
time. Problem instances contained approximately 12,000 variables. An optimality gap of 
0.35% was permitted, consistent with recommendations to solve to within 5% of 
optimality. The resulting Pareto-frontier is visualized in Figures 2-1 (left) and 2 for each 
setting of the cost of one MT of carbon credit.  
 It can be seen from the figures that significant reductions in emissions are 
expected through intelligent selection of construction equipment for use in completing 
project tasks. Figure 2-1 (left) shows that at a cost of $5 per MT of CO2e, a dramatic 
improvement in emissions can result from a modest increase in equipment usage costs. 
For instance, when   is decreased from 0.1 to 0.08, the equipment cost increases by just 
over $312,000 (approximately 4.7%). For this increase in equipment cost, a reduction by 
28% in emissions (and its associated cost) can be obtained. Similar efficiencies are noted 





Figure 2-1: Pareto-Frontier (left) and Cost from Equipment and Emissions (right) 




Figure 2-2: Pareto-Frontier for CO2e at $30/MT (left) and for CO2e at $50/MT 
(right) 
 
Figure 2-1 (right) depicts the relationship between the Ω setting and objective 
function value. Little if any change in the objective function occurs between Ω = 1 and Ω 
= 0.1. This implies that there is little if any change in the solution for Ω in this range. As 
Ω is reduced below 0.1 (the cost of emissions is given more weight), there is a steep 
change in curvature of the line, indicating a significant change in equipment selection.  
An estimate of emissions at 160,000 MTs of CO2e produced from equipment use 
in Contract A over the study period was made based on the number of days each piece of 
equipment in the on-site equipment list spent on site, number of assumed working hours 
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per day and emissions rate per equipment type. This estimate was used to create the 
initial settings for 
tG  for each tS in (2-13) of the (constrained-OESP) formulation. 
Solution of this formulation was obtained and the objective function value (i.e. equipment 
cost) was plotted against a reduced
St
tG . That is, to show how more restrictive cap 
values affect the optimal solution, the value of the sum of 
tG  over all tS was reduced 
from its initial value, assumed at 160,000 MTs over the entire time horizon. The resulting 
cost from equipment is plotted against the reduced values of
St
tG . This is depicted in 
Figure 2-3, where the x-axis indicates the relative value (in terms of percentage decrease) 
of 
St
tG  with respect to its initial value. X% on the x-axis refers to an X% reduction in 

St
tG  from the initial 
St
tG of 160,000 MTs. A percentage emissions reduction of 80%, 
for example, corresponds with a value for 
St
tG of 32,000 MTs (a reduction of 128,000 
MTs).  As indicated in the figure, 
St
tG can be reduced substantially before a notable 
increase in equipment cost arises. This confirms that constraints (2-13) are not binding at 
the initial 
St
tG value. In fact, if constraint (2-13) is binding for any particular time 
period t, when the associated 
tG  is reduced, the problem will be infeasible. At 
approximately 78% of the initial 
St
tG value, equipment cost begins to rise sharply to 
comply with this constraint. When set even lower, it becomes difficult to comply with the 
constraint at any cost, as indicated by the nearly vertical line beginning at an x-axis value 




Figure 2-3: Impact on Equipment Cost of Reduced Emissions Cap 
 
 Figure 2-3 also shows how an industry might set a reasonable cap for a given 
project. In the case of the ICC, the cap might be set in the range of 80-85% of the initial 

St
tG  value. Moreover, if the estimated initial 
St
tG value accurately reflects emissions 
as a result of equipment use in the project (recall that it was assumed that equipment on 
site was in use 6 hours per day, 7 days per week), one will note that for a very small 
equipment cost increase, a very significant improvement in emissions reductions can be 
achieved. 
 To illustrate the potential impact in terms of emissions prevented and choice of 
equipment that results from the use of the proposed methodology, equipment plans 
generated through solution of the OESP with Ω = 1, 0.9, 0.1, and 0 are compared for 
tcc  
of $5 at a single select time interval, t = 21. These results are compared in Tables 2-4 
through 2-6. 
Results given in Table 2-4 indicate that when cost is the only consideration (i.e. 
 =1), few pieces of equipment from the top tier are selected, i.e. the minimum required 
to meet Tier System constraints (2-8 to 2-11). When emissions are the only consideration 
(i.e.  =0), and cost is of no consequence, all equipment are chosen to be in the top tier 
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(Tier 3). While little difference in number of equipment pieces in each tier level is noted 
for   at 0.1 as at 1, there are changes in equipment within a category as shown in Table 
2-5. For example, within the Off-Highway Trucks category, there is a change from 14 
“ArtA335D” selected when  =1 to 13 “Art730s” and three “ArtA35Ds” when  =0.1. 
These fall under the same tier level. Additionally, there are changes in tier level, as is the 
case in the Dozers category. 11 Tier 1 equipment pieces are selected when  =1, while 
11 similar pieces of equipment that fall under Tiers 2 and 3 are selected when  =0.1. 
Appendix provides information associated with t=21 that supports these conclusions. 
Table 2-4. Number of Equipment Pieces Assigned by Tier for t=21and varying 
objective function weights (Ω) 
Tier Ω=1 Ω=0.9 Ω=0.1 Ω=0 
0 7  7 7 0 
1 43 43 44 0 
2 14 14 15 0 
3 8 8 8 77 
Total 72 72 74 77 
 
Table 2-5. Number of Equipment Pieces Assigned by Equipment Type and Category 
for t= 21 by varying objective function weights (Ω) 
Equipment Category Equipment ID Ω=1 Ω=0.9 Ω=0.1 Ω=0 
Off-Highway Trucks: 
ArtA35D 14 14 3 0 
ArtT730 0 0 13 17 
Graders: Com815F 1 1 1 1 





DozD65 0 0 0 11 
Doz650J 1 1 0 0 
DozD5GLGP 2 2 3 0 
DozD6N 7 7 7 0 
Ex315CL 1 1 1 1 
Excavators: 
Ex330CL 0 0 0 5 
Ex345CL 4 4 4 0 
Ex325DL 0 0 0 1 
Forklifts: Fork10054 6 6 6 6 
Tractors/Loaders/Backhoes: 
L410J 2 2 2 2 
L644G 4 4 4 4 
 
Rol50 2 2 2 0 
Rol66 0 0 0 11 
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Rollers: RolSD100D 11 11 11 0 
RolSD110D 0 0 0 1 
Scrapers: Scrap621G 9 9 9 9 
Skid Steer Loaders: Skid460D 1 1 1 1 
Other Construction Equipment: ConcF4800 1 1 1 1 
Other Material Handling Equipment: 
FB643J 1 1 1 1 
HB260HP 1 1 1 1 
Other General Industrial Equipment: TGrind6600 1 1 1 1 
Total 72 72 74 77 
 
From Table 2-6 it can be seen that at a carbon price of $5/MT, over $3 million (a 
50% increase) is incurred in excess costs in selecting the optimal equipment with 
consideration only for emissions (i.e. Ω = 0). A more modest increase (of a bit over 
$64,000) is incurred when cost is given small weight, i.e. when Ω = 0.1. It can also be 
noted that when funds are expended on more efficient (high tier) equipment, the cost 
from emissions in the objective function decreases.  
Table 2-6. Cost Comparison for varying objective function weight (Ω) for a Carbon 
Price of $5/MT 
Weight Ω Equipment Cost Emissions Cost Total 
Ω=1 $6,641,602  $123,384  $6,764,986  
Ω=0.9 $6,642,333 $123,196 $6,765,529  
Ω=0.1 $6,720,404  $108,946  $6,829,351  
Ω=0 $10,008,880  $57,449  $10,066,329  
Ω=0.9 vs. Ω=1 $731  $(187) $543  
Ω=0.1 vs. Ω=1 $78,802  $(14,437) $64,365  
Ω=0 vs. Ω=1 $3,367,277  $(65,935) $3,301,343  
 
The percentage increase in cost and reduction in estimated actual emissions that 
result from considering the cost of emissions in the objective function can also be derived 
from the results. For a 0.95% increase in total cost from equipment, a savings of 12% in 
emissions can be achieved given Ω set to 0.1. Likewise, for a 51% increase in equipment 
cost, a reduction in emissions by 53% can be achieved given Ω set to 0.  
To demonstrate that the model produces feasible assignments of equipment to 
time periods, a quick validation of some of the computations is completed. Consider cut 
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and fill activities in time period 21. The data supplied by the contractor indicates that 
there is a need for a total of 216,731 cubic yards of earthwork. This activity requires 
cutting of the soil so that it can be moved. This task is undertaken by dozers. Solution of 
the mathematical program for Ω = 1 as given in Table 2-5 indicates that 10 dozers of 
three different types (Doz650J, DozD5GLGP and DozD6N) should be assigned to this 
task. The first of these dozer types has a productivity rate of 524 cubic yards/day, while 
the second and third types have rates of 551 cubic yards/day and 1008 cubic yards/day. 
These rates are computed from cycle times and blade sizes. Consider period 21 with 
duration of one month or 25 working days. The total work that can be completed by these 
10 dozers is 217,035 cubic yards. This exceeds the required 216,731 cubic yards.  
Similar computations for different settings of Ω result in similarly satisfactory 
equipment choices. For example, when Ω is set to 0.1, the model selects 10 dozers of 
types: DozD5GLGP and DozD6N. This selection of dozers can support an estimated 
217,710 cubic yards of work in the one month period. When Ω is set to 0, 11 dozers of 
type DozD65 with daily productivity rates of 796 cubic yards/day are selected, enabling 
completion of 218,790 cubic yards of work in the given month. 
Note from Table 2-A that for Ω = 1 or 0.1, all selected dozers fall into Tier 1; 
however, for Ω = 0 (i.e. the objective is to choose the most environmentally favorable 
equipment), Tier 3 dozers were selected. Again, to assess the validity of decisions 
suggested by the model, consider the emissions rates of these equipment pieces. Doz650J 
and DozD5GLGP produce 0.7 tons/day. DozD6N produces 1.16 tons/day. Finally, 
DozD65 produces 0.25 tons/day. Costs per month for these pieces are: $4,724/month, 
$5,129/month $8,922/month and $10,800/month, respectively. Note that as the emissions 
 48 
 
rates decrease, the monthly cost for use of the equipment increases. With decreasing Ω, 
we see the contribution to emissions due to dozer use decreases from 128.98 tons/month 
to 69.41 tons/month, while the cost increases from $77,436/month to $158,400/month. As 
there are 70 different equipment pieces available for use in this construction project, and 
each piece is unique in terms of its tier ranking, cost of use, and productivity, the 
selection of the optimal set of equipment for use in each period is complicated. The 




Solution of the proposed mathematical formulation provides an optimal choice of 
equipment to be used in each period of a construction project. It further aids a contractor 
in deciding whether to buy, lease or rent equipment for the project. It relies on data that is 
readily available for any moderate to large construction job. Output of the model can help 
contractors in quantifying the potential value in terms of costs to meet environmental 
standards or identify requirements for investment in new equipment to reduce project 
emissions. Also, by including equipment that can be rented or leased in the pool of 
possible equipment for selection, the tool aids in decisions related to augmentation of an 
equipment fleet through renting or leasing. Costs considered in the objective function of 
formulation (OESP) can account for changes in cost as a function of purchase price, 
depreciation, terms of lease, rental prices, and tax regulations. 
Delays in task completion may result as a consequence of unforeseeable 
circumstances, such as inclement weather. Such delays adversely affect project length. 
Through solution of the mathematical formulation using updated task durations, the 
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proposed methodology provides optimal equipment selection for future time periods so as 
to reduce the impact of the delays. The viability (and cost) of shortening the project’s 
duration so as to obtain a bonus for early completion can also be evaluated. 
While all bids must show that designated requirements regarding the environment 
in the call for proposals are met, rarely is environmental impact considered in choosing 
the winning bid. The proposed decision tool permits a contractor to develop an 
equipment-usage plan that adheres to current and future environmental regulations that 
might affect construction, including the EPA’s Non-road Diesel Engine Tier System, and 
possible establishment of a carbon tax or cap and trade programs. Moreover, it aids 
contractors in trading off project cost, duration and resulting emissions in the 
development and proposal of construction bids, allowing green construction decisions. 
The tool will, likewise, enable state agencies to consider emissions in addition to project 
costs and duration in assessing bids.  
The proposed methodology can aid construction firms in maintaining profitability 
in a carbon regulated future by facilitating decisions aimed at meeting new regulations or 
reducing environmental impacts by making changes to its equipment fleet. This can also 
aid in better positioning a construction firm to receive government-provided incentives 
for environmental stewardship. Consideration of solutions to the OESP for a select 
project generated by setting Ω to its extreme values (i.e. 0 and 1) will provide policy 
makers with reasonable estimates of achievable emissions reductions, and an 
understanding of costs associated with emissions abatement. Likewise, in an emissions 
regulated future, solution of the (constrained-OESP) can facilitate a construction firm in 
determining the amount of money in terms of an acceptable carbon price for expanding 
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its carbon allowance through either the purchase of surplus carbon credits or by paying 
penalties for noncompliance. It may also be possible to profit from selling surplus 
allowances. Additional costs associated with producing such a surplus through equipment 
selection can also be assessed. Furthermore, this feature facilitates policy makers or 
contracting agencies in setting a reasonable cap for a given project.   
As public sentiment for reducing our carbon footprint continues to increase in 
popularity, it may be possible for companies employing environmentally friendly 
decision-making processes to attract and retain environmentally conscious clients. Thus, 
it can be profitable to meet or even surpass expectations of emissions regulations. 
Moreover, as new regulations are adopted, these companies will be poised to take a larger 
share of the market, as their less earth-friendly competitors are driven out of business.  
The optimization-based methodology proposed herein, therefore, aids the 






Table 2-A provides a list of selected equipment given by solution of the OESP with the 
given Ω. The number that precedes the equipment name indicates the equipment tier 
level. 
Table 2-A. Selected Equipment Quantities for t=21 for selected objective function 
weights (Ω) 
Ω=1 (and Ω=0.9) Ω=0.1 Ω=0 
Tier. ID         Quant. Tier. ID        Quant. Tier. ID       Quant. 
0.ArtA35D 3 0.ArtA35D 3 - 
0.Cr165TN 3 0.Cr165TN 3 - 
0.TGrind6600 1 0.TGrind6600 1 3.ArtT730 17 
1.ArtA35D 11 1.ArtT730 13 3.Com815F 1 
1.Com815F 1 1.ConcF4800 1 3.ConcF4800 1 
1.ConcF4800 1 1.DozD5GLGP 3 3.Cr165TN 3 
1.Doz650J 1 1.DozD6N 7 3.DozD65 11 
1.DozD5GLGP 2 1.Ex315CL 1 3.Ex315CL 1 
1.DozD6N 7 1.FB643J 1 3.Ex325DL 1 
1.Ex315CL 1 1.L410J 2 3.Ex330CL 5 
1.Ex345CL 4 1.L644G 4 3.FB643J 1 
1.FB643J 1 1.Rol50 2 3.Fork10054 6 
1.L644G 4 1.Scrap621G 9 3.HB260HP 1 
1.Scrap621G 9 1.Skid460D 1 3.L410J 2 
1.Skid460D 1 2.Com815F 1 3.L644G 4 
2.HB260HP 1 2.Ex345CL 4 3.Rol66 11 
2.L410J 2 2.HB260HP 1 3.RolSD110D 1 
2.RolSD100D 11 2.RolSD100D 9 3.Scrap621G 9 
3.Fork10054 6 3.Fork10054 6 3.Skid648G 1 





CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS FOR NATURAL 
GAS PIPELINE AND LNG SUPPLY NETWORK 




Natural gas, the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel, is expanding its market 
globally. To satisfy the growing demand for energy, the supply network of natural gas 
needs to be expanded. Network expansion requires huge financial investments. These are 
strategic investments and need a careful analysis. In natural gas markets some suppliers 
have better geographic and political positions than others, which makes them leaders and 
the rest of the market followers. In this chapter a decision-support model for strategic 
investments in natural gas network capacity expansions as a two-level leader-follower 
problem known as a Stackelberg game is developed, in which the lower-level is an 
equilibrium problem, which when combined with the upper-level problem is known as a 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Stackelberg games are 
widely used for analyses of regulations for an economy or a particular industry (Abou-
Kandil and Bertrand 1987; Bard 1998; Dimitriou et al. 2008; Jain et al. 2008). To 
illustrate the use of the model, a case study of a proposed natural gas supply pipeline 
from Russia to China is considered. Findings of the study suggest that current prices and 
market characteristics are not favorable for Russia (as a Stackelberg leader) to invest in 







Natural gas is the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel, which is expanding its share 
of consumption in global markets growing from 15% in 1965 to 24% in 2010. In terms of 
trillion cubic feet (Tcf), this is an increase from 23 Tcf to 104 Tcf (MIT 2010). Forecasts 
indicate further growth of demand in North American, Eurasian and Middle Eastern 
energy markets (Figure 3-1) (AGA 2008; EIA 2010a; MIT 2010). While pipeline 
infrastructure is aging and the need for energy in the world is growing, there is worldwide 
need for new pipelines and capacity expansions for existing pipelines and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) plants with supporting transportation vessels (ANL 2007; MIT 2010). 
Decision-making for these types of investment projects is challenging and sometimes 
includes issues of not only technical and financial feasibility, but also factors of political 
orientation and preferences (von Hirschhausen et al. 2005).  
  
     
Figure 3-1: North American (left) and Total World (right) Natural Gas 
Consumption. 
 
According to projections in the U.S. and Canada alone the range of investment 
varies between $133 and $210 billion in infrastructure over the next 20 years. This is 
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primarily based on increased domestic natural gas production from unconventional shale 
basins along with tight sands and the need to connect those to the existing pipeline 
network (Brown et al. 2010; Levell 2010; INGAA 2009). Studies in the area of the 
natural gas industry analyze the market from various perspectives such as maximizing 
profits or minimizing costs while meeting the demand in the market, or considering social 
welfare in addition to those analyses. In particular the World Gas Model (WGM) is a 
long-term, game theoretic model of global gas markets that has been used in such studies. 
The original model was developed for the North American market only (Gabriel et al. 
2005a, 2005b), which later was extended to a global version (Gabriel et al. 2012). WGM 
has a “Cournot coefficient” which allows having more sophisticated analyses by 
assigning market power to a particular player/s. Similar to WGM other widely recognized 
models related to natural gas market analysis that have some type of market power are 
GASMOD and GASTALE (Gabriel et al. 2010). GASMOD is a European gas market-
based game theoretic two-stage model where local producers decide how much to 
produce after exporters outside of Europe decide how much to import gas to Europe 
(Holz et al. 2006). GASTALE is also an equilibrium model for the European gas market 
that includes producers, transporters, storage, and consumers of natural gas where under 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium (Cournot competition) producers maximize their profits 
assuming that other regions will not affect their sales in consuming regions (Lise and 
Hobbs 2009). These specified models have endogenous data for capacity expansions, but 
none of these models takes into account the bi-level leader-follower approach for 
capacity expansion analyses, where the leader may decide on its capacity expansions and 




The model AMIGA, developed at Argonne National Laboratory and DePaul 
University, makes use of Lagrange multipliers, but does not include a leader-follower 
formulation so may not be appropriate to represent players in the model (Huntington 
2005). The model EUGAS depicts the European gas market while providing prices also 
for electricity generation (Perner and Seeliger 2003; Huntington 2005). It provides 
information about investments for the industry. This model is geographically specific and 
similar to other models discussed above, but does not supply information on a leader-
follower basis. The model GASCOM is a game theoretic model which provides specific 
information about the timing of pipeline construction. It is mostly limited to the area of 
Former Soviet Union (Huntington 2005). GASCOM is an equilibrium-based model and 
may not necessarily maximize a leader’s profits and is not formulated as such. Rice 
University developed a model for gas trade with large spatial coverage, but does not 
provide specific information about network expansion and moreover it is not formulated 
as a leader-follower problem and may not be used for leader’s profit maximization 
purposes (Huntington 2005). FRISBEE is another gas market model that provides 
information about gas prices including LNG. FRISBEE is not formulated to maximize a 
leader’s profits either (Aune et al. 2009). The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
developed the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) and SAGE models, which are 
used to produce the output for the Annual Energy Outlook report, but these models do not 
provide information about strategic investments from the leader’s perspective and do not 
maximize the leader’s profits (Huntington 2005). ICF developed the NANGAS model, 
which is a dynamic, linear program and provides information about pipeline expansion 
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and also provides information about carbon prices, but does not allow for market power 
(Gabriel et al. 2003; Huntington 2005). The equilibrium approach needs to be considered 
when modeling the natural gas industry (Huntington 2005). GaMMES model developed 
at Electricité de France (2011) is a generalized Nash-Cournot equilibrium model 
calibrated for the European gas market and considers the shale gas availability for 
European producers, but does not take into account the effect of the leader-follower 
relationship (Abada et al. 2011). 
Some studies had been conducted in electric power market analyses using an 
MPEC formulation. For instance, the decisions of an energy-producing leader firm for 
expansion investments were investigated while considering the stochastic production 
levels of follower firms (Wogrin et al. 2011). MPEC applications were applied to the 
energy market not only for network or capacity expansion purposes, but also for a pricing 
and bidding purposes. In that problem each firm submits bids to an ISO for profit 
maximization by taking into account decisions made by rival firms (Hobbs et al. 2000). 
This is an important aspect for strategic investment analyses that allows for considering 
the effect of leader’s decision on the rest of the gas market. Kazempour et al. (2011) used 
an MPEC approach for strategic investment decision making for electricity generation.  
Murphy and Smeers (2005) used various approaches including MPEC formulation for 
investment decisions for electricity generation where the first stage considered 
investments for expansion and the second stage of the problem was a production level 
analysis (Murphy and Smeers 2005). Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981) discussed 
solution methods for MPECs using the disjunctive nature of complementarily slackness 
conditions (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981). Other MPEC models for the power sector 
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were formulated by Gabriel et al. (2009) where the authors described a Benders 
Decomposition approach for solving discretely constrained MPECs with application to 
the power sector. A similar method was implemented in addition to a heuristic approach 
by de la Torre et al. (2007) where a three-level problem was solved for bidding decisions 
in the power sector. Baumrucker (2009) presented pipeline operational cost minimization 
problem, formulated as an MPEC structured for nitrogen and hydrogen gas pipelines. The 
work also indicated the differences with natural gas pipelines. The major difference of 
these networks was identified to be the multiple branching, while for natural gas the 
pipeline does not consider such technical issues. There are many more models dedicated 
to MPEC formulations for the power sector, but are not presented here (e.g., Su 2005; 
Yao et al. 2008; Gabriel and Leuthold 2010),  
In this chapter we develop a model for natural gas network capacity expansions as 
a two-level leader-follower problem known as a Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg 
2011), in which the lower-level is an equilibrium (complementarity) problem, which 
when combined with the upper-level is known as a mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Previously Stackelberg games have been applied to gas 
markets by De Wolf and Smeers (1997) where the authors discussed the European gas 
market to illustrate the effect of using such an approach, although it was dedicated to 
decision-making for production levels only. The current work considers the effect of 
network expansion in addition to production levels for a multi-period time horizon.  
MPECs are more general than bi-level optimization programs, but with different 
objectives at each stage (Scholtes 2008). MPECs are important problems and play a 
significant role in engineering and economic analyses, but in general are hard problems to 
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solve (Luo et al. 2008). Some of the solution techniques include Vertex Enumeration, 
Penalty method, Benders decomposition method for discretely-constrained problems 
(Gabriel et al. 2010; Fricke 2003; Pang and Fukushima 1999).  
One of the distinguishing exogenous factors is representing dependence on 
suppliers. Different than most other approaches, we model this dependence via a key 
coefficient which represents an upper bound on the percentage of entire supply from each 
supplier for a given market. In the current worldwide market where decisions go beyond 
just cost effectiveness, this term plays a significant role in identifying the most preferable 
solution. In addition, we consider costs from greenhouse gas emissions due to capacity 
expansions and from the transportation and use of gas.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the two-level 
formulation including an overview of the problem addressed in the chapter; Section 3.3 
provides numerical results for a case study involving Russia and China; in Section 3.4 
results and conclusions are given followed by Appendix 3-A and 3-B.  
3.2 Formulation 
 
The problem discussed in this chapter deals with decision-making for strategic 
investments in natural gas network capacity expansion and for annual gas production 
levels by the leader firm to maximize its profits. Followers are modeled using as a Nash-
Cournot game, which later gets combined through disjunctive modeling with the upper-
level problem. In the lower-level problem, followers compete with each other while 
taking into account the amount of production by the leader firm as a fixed value. The 
followers also indirectly take into account the network capacity expansions by the leader 
since the level of production by the leader changes based on the decisions made for 
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expansions. The leader decides how much to expand the network capacity for a certain 
market while anticipating the behavior from the followers and adjusting its decisions 
accordingly.  
Players at both levels consider costs associated with carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e) pollution stemming from natural gas operations. In particular, the leader considers 
carbon costs that would result from the expansion of capacities in addition to those 
associated with supply and use of the natural gas. In contrast the followers problem 
consider only the amount of carbon being generated from the supply and use of gas, since 
in the formulation they do not make decisions for a supply network expansions. The 
leader also faces fixed charges when it decides to expand a capacity in a considered time 
period, while followers do not have such expenditures.  
The constraints of the model include technical capacity limitations that may 
reduce the amount of gas being extracted from gas supply node (region), and consumer 
preferences for the delivered gas. The model also takes into account the time value of 
money through a discounting factor. In the leader’s problem, three modes of gas network 
expansion and production are considered: traditional pipelines, LNG delivered through 
vessels, and LNG through cryogenic pipes. In contrast, the followers’ problems consider 
only the first two modes, since there are no cryogenic pipelines in place that might be 
considered as existing capacity for followers. Cryogenic pipelines are a novel technology 
pipe that allows transportation of LNG over relatively long distances. A specially 
designed wall of cryogenic pipes allows extremely low temperature LNG to be 
transported. Cryogenic pipe-in-pipe technology in comparison to traditional pipes is 
advantageous as it may transport 600 times more natural gas due to low temperature 
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compression (down to -160 C
o
). Due to temperature differences with the surrounding 
environment traditional pipelines are not capable of transporting the LNG and therefore 
the traditional mode for LNG transportation has been vessels. The latest technological 
achievements have made it possible to transport LNG over relatively long distances using 
cryogenic pipes. The novel technology by Technip promises to transport it over longer 
distances and a pilot five-mile project is in its procurement stage (Technip 2011). ITP 
(2011) has similar projections and uses such pipelines for transporting heavy and waxy 
oil or other cryogenic liquids. Even though it seems a reasonable form of transport mode 
for LNG supply the length of a single link and the cost still make it an expansive option 
for broader integration into the natural gas supply network. 
In the next section we provide the details of the formulation.  
3.2.1 Notation for the Model 
 
This section presents the sets and short description of notation used in the model 
formulation with capital letters (generally) referring to the leader's problem unless when 
defining sets. The bulk of the notation can be found in the Appendix 3-A.      
Indices: 
f follower firms 
i  origin node 
j  destination 
t  five-year time increment 
 
Sets: 
F set of all followers 
N  set of all nodes   
T set of all time periods included in the model 
 
Subscripts indicate origin and destination nodes followed by the time period. In 
the followers’ problems, subscripts also include the index for the firm. Superscripts 
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indicate the mode of natural gas such as P for pipelines, LNG for liquefied natural gas 
and PCRY for cryogenic pipelines. The superscript notation is followed by “exp” for 
expansion and “supp” for supplies. For example the term        
     
 means intercept 
(INTR) for pipeline (P) expansion (exp) from origin (i) to destination (j) at time period (t) 
in the inverse demand function used to formulate the objective function as a profit 
maximization for the leader. Similarly,       
     
 stands for the slope of the same item. 
Also, it should be noted that in the case study the network capacities are expressed in 
trillion cubic feet per year (Tcf/y)
3
. Production levels are also expressed in Tcf/y for 
consistency.  
The next section presents a mathematical formulation for the leader’s problem. 
3.2.2 The Leader’s Problem 
 
The leader is modeled as maximizing its own profits based on consideration of the 
followers’ market behavior. Its decision variables are capacity expansions in 
conventional pipelines, LNG plant and vessels, cryogenic pipes, and the amount of 
natural gas being supplied through those capacities. The conventional pipeline capacity 
expansion level is the difference between capacity at time t and the previous time 
interval: (    
              
         ), where     
  is an exogenous factor in [1, ∞) 
representing the difference between supply level and the maximum capacity.      is the 
supply level at time t.
4
 Similar capacity expansions are: LNG with term (    
          
        
             ), and term for cryogenic pipes 
                                                 
3
 1 cubic foot is equal to 0.02831 cubic meters. 
4
 An alternative approach is to have separate capacity variables, but for computational efficiency reasons 
the approach above was selected. 
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(    
                    
               ). For liquefied natural gas supply levels are 
represented by               . Since the model is developed for capacity expansion 
decisions, all supply levels are presented in total annual values which may not exceed the 
total network capacity for each mode. The objective function for the leader’s profit 
maximization problem is given in (3-1). Profit is the difference of revenues and costs. 
Revenues are from expansion of network by three sources: for conventional gas by 
pipelines, for LNG through vessels and through cryogenic pipes. All three revenue terms 
are of the same form namely: 
  (       
               
         ) (    
   
             
   
        ) 
Revenues generated from supplies will have similar structure to those from expansion: 
(       
                
          )     . 
where       represents the quantity in conventional, LNG or cryogenic pipelines, 
     {                   } and super and subscripts for the inverse demand function are 
suppressed for simplicity     {                   } .  
There are five cost terms: expansion costs, supply costs,
5
 carbon costs from expansion 
associated with pipeline expansion and gas supply, and capital investments. Respectively, 
for the pipelines the cost terms are: (    
     (    
              
         )) between time t 
and t-5, (    
          ) the cost for supply, (        
     (    
              
         )) 
the cost of carbon resulting from expansion for the time interval between t and t-5, 
                                                 
5
 The Leader can either produce its own gas or procure it from others; hence gas supply term is the general 
term used. Also, the supply cost includes the levelized cost from any previous installations. 
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(        
          ) the carbon cost from the supplied gas, (    
          
     ) for fixed 
charges if expansion is selected. 
In a similar approach the cost terms are included for LNG plant and vessels and LNG 
cryogenic pipelines. 
All cost terms are of the same form namely for expansion: 
 (    
       
(    
   
             
   
        )). 
For supply the general term is: (    
        
    ). 
Carbon cost terms that are also related to different modes of natural gas network 
expansion are expressed as: (        
       
(    
                
           )) 
For gas supply and final use related carbon terms in formulation are of the form: 
(        
        
    ), while terms for fixed charges are expressed as: (    
       
 
    
       
). 
In this formulation, five-year time increments are used which are indicated via the 
notation t and t-5. This is an assumption based mostly on an idea that on average the 
investment and construction process take about five years until the new link between 
origin-destination (OD) nodes materialize. In (3-1), the revenues are generated through 
capacity expansion and the gas transported through those capacities. For the case study in 
this chapter, the profits from expansion are set to be non-positive, since it is assumed that 
the expansion is done by the same company and there is no external funding. The results 
in the case study indicate that the expansion is made only enough to produce zero profits 
from expansion. However from a tax perspective it may be advantageous to show the 
expansion as an expense.  
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For instance the firms may be characterized as in Figure 3-2. The diagram on the 
left indicates that the firm does not have external funding while the figure on the right 
accounts for an external source for network expansion projects. These two options are the 
reason for the given structure of the objective function to allow for having profits 
maximized also from expansion construction activities. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Firm’s Possible Structural Forms Considered in Model Formulation 
 
Considering the discussion above about the possible profit maximization options 
for a leader firm the general form the objective function of the leader firm will be: 
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The extensive form of the objective function is given in the Appendix 3-A as (A.1). 
For designing supply networks with detailed engineering considerations the 
nonlinear model might be better for accuracy. For instance the flow–pressure relationship 
or the impact of atmospheric pressure on pipelines is not linear and nonlinearity is 
appropriate for development of such models for natural gas systems. However, these 
issues are less common and probably less appropriate for higher-level decision-making 
models that are used to answer policy questions such as extent of market power by 
certain players, effects of capacity on prices, regional and seasonal price differentials and 
others (Gabriel et al. 2005b). In many other situations the linearity assumption is 
supported by the fact that in the range of the solution the demand curve is almost linear 
and the model does not suffer due to this assumption (von Hirschhausen et al. 2005; 
Schirillo 2006). This assumption is an analogy to the demand curve of nuclear power, 
which has a high cost for installation and a constant production level per unit capacity. In 
this case the cost of installation is moderately high while the capacity is designed in a 
way that would mostly be served with its full capacity so any addition of an extra unit 
will add up the cost linearly.  
The leader’s problem has the following constraints, which are formulated based 
on technological and natural conditions (the node capacity) of production/supply and 
security of supplies expressed as preferences of a consumer for delivery from suppliers: 
General form for equations (3-2) - (3-4): 
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In extensive form: 
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General form for equations (3-6) - (3-10): 
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In the leader’s problem the capacity expansion is subject to technical limitations 
for a given time interval between origin and destination nodes. Such limitation is 
enforced through constraints (3-2 to 3-4). In particular constraint (3-2) limits pipeline 
capacity expansion in a given time interval, and constraint (3-3) for LNG plant and vessel 
capacity expansions. For cryogenic pipeline expansion such limitation is enforced by 
constraint (3-4). In addition to technical constraints, the capacity of expansion can be 
limited because of the natural gas availability from the ground due to natural resource 
extraction rate regulations, which is expressed through constraint (3-5). In this constraint 
players from the lower-level problem are also included since the capacity of a particular 
location can be used by multiple players and hence the total capacity of expansions and 
accordingly flow capacities cannot exceed the maximum capacity possible to extract 
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from a particular location. The formulation of this constraint with inclusion of the time 
factor in the indices together with cost terms in the objective functions allows analysis of 
the market subject to geological and economic perspectives of technological 
achievements and their impact on resource availability.    
Consumers may prefer to have more capacities from one supplier and less from 
another supplier for political or other reasons. Having information about consumers’ 
preferences the leader can make more favorable decisions for its investments. Constraints 
(3-6)-(3-10) are designed to use the consumers’ preferences in the decision-making 
process. These constraints are formulated for different modes of natural gas supplies (i.e. 
conventional gas, LNG and LNG through cryogenic pipelines) including both upper and 
lower-level players, and provide more flexibility both for supply preferences, security 
and accuracy. Constraints (3-6)-(3-10) consider supplier dependency for example 
something that might be useful for supply diversity. The term on right-hand side of these 
constraints (e.g.,     
      
) represents the maximum percent of supply from a given 
supplier for a given mode of gas. Constraints (3-11 to 3-13) are useful to "turn off" 
capacity options consistent with geographic or political considerations. Constraints (3-14) 
are binary variables enforcing capital investment costs in to the function if the installation 
is selected. Constraints (3-15) are for non-negativity of variables. The additional 
constraint (3-16) is a calibration constraint initially used to find appropriate values for the 
inverse demand function parameters. Once these parameters have been determined this 




3.2.3 Followers’ Problems 
 
The followers are modeled as maximizing their profits by maximizing their production 
levels while taking the leader’s supply quantities as fixed. Followers are included in this 
problem with fixed capacities, which means they do not solve the problem for capacity 
expansion. The idea of fixed capacity should not be mixed with the supply level, which 
may be a fraction of the existing capacity. Since cryogenic pipe-in-pipe technique for 
LNG transportation over long distances is a novel technology it is assumed that the 
follower firms do not invest in these novel technologies. The objective function for the 
followers’ problem is given in (3-17). The formulation of this function follows the same 
structure from leader’s problem with the difference of not including network expansion-
related terms: 
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The followers have only upper bound due to technical capacity limitations on 
their production levels. Those are presented below: 
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As described above, the followers maximize their profits shown in the objective 
function. Costs included in (3-17) are for production and for related carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions. Constraints (3-18) and (3-19) enforce capacity limitations, which 
are related to the upper levels of existing capacities in terms of pipelines and LNG plants 
and vessels (LNG Plants 2006).  
In the following section KKT conditions for the followers’ problem are presented, 
which later are transformed into a disjunctive program. 
3.2.4 KKT conditions for followers’ problem 
 
The lower-level problem with Nash-Cournot competition needs to be solved as an 
equilibrium problem. This problem is solved as a complementarity problem by using the 
KKT conditions. A generic complementarity problem is defined as finding a vector 
(    ) which satisfies the following conditions (Cottle et al. 2009): 
         
            
                 
 
where vector      and M is a matrix      . 
The following KKT conditions are derived for the followers’ problem:  
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3.2.5 Disjunctive form of followers’ problem 
 
A disjunctive constraint form was used to formulate the followers’ problem (Sherali and 
Shetty 1980; Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981; Hobbs 2001; Winston 2009; Gabriel and 
Leuthold 2010). 
The generic structure to convert complementarity conditions to disjunctive 
constraints is provided below by using notation used in Section 3.2.4 for deriving KKT 
conditions. The complementary conditions are generally in the form:  
       
       
where   is a primal or dual variable and    is associated function. With the disjunctive 
programming technique this complementarity condition is converted as follows:  
        
    
             
where    is a binary variable for replacing complementarity by disjunctive constraint and 
M is a large enough constant. Once the disjunctive constraints are used they can be 
combined into the upper-level problem. The combined upper- and lower-level problems 
are presented in Appendix 3-A.  
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The key to making the disjunctive constraints approach work is to correctly select 
the constant M. Too large a value of M may produce computational difficulties, too small 
a value may overly constrain the feasible region. Based on Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), 
in this chapter we have used 16.536 selected as the maximum from values of intercepts, 
slopes of inverse demand function and capacity limitations. 
3.3 Case Study 
 
The case study is presented to illustrate the functionality of the model. Instead of 
hypothetical case study analysis considered a proposed pipeline for natural gas from 
Russia to China called “Altai” (see Figure 3-3). The objective is to decide how much 
conventional pipeline, LNG plant and vessel or cryogenic pipeline capacity to install 
from Russia to China. Certain assumptions were made along the way of scenario 
development, which are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
Considering the fact that Russia is a major energy supplier to other continents and 
expressed its willingness to satisfy all of China’s natural gas demand in the future, 
Russia’s entry into this market may become an important issue and have an impact on 
other suppliers’ capacities. 
















Figure 3-3: Planned natural gas pipelines in China 
 
From Figure 3-3 three pipeline projects from Russia (Altai, East Siberia, and Far 
East) can be observed for approximate routing purposes (Yamaguchi 2003).  
Currently, Russia is not a major supplier in the Chinese natural gas market, but it 
desires to be so given the growing demand (see Figure 3-4). Therefore, in our formulation 
the upper-level player for the case study represents Russia. Other market players 
considered in the model are Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which currently are even 
more major players in the Chinese market, but for the purpose of analysis when Russia 
desires to become a leader those players are considered as followers. Given this set of 
players we analyze the level of capacity that needs to be installed by the leader while 
maximizing its profits and seeing the impact of those decisions on the followers’ 
production levels. The results of the analysis indicate why current market conditions are 
Proposed Altai pipeline trajectory 
East Siberia pipeline trajectory 
Far East pipeline trajectory 
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not favorable for investments and also discuss what should those parameters be in order 
to make it more attractive for the leader to invest on a given project.  
  The Altai project was approved by Order N 372 on 16
th
 May 2006, but because of 
a lack of agreement on natural gas prices between Russia and China, the construction of 
the pipeline has not yet started (Lebedeva-Hooft 2007). On September 27, 2010 other 
major terms were approved and signed by Gazprom and CNPC (China National 
Petroleum Corporation), but again those terms were not enough to start the construction 
of the pipeline. Figure 3-4 depicts the likely route for the Altai pipeline.  
 
Figure 3-4: Potential route for Altai gas project trajectory 
Source: (Gazprom, 2011) 
 
China plans to expand its natural gas imports because of growing energy demand 





Figure 3-5: Consumption and Production of Natural Gas in China (2015 and 2020 
are forecasts) 
Source: (EIA 2011c; LNG 2010) 
 
From Figure 3-5 it can be seen that in 2015 already a 34.7% (5.3Tcf/8.12 Tcf) of 
total projected consumption needs to be satisfied by additional imports and in 2020 
imports would be almost 50% of 14.12 Tcf of total consumption.  
The Altai Project would connect Russia’s Kovykta gas field to Xinjiang 
(northwest of China). The capacity of the proposed pipeline would be from 1 to 1.4 Tcf/y 
which should come online by 2015. Another proposed pipeline with Russia, called the 
Eastern-Siberia pipeline, would connect Russia’s east and Sakhalin Island to northeastern 
China. Plans for the eastern route also call for a pipeline capacity of 1.06 to 1.41 Tcf/y. 
Russia and China continue to have ongoing negotiations on price and pipeline financing 
measures. The third proposed pipeline (Far East) project is 0.42 Tcf/y capacity pipeline 
from two of Myanmar’s offshore blocks to China. In March 2009 CNPC signed a 
contract with Myanmar to finance the construction of a 1,123-mile pipeline (EIA 2010b; 
CNPC 2010).  
As mentioned earlier, to illustrate the use of the model, two follower suppliers 
were included in the lower-level problem (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Russia is 
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modeled as the upper-level leader. The factor specifying the dependence on suppliers is 
included in the model formulation. An example of dependence is the differences between 
announced supply capacities of 2.825Tcf (80 BCM) from the Russian side and China’s 
later announcement of 2.401 Tcf (68 BCM), which may indicate China’s preference for 
being less dependent on Russian gas supplies (Kommersant 2006). The ratio between 
these two values for supply can be used as a proxy for supply dependence or a security of 
supply factor which in this particular case is almost 85% (2.401 Tcf/2.825 Tcf) of the 
total supplies proposed by the leader. This information can be interpreted as a 
dependency factor/security of supplies or political preference as a representation of a 
consumer side “market power”.  
Scenarios presented below consider two values of the dependency factor for the 
upper-level problem. Figure 3-6 illustrates the schematic structure of the case study 
where the followers have installed capacities and the leader decides how much capacity 




Figure 3-6: Schematic representation of supply from leader and followers 
 
The cost of capacity expansions for pipelines is based on per inch of the diameter 
per mile data presented below. For LNG plants and vessels cost it is converted to a dollar 
per volume of natural gas per year, since usually LNG is measured in million metric 
tonnes per annum (MMTPA), which is equivalent to 140 million cubic feet per day. 
Installation costs for cryogenic pipelines is assumed to be 10% lower than that of vessels 
per unit of natural gas, but it is still higher than the cost of conventional pipes by a factor 
of 2.66. The 10 percent figure is an assumption needed due to lack of data but justified to 
some extent by the fact that manufacturers clearly indicate the cost advantages over LNG 
vessels (ITP 2011). Lastly, the transportation costs through cryogenic pipes is assumed to 
be higher than that of LNG vessel-based transportation, since the pressure should be 
                                                 
6
 If installation costs for cryogenic pipeline are 10% less than the LNG vessels then compared to 
conventional pipelines it costs 2.6 times less. 
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maintained over the length of the links by pump stations which require extensive 
maintenance and resource related investments.    
Conventional pipeline expansion costs were previously studied and are broken 
down into material cost (approximately 26% of total), labor cost (approximately 40-50% 
of total), right of way (approximately 22% of total), miscellaneous (approximately 7% of 
total) (Parker 2004) 
The pipeline construction cost equation is given as: 
                               
                                                       
 
where  (dia) is the diameter of the pipeline in inches,  
(length) is the length of the pipeline in miles, and 
Cost is in dollars.  
 
For a 56-inch diameter and 1,700-mile long pipeline (Altai) the cost according to 
the above equation is $5.11 billion. If we use this equation with a given set of data to 
calculate the cost of the Altai project and compare it with the announced cost, there is a 
difference of about $8.89 billion ($14 Billion-$5.11 Billion).  
Based on the data from INGAA (2009) the cost of a 56-inch diameter and 1700-
mile long pipeline is about $5.81 billion. When the cost of 11 compression stations is 
added to the cost of pipeline construction, which is assumed to have four units in each 
station by 3,590 horsepower each, the cost gets to about $6.1 billion, which is still lower 
than the proposed $14.0 billion (IFPA 2007; Gazprom 2011; ICF 2009). According to the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics the labor costs are less in China than in the U.S. (data for 
Russia are not available and assumed to be the average of China and U.S. values). Hence 
the Chinese labor component being about 50% of the pipeline construction costs the total 
cost was supposed to be even lower than in the U.S. (USBLS 2010).  
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Although the above analyses resulted in lower costs ($5.11 billion or $6.1 billion) 
than the actual total costs of $14 billion, the latter was used in the case study to match the 
announced cost level. However, the value of the above analysis is to show that the 
announced costs are probably too high. If the $14 billion figure is used and then 
converted to a cost per inch diameter per mile, the resulting value is $147,000 which is 
comparable to but still a bit higher than the Nabucco pipeline project, which has similar 
technical characteristics as the Altai project. 
The cost of a typical LNG plant and necessary number of vessels to service such a 
plant are assumed to be $1.5 billion/1 MMTPA plus $120 million for each vessel (50 
vessels for and approximated distance of 1,250 miles
7
) and $1 billion for receiving 
terminal 1 bcf/day. Thus, the typical total cost for an LNG plant for the Case Study would 
be about $45.4 billion.
8
 
Considering technological improvements and the fact that the cost of vessels has 
decreased over time and the capacity has increased per vessel the estimated cost is 
decreased by 20% resulting in about $36.3 billion as opposed to the $45.4 billion figure.  
To summarize, the costs per Tcf/y capacity the pipeline installation for Altai will 
be about $12.727 billion, but LNG plant and vessels would be about $36.3 billion and 
cryogenic pipelines for LNG about $33.03 billion, for further details about cost 
estimations see the Appendix 3-B.  
We assume that Russian production cost is $80 per kcm. This is based on data 
provided by Tarr and  Thomson (2003) for long-run marginal costs of natural gas at $35 
                                                 
7 
1 mile is equal to 1.6 kilometers. 
8 
See the Appendix 3-B for details. 
 80 
 
to $40 per kcm and we doubled it to account for replacing old infrastructure investments 
as well as losses and money inflation.  
Costs associated with environmental issues are also considered in the decision-
making process. The carbon footprint of pipeline construction is presented below and the 
carbon-related costs from capacity expansion are assumed to be $15/tonne of CO2e 
(INGAA 2009). Table 3-1 presents emissions from various stages of pipeline 
manufacture and installation.  
Table 3-1. CO2e emissions from pipeline construction 
Diameter 
(inch) 













16 133.7 9.9 49.2 6.9 40.7 240.4 
20 206.4 16.0 53.4 8.6 40.7 325.1 
24 258.6 22.3 84.0 10.4 40.7 416.0 
36 543.0 48.8 119.7 15.8 40.7 768.0 
48 973.7 85.6 138.6 21.5 40.7 1,260.1 
Source: (NACAP, 2010) 
 
Since we use pipeline capacities in our model that correspond to a proposed 56-
inch pipe the corresponding CO2e emissions are extrapolated based on the data provided 
in Table 3-1 and resulting in 3421.7 tonne/mile
9
 while considering increasing average 
percentage pattern for emissions over varying diameters of pipes (from 20% to 25%). 
Considering the length of the proposed pipeline and its capacity the amount of emissions 
for this pipeline per Tcf
10
 would be (1,700*3,421.7)/1.4= 4,154,921.43 tonnes/Tcf.  
                                                 
9
 3421.7 tonne/mile=Kilometer to Mile factor 1.6 *Average percentage increase of emissions by diameter 
20%*(Diameter of 56“)*((Emission from 48“/Diameter of 48“)+((Diameter of 56“-Diameter of 
48“)*((Emission from 48“/Diameter of 48“)-(Emission from 36“/Diameter of 36“))/(Diameter of 48“-
Diameter of 36“))); 1 inch is equal to 25.4 millimeters. 
10 
Since the proposed pipeline capacity is 1.4Tcf. 
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The amount of emissions associated with the energy content of natural gas is 
equal to 117 pounds
11
 of CO2e per million BTU, or 0.12 pounds per cubic foot of gas 
(EPA 2010). The cost factor considering these emissions is also included in the objective 
function in both the upper and the lower-level problems. The amount of CO2e emissions 
per Tcf of natural gas is thus 0.12*10
12
/2,204.62=54,431,150 tonnes.  
More details of the input data are presented in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 in the case study 
section. 
3.3.1 Cases and Scenarios 
 
The case study consists of two cases. The first case analyzes the effect of capacity 
expansion if prices stay the same as those in China as reported in (FGE 2009). The 
second case analyzes scenarios where the leader increases the price in China by making it 
equal to European prices, while the followers keep the same price as in the first case as 
reported in (Bloomberg 2011).
12
 In the case study it is assumed that there is only one firm 
at each supply location (although for the followers’ problem it can be any number). Each 
case has the following scenarios with corresponding major characteristics:  
1) The dependence factor is 1 for both the upper and lower-level problem players. The 
leader and followers supply with their given prices calibrated to publicly available 
values as of 2010. The leader has no capacity limitations since it wants to determine 
the optimal capacity it needs to install. It is assumed that followers have enough 
supply to satisfy the difference between the leader’s supply and the demand.  
                                                 
11 
1 pound is equal to 0.4535 kilograms. 
12
 This increase is achieved through calibrating the parameters of the demand curve.  
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2) The dependence factor is 1 for both the upper and lower-level problem players. The 
leader and followers supply with their given prices available publicly. The leader has 
no capacity limitations since it wants to determine the optimal capacity it needs to 
install. The followers have supply limitations of 1.1 Tcf/y for pipelines according to 
existing capacities and 1.226 Tcf/y for LNG. 
3) The dependence factor is 1/1.17 (0.85 as specified above as willingness for total 
supplies) for the upper and 1 for lower-level problem players. The leader and the 
followers supply with their given prices available publicly. It is assumed that the 
followers have enough supply to satisfy the difference between the leader’s supply 
and the demand.  
4) The dependence factor is 1/1.17 (0.85 as specified above as willingness for total 
supplies) for upper and 1 for lower-level problem players. The leader and the 
followers supply with their current prices available publicly. The followers have 
supply limitations of 1.1 Tcf/y for pipelines according to existing capacities and 1.226 
Tcf/y for LNG. 
The cases and scenarios are summarized in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2. Summary of Case and Scenario assumptions 







Scenario 1  Chinese/European  No limit / No limit/ No limit 1      /1  /1  
Scenario 2  Chinese/European  No limit on Leader /1.1 /1.226  1      /1  /1  
Scenario 3  Chinese/European  No limit/ No limit/ No limit 0.85 /1  /1  
Scenario 4  Chinese/European  No limit on Leader /1.1 /1.226 0.85 /1  /1  
  
 
The cases consider that the next unit of capacity can be installed with a lower 
cost. In particular for pipelines, on average, the right of way may be responsible for 22% 
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of the total cost. The same approach was used for LNG plants as well as for LNG 
cryogenic pipes. This cost structure is taken care of by binary variables that impose 
capital investment fixed costs. 
The model was calibrated to current natural gas prices in China and then the effect 
of changes such as dependence factor and price from the leader were analyzed. The slope 
and the intercept of the inverse demand function for natural gas were selected based on 
historical data. However, since the data for China were available only for certain regions, 
the slope and intercepts were compared and approximated to those from the Russian 
natural gas inverse demand curve. Calibration was also used for fine tuning the inverse 
demand parameters for capacity expansion. A reverse approach is used for identifying 
more precise values for the Chinese natural gas inverse demand curve. This process is 
based on price approximation of natural gas price in China and recording the 
corresponding inverse demand function parameters.  
Table 3-3 presents the Leader’s data for Case 1 and Scenario 1. The data for 
additional cases and scenarios are described afterwards. Note that the demand curve for 
2025 is the same as the demand curve for 2020 due to data unavailability. The leader’s 
data for the inverse demand function intercepts and corresponding slopes are assumed to 
have about 20% cost reduction for each additional unit of expansion. Capital investments 
are assumed to be around 10% of total expansion costs. Capacity limitations are selected 
to be greater than the expecting demand. Costs for capacity expansion, related carbon 
emissions and production are also presented in Table 3-3. Costs are assumed to have an 
increase of 10 to 15% within each 5 year intervals, due to inflation.  
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Table 3-3. Leader’s data used for Case 1-Scenario 1 
Leader’s data are in Tcf/y and $ billions/Tcf 
Data by Years 2015 2020 2025 
       
     
    $13.990  $15.390  $16.930  
      
     
 Lower bound 2.700  3.078  Upper bound 3.400  
       
       
 $40.730  $44.810  $49.290  
      
       
 Lower bound 8.100 8.962  Upper bound 9.900 
       
        
 $36.700  $40.370  $44.400  
      
        
 Lower bound 7.3  8.073  Upper bound 9.0  
       
      
 $5.310  $5.840  $6.420  
       
        
 $6.250  $6.880  $7.570  
       
         
 $6.380  $7.020  $7.720  
      
      
,       
        
,       
         
 0.0001629 0.0001629 0.0001629 
    
     
                     $1.270                      $1.460                       $1.680  
    
       
                     $1.480                      $1.700                      $1.960  
    
        
                     $2.750                      $3.170                      $3.640  
       
     
 ,        
       
         
        
 10.000 10.000 10.000 
Hit  20.000 20.000 20.000 
CONSjt 2.830 7.060 7.060 
    
      
,     
        
,     
         
 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    
     
  $12.720  $14.63   $16.82  
    
       
  $37.030   $42.59   $48.97  
    
        
  $33.360   $38.36   $44.12  
        
     
,         
       
,         
        
  $0.816   $1.089   $1.361  
        
      
,         
        
,         
           $0.062   $0.083   $0.104  
    
      
  $3.390   $ 3.900   $4.480  
    
        
  $4.070   $4.680   $5.380  
    
         
  $4.150   $4.770   $5.490  
 
For LNG plant expansions the intercept of the inverse demand curve is considered 
to be the same for years 2015, 2020 and 2025, because of not realistic technological 
advancement in relatively short timeframe from 2015 to 2025.  
For LNG cryogenic pipes the intercept of the inverse demand function increases 
over time, since it is a new option for LNG transportation over long distances and is 
assumed to have a more promising future for LNG transportation.  
Emissions costs are assumed to get much higher over years and the marginal increase is 
assumed to be $5/tonne for each five-year interval (Capoor 2007). 
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The data information for Case 2 is not presented in tabular form since the only 
difference is in the leader’s selling price set to be equal to European prices, which allow 
having more profit per unit of supplied natural gas. Table 3-4 presents similar input data 
for the followers.  
Table 3-4. Followers’ data used for Case 1-Scenario 1 
Data are in Tcf/y and $ billions/Tcf 
Data by Years 2015 2020 2025 
       
      
  
Turkmenistan  $4.240   $4.880   $5.610  
Uzbekistan  $4.920   $5.660   $6.510  
       
        
  
Turkmenistan  $5.090   $5.850   $6.730  
Uzbekistan  $5.900   $6.790   $7.810  
      
        
same for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 0.0001629 0.0001629 0.0001629 
       
      
,        
        
 same for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 10.000 10.000 10.000 
    
      
,     
        
 same for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 1.000 1.000 1.000 
        
      
,         
        
 same for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  $0.816   $1.089   $1.361  
    
        
 
Turkmenistan $2.120 $2.440 $2.800 
Uzbekistan $2.460 $2.830 $3.250 
    
      
  
Turkmenistan $2.540 $2.930 $3.360 
Uzbekistan $2.950 $3.400 $3.900 
 
In Table 3-4 the data include intercepts and slopes for inverse demand functions 
followed by capacity limitations, which in two cases in Scenarios 1 and 3 are assumed to 
be enough to satisfy the gap between leader’s supply and the demand. In Scenarios 2 and 
4 those are assumed to have lower caps on production as discussed in major 
characteristics of scenarios. Costs for production are based on publicly available data 
discussed in previous sections. 
The next section presents results and conclusions that discuss the usefulness of the 




3.4 Results and Conclusions 
 
This section provides an analysis of results. It is found that for the leader it would not be 
profitable to install publicly announced 1.4 Tcf/y capacity by 2015. Tables 3-5 and 3-6 
present the output of the runs for Case 1 and Case 2 accordingly. 
 
Results for Case 1: 
 
Table 3-5. Results for Case 1 
Leader and Followers Scenario 1 and 3 Scenario 2 Scenario 4 
Data by Year 2015 2020 2025 2015 2020 2025 2015 2020 2025 
Qijt  (Tcf/y) 0.743 1.835 2.847 1.204 3.832 6.203 1.094 3.723 5.834 
LNGijt (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PLNGijt (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
qfijt from Turkmenistan (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.005 0.135 0.526 1.100 0.729 0.524 1.099 0.000 
lngfijt from Turkmenistan (Tcf/y) 0.721 3.801 4.078 0.000 1.028 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.175 
qfijt from Uzbekistan (Tcf/y) 0.014 0.247 0.000 1.100 1.100 0.128 1.100 1.100 1.051 
lngfijt from Uzbekistan (Tcf/y) 1.352 1.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.138 0.000 
Total (Tcf/y) 2.830 7.060 7.060 2.830 7.060 7.060 2.830 7.060 7.060 
 
Table 3-5 indicates that under Scenarios 1 and 3 the leader should have only 
0.743 Tcf/y installed by 2015 and then add more capacities for years 2020 and 2025. 
These gradual capacity additions will result in $4.574 billion of profit over the specified 
time period. It should be noticed also that the profit is discounted over time by 12% for 
every five-year interval (USBLS 2009).  
Results for Case 1 Scenario 3, which other than the dependence factor of 85% 
uses the same parameters calibrated for Scenario 1, are the same as in Scenario 1, since in 




It can be concluded for these scenarios that a capacity of 1.4 Tcf/y that the leader 
has announced to have installed by 2015 may not be the most favorable to maximize its 
profits in the short-run.  
At the same time it can be seen from the data in Table 3-5 that by 2020 the leader 
needs to have more capacity in place than it has announced publicly for optimal 
investments. However, this higher capacity (1.835 Tcf/y versus 1.4 Tcf/y) may actually 
be realized if negotiations take extra years.  
LNG supplies both through vessels or cryogenic pipelines under current prices 
seem to be not profitable and the model did not suggest any capacity installation for all 
years considered. This suggestion also matches with existing discussions for natural gas 
supply to China from Russia where these options were not discussed as a form of gas 
supply.  
What happens if prices stay as those were in 2010 used in case study and the followers 
can supply only up to the existing capacities they have?  
In this case the problem becomes infeasible or the leader makes a negative profit 
(if this is allowed by the model) to supply the demand. This may become a question of 
negotiations where decision makers can use the model and see what would be the tradeoff 
for negotiations. Obviously, for the leader the best option would be if China covers the 
pipeline installation expenses, but then raises the question of ownership and operational 
rights of the pipeline.  
Using the calibration capability of the model the decision-maker can find the 
demand function parameters that would make the supplier profitable. These cases are 
depicted by Scenario 2 and 4.  
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Initially the lower and upper bounds for slope of the demand function were used 
based on the real life market data (Table 3-3). By removing lower bounds for slope for 
pipeline capacity installation inverse demand function and keeping all other input data the 
same as in Scenario 1 and calibrating the model it is found that the slope would need to 
be 0.954 in year 2015, 0.947 by 2020 and in 2025 it should be 1.303 compared to 2.7, 
2.821 and 2.837 respectively to make the Leader interested in supplying the demand 
without taking the negative profits. Numbers for Scenario 2 are obviously lower than the 
market data, but provide good information to the leader on what they need to concentrate 
during negotiations to become profitable. If demand function conditions met then the 
Leader can receive $15.997 billion in profits. 
Next, Scenario 4 analyzes the same conditions as Scenario 2 with an additional 
restriction of not exceeding the total supply from the leader by 85% of total demand, as it 
was described for Scenario 2. Results for Scenario 4 are also presented in Table 3-5. 
From a comparison of the cases in Table 3-5 it is noticed that for the followers 
there is a significant change in total natural gas market share for certain time periods, 
while for the leader the restriction of 85% changed the production in 2025 decreasing it 
from 6.203 Tcf to 5.834 Tcf, in 2020 from 3.832 Tcf to 3.723 Tcf and in 2015 from 1.204 
Tcf to 1.094 Tcf. These numbers indicate that even with the 85% limitation the leader 
may stay profitable and receive $15.642 billion in profits if it can affect the market 
conditions as discussed in Scenario 2.  
These analyses indicate that there is some additional power to the leader, since it 
can anticipate its impact on followers’ production volumes and use it as a political 
instrument. From Table 3-5 it can also be noticed that when the assumption for demand 
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in 2025 stays the same as in 2020 the leader adds more capacity for 2025, which indicates 
a gradual takeover of the market due to a profitable environment.  
 
Results for Case 2: 
 
Under Case 2, the leader’s inverse demand function parameters evaluated at the reported 
solution are comparable to real life European market prices as in 2010 (assumed to be 
$11.328 billion/Tcf) for natural gas. But at the same solution the followers’ inverse price 
function yields lower supply prices at roughly the level of the Chinese market. Similar to 
Case 1 Scenario 1 here in Case 2 also the LNG option is excluded because of its high 
installation costs.   
Table 3-6. Results for Case 2 Scenarios 
Leader and Followers Scenario 1 and 3 Scenario 2 Scenario 4 
Data by Year 2015 2020 2025 2015 2020 2025 2015 2020 2025 
Qijt  (Tcf/y) 0.788 2.202 3.530 2.830 7.060 7.060 2.352 5.983 5.983 
LNGijt (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PLNGijt (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
qfijt from Turkmenistan (Tcf/y) 0.005 0.028 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.550 1.077 
lngfijt from Turkmenistan (Tcf/y) 1.048 2.508 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.527 0.000 
qfijt from Uzbekistan (Tcf/y) 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lngfijt from Uzbekistan (Tcf/y) 0.989 2.248 3.506 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total (Tcf/y) 2.830 7.060 7.060 2.830 7.060 7.060 2.830 7.060 7.060 
 
Here in Scenario 2 the followers have capacity limitations similar to Case 1 
(Scenario 2). For Scenario 2 since the leader inverse demand function parameters are 
calibrated as real life European market prices as in 2010, the leader supplies all the 
demand. This result coincides with the announcement by Russia expressing its 
willingness to satisfy all of China’s natural gas demand in the future. Indeed, if 
negotiations result in higher prices for natural gas in China then it would be extremely 
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profitable for the leader to make all necessary investments and still generate $111.588 
billion profit over the considered time horizon.  
The results for Scenarios 1 and 3 are the same since the only difference between 
them, the 85% dependence constraint, is not binding. In contrast when the 85% 
dependence factor is included in Scenario 4 we see the followers picking up some market 
share. All the results are presented in Table 3-6. 
Analyses for favorable parameters  
 
In addition to these scenarios more analyses were conducted to understand parameters 
that would make the LNG option more favorable for the leader. This was done by 
removing lower bounds for the slope of inverse demand curves in all supply modes. It 
was found that with current prices, no parameter can make an LNG supply favorable for 
the leader. With high prices as in Case 2 it is found that if the leader can make the 
consumer pay higher prices for each additional unit capacity installation then it may 
supply LNG. In particular if the slope for the LNG plant and vessel expansion were 0.404 
in 2020 and 0.829 for LNG pipeline in 2015 then the leader would install LNG plants for 
4.313Tcf by 2020 and LNG pipeline of 2.747 Tcf by 2015 and generate profits. The 
difference of supply 0.083 Tcf would be covered by Turkmenistan in 2015. Although 
profits are attractive, it would not be easy to have that much influence on the market that 
would allow changing the slope of the inverse demand curves so much below the lower 




Both cases with their scenarios analyzed in this research provide an important intuition 
for decision-making. The model can be used by any player in the market and also by 
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consumers during contractual negotiations. It is important to highlight that many cases 
need to be investigated in order to have a clear understanding for negotiations and 
political decisions; hence the developed model is important for investors, policy makers 
and other decision-makers in natural gas industry. The model can be used for carbon 
policy analyses and analyze the impact of carbon costs under different policies, on natural 
gas supply network expansion and production levels. Due to self-calibration capability 
the model allows to determine favorable parameters that may help to get the desired 
profit values, to be used by decision-makers for contractual agreements or political 
orientation. 
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Extended form of the Leader’s objective function (A.1) in combined formulation of 
upper- and lower-level problems (A.1) to (A.25): 
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Followers’ Problem Disjunctive Form: 
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As an expression the cost associated with LNG plant is calculated as the following 
(Najibi et al. 2009; LNG Plants 2006; EIA 2010d): 
 LNG plant costs $1.5 billion per one million metric tonne per annum capacity 
(MMTPA) and 1MMTPA is equivalent to 140 million cubic feet per day. Also, 
for the same capacity similar to proposed pipeline, the plant needs to have 24 
MMTPA. 
 Vessels to transport the LNG from origin to destination cost about $120 million 
each. 
 Number of vessels necessary to serve the plant with a capacity that is equivalent 
to suggested pipeline capacity is 50 with approximate distances of 1,250 miles for 
shipping. 
 Receiving terminals cost $1 billion per 1 billion cubic feet per day. Therefore for 
the given capacity per year the daily capacity of the terminal is being determined 
by dividing the annual capacity of production to number of days in the year, while 
assuming year round operation of a plant. 
Given these values the formula can be derived for cost calculations using the following 
notation: 
CapF – capacity factor,  
UCost – LNG plant unit cost per MMTPA,  
ConvF – conversion factor from MMTPA to cubic feet,  
NVes – number of necessary vessels,  
VCost – vessel cost,  
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TCost –receiving terminal costs for a given capacity,  
CapT – terminal capacity for annual capacity of the plant,  
YDays – operational number of days per year. 
Values used for above terms are: 
CapF = 24 MMTPA 
UCost = $1.5 billion 
ConvF = 140 million 
NVes = 50 Vessels 
VCost = $120 million 
TCost = $1 billion per bcf/d 
YDays = 365 Days 
CapT = 24*140 million*365 = 1.226Tcf/y 
Cost of LNG through vessel supplies= UCost* CapF+ VCost* NVes+ TCost* CapF* 
ConvF/ YDays = $1.5 billion*24 MMTPA+$120 million*50 Vessels+$1.0 





CHAPTER 4: EFFECTS OF VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES, 
TRAFFIC VOLUME CHANGES, INCIDENTS AND WORK 





This chapter seeks to quantify the effects of newer, more efficient vehicle technologies, 
traffic volume changes, incidents and work zones on emissions production from on-road 
traffic. These effects are studied using microscopic traffic simulation and developed 
emissions estimation tools that together can capture emissions effects from the operating 
parameters of vehicles (e.g., second-by-second velocities and accelerations, power 
demand). An emissions estimation tool is proposed that estimates all air pollutants 
(except air toxics), namely CO2, CO, CH4, THC, NOx, SOx, PM10 and PM2.5, from on-
road traffic. A case study involving Montgomery County, Maryland’s I-270-MD-355 
corridor, including connecting arterials, was conducted. Findings from the case study 
indicate that vehicle composition greatly affects the amount of emissions, and significant 
potential for reaching emissions reduction goals exists through improvements in vehicle 
mix efficiencies within the traffic composition. It was also noted that work zones and 
traffic incidents reduce the amount of emissions produced over a time increment due to 
reduced average speeds, while per vehicle emissions rise over the span of the simulation 
network and simulation period. Non-linear multi-regression emissions estimation models 
were also developed to support GHG emissions analyses for other comparable roadways. 
Implications for policy-makers are discussed.  
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4.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are responsible for maintaining the earth’s temperature; 
however, excessive presence of these gases can be harmful. In recent years, national and 
international support for GHG reduction has grown by proposing and enforcing certain 
requirements aimed at reducing the activities that cause climate change. Thus, many 
restrictions have been imposed to minimize GHG emissions (Intergovernental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) 2007). The transportation sector accounts for 28% of total U.S. 
GHG emissions. 84% of these emissions are due to on-road vehicle use (DOT 2011; EPA 
2012a).  
The generation of emissions from on-road vehicles is directly affected by vehicle 
technology, roadway geometry, and traffic congestion, among other factors. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) attributes a cost of approximately $200 billion 
annually to traffic congestion (DOT 2011; GAO 2012). Congestion directly impacts 
traffic speed, stops and starts, and frequent acceleration and deceleration actions, thereby 
affecting the amount of fuel burned. An optimal speed of approximately 32 miles per 
hour (mph) (or 50 kilometers per hour) has been found to produce the minimum rate of 
emissions (Barth and Boriboonsomsin 2008; Rao et al. 2010; Unal et al. 2003). Stops and 
starts not only negatively affect overall speed, but increase the number of acceleration 
stages and, thus, emissions generation. Barth and Boriboonsomsin (2008) studied the 
effects of a variety of traffic stabilizing approaches, including congestion mitigation 
strategies (e.g., ramp metering, incident management), speed management techniques 
(e.g., enforcement, active accelerator pedal (Hjalmdahl and Varhelyi 2004) used to 
constrain vehicular speed to below allowable speed limits), and shock wave suppression 
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techniques (e.g., variable speed limits, Intelligent Speed Adaptation) that eliminate the 
acceleration/deceleration events due to stop-and-go traffic. The study concluded that a 
20% reduction in emissions could be achieved through such approaches.  
Traffic congestion has had a continuing upward trend over past decades. This is in 
part due to an increase in vehicle ownership and use. However, a significant portion of 
this increase can be attributed to so-called non-recurring events, such as construction 
projects and traffic incidents. In fact, the DOT attributes approximately half of the costs 
of congestion to construction operations and traffic incidents (DOT 2011). In a study 
from 1999, it was found that work zones and incidents were responsible for 24.3% and 
45% of traffic delays, respectively (Rao et al. 2010). Therefore, a number of policies and 
programs have aimed to mitigate the effects of work zones on traffic congestion. 
Additionally, traffic incident management (TIM) programs are widely implemented with 
the goal of reducing response time to incidents, thus, reducing incident duration and 
ensuing traffic delays and congestion. Many strategies that apply for incident 
management, such as implementing signage or traffic redirection, have application in 
work zone management as well (FHWA 2010). However, the impact of these strategies 
may differ between applications (Ruehr 2010) primarily due to differences in duration 
and length of affected area. For example, while roadway maintenance is scheduled in 
advance, incidents arise stochastically; thus, plans for their management may differ.  
A host of programs and policies, often relying on incentives and disincentives, are 
being considered across the U.S. with the aim of supporting efforts that directly reduce 
emissions from on-road vehicle traffic (Ou et al. 2010; Wise et al. 2010). These include 
those that aim to reduce traffic congestion, such as programs that aim to increase transit 
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ridership, reduce roadway use during peak hours (e.g., congestion pricing), eliminate 
bottlenecks and improve traffic flow along arterials through changes in traffic control 
strategies and improve traffic signal coordination. Often, these programs and policies 
(DOE 2012) aim to increase rates of penetration of improved vehicle technology on the 
roadways by promoting ownership of more efficient vehicle technologies, such as electric 
plug-in vehicles. The effectiveness of a particular vehicle technology in reducing 
emissions from vehicle use is also impacted by the type of fuel used (Westerholm and 
Egeback 1994). Other policies, like those that impose taxes on fuel purchases or charge 
for roadway use, have been designed to reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT) (e.g., 
Beevers and Carslaw 2005). Moreover, programs that incentivize construction plans with 
goals to reduce emissions have been applied in a variety of locations (Ahn et al. 2010). 
Additional efforts have been expended to assess the effectiveness of these programs (e.g., 
Anas 2009); however, it must be noted that the potential impact on emissions reduction is 
often difficult to ascertain both before its implementation and after. 
A number of tools have been developed for general estimation of emissions from 
on-road vehicles. Barth and Boriboonsomsin (2008) developed a regression emissions 
estimation model for emissions from freeways considering average speeds. Microscopic 
emissions estimation models, including MOVES (EPA 2010), CMEM (CMEM 2011), 
MEASURE (Bachman 1997), VT-MICRO (Rakha et al. 2003), have been proposed in 
the literature. These models provide vehicle-specific emissions estimates. While some 
models can be used independently, others (such as CMEM, VT-Micro,) function in 
parallel with traffic simulation models as plug-ins receiving modal vehicular parameters 
(e.g., vehicular speed, engine mode) as inputs for emissions estimation.  
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In addition to these general tools, a number of works have proposed models with 
more specific application. Unal et al. (2003) proposed a model for estimating emissions 
produced by on-road traffic that employs emission factors (EFs) associated with each 
stage of the driving cycle, including idling, acceleration, deceleration and cruising. They 
applied their approach to study the cost of emissions reduction through vehicle 
technology adoption and found that the cost of a trip would increase by 10% for every 
1% reduction in CO2 emitted. In their work, Unal et al. also considered the impact of 
congestion management strategies on congestion, but comment that changes in 
congestion cannot necessarily be equilibrated to changes in emissions. Further, two tools 
have been developed specifically for the analysis of work zone effects on emissions 
production: Enhanced QUEWZ-98 with “Emission Workbook” (Benz and Fenno 2011) 
and WZCAT (Lee et al. 2008). These tools base their estimates on average emissions 
rates and consider limited vehicle classes, e.g., light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Based on a 
study in Beijing, Anas (2009) reported that improvements in vehicle technology can 
significantly reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions; although, details of the 
analysis were not provided. 
Ahn et al. (2002) developed nonlinear regression models to predict the amount of 
CO2 emissions as a function of second-by-second vehicle speed and acceleration. In an 
effort to address impracticalities of these models, Afotey (2008) proposed alternative 
models for highway and arterial CO2 emissions estimation that similarly incorporate 
vehicle speed and acceleration, but using data derived through real-world experiments. 
Afotey presented linear multiple regression models with emissions as the dependent 
variable and vehicle speed, acceleration, deceleration and power demand as the 
 106 
 
independent variables for both highways and arterials. Obtaining input data related to 
power demand is impractical. Additionally, the models were found to have R-squared 
values of 0.26 and 0.61, respectively. Afotey suggested that inclusion of other important 
factors, including road grade, weather conditions, air conditioning usage, tire pressure, 
road surface conditions and total vehicle weight, could result in a model with better fit; 
however, no such models were provided. In general, models that employ a linear 
formulation have been found to provide insufficient prediction capability. A model with 
greater prediction capability and obtainable input data is desired. This chapter seeks to fill 
this need.  
In this chapter, the effects of changes in vehicle volume and composition, as well 
as the impact of temporary roadway capacity reductions due to construction activities or 
traffic incidents on GHG emissions resulting from on-road traffic, are studied. The effects 
of these changes and reductions along arterials and freeways are investigated and 
compared by analyzing results from systematically designed simulation runs using a 
microscopic traffic simulation model of a corridor in Maryland. Results in terms of the 
carbon dioxide equivalent of calculated emissions, including CO2, CO, CH4, THC, NOx, 
SOx, PM10, and PM2.5, are obtained through application of ORSEEM (On-Road 
Simulation Emission Estimation Model) described in the next section. From this study, 
general insights were derived and statistically verified nonlinear multi-regression 
emission estimation models were developed to support analyses for other comparable 
roadways. Insights into potential gains that can be achieved from specific emissions 




The authors know of no other work that studies the effectiveness in terms of 
emissions reduction of policies or other programs aimed at changing vehicle technology 
adoption or work zone/incident management implementations. 
 4.2 On-Road Simulation Emissions Estimation Model (ORSEEM)  
 
ORSEEM, developed for this study and designed to be portable from project to project, is 
a microscopic emissions estimation tool that estimates the production of air pollutants as 
a function of modal vehicular parameters (e.g., velocity, acceleration, stops, starts, and 
idling), vehicle composition categories (e.g., passenger cars, trucks, semis, and buses) 
and class (age and tier level), and accounts for the increased prevalence of alternative 
vehicles on our roadways. ORSEEM also includes commercially available alternative 
fuels, like biodiesel blends, ethanol blends and reformulated gasoline. It estimates all 
criteria air pollutants (except air toxics), namely CO2, CO, CH4, THC, NOx, SOx, PM10 
and PM2.5. ORSEEM employs empirical formulae suggested by Barth et al. (2002), but 
an updated EFs database to account for new technologies and alternative fuels. 
Adjustment factors are applied to account for greater efficiencies of hybrid passenger 
vehicles, including both cars and light-duty trucks. Further, the impact on emissions of 
added power requirements due to roadway grade changes is included in ORSEEM. This 
is important because a 1% increase in roadway grade can result in more than 9% increase 
in fuel consumption and carbon emission rates (Park and Rakha 2006). Moreover, an 
increase in emissions on the order of 42 to 80% was found for some emission types 
resulting from increased grade-weight combinations (Fernández and Long 1995). 
ORSEEM input information includes: vehicle characteristics (such as vehicle 
type, fuel type, weight, vehicle age group, vehicle make year, vehicle engine size), 
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vehicle speed, acceleration, study time span, and position in the network (i.e. link 
number). Users may obtain these vehicle records by either utilizing a traffic simulation 
model, such as VISSIM, PARAMICS, or CORSIM, or through field investigation. The 
module, however, was developed based on output options available through the 
microscopic traffic simulation modeling platform VISSIM (version 5.40) from PTV, Inc. 
This platform was chosen due to its wide use, flexibility, detailed output, and tested 
ability to replicate traffic conditions. 
Building on EFs employed within MOVES, and equations and concepts used in 
the development of CMEM, ORSEEM uses a power-based approach to estimate 
emissions wherein vehicle characteristics and modal parameters, namely vehicle mass, 
velocity and acceleration were used to calculate vehicle specific power (VSP) demand. 
VSP and related instantaneous velocity were used to determine the EFs for CH4, PM10, 
CO2 and SOx pollutants and subsequently the related emissions results.  
ORSEEM was developed and coded as a spreadsheet tool in Microsoft Excel 
Visual Basic for Application (VBA). It uses lookup tables for emission rates obtained 
from EPA’s MOVES (EPA 2012b) along with additional updated database extensions to 
account for newer vehicular technologies. The ORSEEM database was classified by base 
fuel type (i.e. gasoline or diesel) and includes seven categories of on-road vehicles based 
on their gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR), namely: light-duty vehicles (LDV), light-
duty trucks (LDTs), two classes of light heavy-duty vehicles (LHDs), medium heavy-
duty vehicle (MHDs), heavy heavy-duty vehicles (HHDs) and buses. Each vehicle 
category was classified by model year extending from 1995 to 2020, and then by vehicle 
age class and 22 operating modes. Vehicle age classes, or the difference in the current 
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year and the vehicle model year, were categorized as 0-3, 4-5, 6-7, 7-9, 10-14, 15-19 and 
20 years and older. 
It is known that vehicle emissions are a product of several operating modes, such 
as start exhaust, running exhaust, idle exhaust, evaporation permeation, fuel vapor 
venting, brake, brake wear and tire wear. Running and idle exhaust emissions are 
determined using ORSEEM as these operating modes are displayed most on highways 
and arterial roadways. It is also assumed that since instantaneous emission estimates are 
determined within ORSEEM, those emissions that result from the process of evaporating 
fuel in the vehicle’s fuel injection system, especially between fuel pump cycles and 
during conditions resulting in negative power demand, are inherently captured within the 
results produced by ORSEEM, either within the running exhaust emission results (when 
power demand is positive), or within vehicular process emissions, i.e. THC, CO, PM, 
CH4 emissions (when power demand is negative). Moreover, there are many variables 
that contribute to engine power, such as engine speed, air-to-fuel ratio, fuel use and 
catalyst pass fraction, but vehicle emissions are most influenced by engine power and 
fuel use. Thus, these variables were included in the emissions estimation process of 
ORSEEM. See (Miller-Hooks et al. 2012) for additional details. 
Naturally occurring atmospheric gases, such as water vapor, CO2, N2O, CH4, 
ozone (O3), and anthropogenic-produced gases, such as halocarbons, nitric oxide (NO), 
CO, aerosols, and fluorinated gases, are collectively classified as GHGs. Other air 
pollutants, such as SOx, ROGs and particulate matter (PM), also indirectly affect 
greenhouse effect (EPA 2010). GHGs are measured qualitatively through global warming 
potentials (GWPs), a measure of the amount of radioactive force absorbed by one unit 
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mass of a GHG to that of one unit mass of reference gas over a specified time period 
(IPCC 2007). That is, GWP measures how much heat the corresponding GHG traps in the 
atmosphere in comparison to carbon dioxide. The existence of such gases creates a 
greenhouse effect, a natural phenomenon that is induced when atmospheric gases trap the 
ultraviolet rays from the sun within the earth’s atmosphere, that is essential in 
maintaining the earth’s temperature and climatic conditions. ORSEEM calculates the 
total emissions in carbon dioxide equivalents by using appropriate 100 year GWPs. In 
general GWPs are calculated for 20, 100 or 500 years, but the most commonly used rate 
is for 100 year increment (Gillenwater 2010).  
Estimates from numerical experiments involving ORSEEM fell within reasonable 
accuracy as per the 2011 CAFÉ standards (LDV: 27.3 mpg and 326 g CO2/mi; LDT: 24.1 
and 369 g CO2/mi). However, it must be noted that on average ORSEEM’s emissions 
production estimates were 40% lower than the national values, and fuel consumption 
estimates were 29% lower for LDVs. For LDTs, the values were 80% and 5% lower for 
emissions and fuel consumption, respectively. Such conservative estimates were likely 
produced, because ORSEEM uses a microscopic approach (i.e. summation of 
instantaneous estimates) and updated EF data for emissions and fuel consumption 
estimation as compared with EF data used to produce the national values. Moreover, it 
must be noted that the national values were derived from average fuel consumption 
estimates using a macroscopic approach, based on EFs and vehicle technologies related 
to older data sets (EPA 2000). Thus, it was expected that the results would be lower as 
compared to the national values derived from average fuel consumption. 
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ORSEEM explicitly considers important variables relevant to assessing transportation 
policies and management programs and is, therefore, comprehensive in its estimation of 
on-road modal emissions. It provides an essential tool for considering the environmental 
effects of proposed policies, congestion and incident management programs, maintenance 
operations, changes in driver behavior or vehicle composition, and alternative roadway 
designs or new approaches to operations (e.g., High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) to High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane conversion). In the next section, ORSEEM is applied in the 
quantification of savings in emissions due to roadway enhancements, as well as of 
negative impacts from lane closures due to maintenance activities and incidents. 
4.3 Case Study 
 
The impacts from older vehicular technologies, work zones, and traffic incidents on 
emissions quantities are investigated through simulation on a case study involving a 
corridor located primarily in Rockville, Maryland. Simulation runs replicated an hour 
within the morning peak period (6:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m.). VISSIM (version 5.40) was used 
and ORSEEM was applied. From each simulation run, information pertaining to 
vehicular movements on a second-by-second basis was recorded. This information was 
employed by ORSEEM post-simulation to provide estimates of on-road emissions from 
simulated roadway use. For each combination of different factors considered in the 
simulation design, three simulation runs were made, each with a different seed value. 
Average results over these runs are reported. Parameters, such as driving behavior for 
arterials and highways, were set identically across all simulation runs. One run of the 
VISSIM model replicated traffic movements for 5,400 seconds, the first 1,800 seconds of 
which was the warm-up period. 
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The study area is depicted in Figure 4-1, both on a roadway map (1a and b) and in 
the chosen simulation modeling framework (see Figure 4-1c and 4-1d). The corridor 
spans a 7 mile stretch of I-270 (a freeway) and MD-355 (an arterial), major north-south 
roadways connecting the Washington Beltway (I-495) with the newly constructed 
Intercounty Connector (ICC), and connecting arterials. It is bounded by Montrose Road 
in the south end. The network depicting this corridor includes not only freeway, but 
arterials with signalized intersections. Just south of this location are the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s headquarters and the National Naval Medical Center in 
Bethesda. Moreover, the corridor is a focus of smart growth initiatives and home to 
several companies, medical facilities and government agencies (e.g., the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). These facilities are additional commuter traffic generators for this 
area.  
The study roadway segment consists of six interchanges connecting I-270 with 
local roads. The interchanges involve eight on-ramps from local roads to Collector / 
Distributor (CD) lanes, five off-ramps from the CD lanes to the local roads, four slip 
ramps from CD lanes to General Purpose (GP) lanes, and two slip ramps from GP lanes 
to CD lanes. Access to/from the 1,000 foot section of the existing HOV lane that is 
closest to the Spur was restricted. For simplicity, continuous access was assumed. Traffic 
demand data was provided by the Maryland State Highway Administration (SHA) based 
on 2006 survey data. MD-355 runs parallel to the I-270 freeway and consists of multiple 
interchanges with local roads. North and southbound lanes were included in each model. 
A total of 162 (91 freeway and 71 arterial) lane miles were modeled as depicted in Figure 
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Figure 4-1: Freeway I-270 and arterial road MD-355 (6.5 and 7 mile stretches) 
 
The simulation environment requires significant data input. Traffic demand data 
for this network of roadways was provided by SHA based on 2011 data and was assumed 
to enter the network over the simulated period. For the freeway portion of the corridor, 
the northbound and southbound 2006 vehicle composition data (Table 4-1) from Chou et 
al. (2010) was employed. Truck and bus percentages were between 6 and 11% for 
freeway segments and approximately 2% for arterials. Arterial data were extracted from 






signal timing plans specific to the analyzed area were obtained from SHA. Information 
for vehicle-specific characteristics, such as traffic composition, type, model, make and 
engine specifications, were obtained from the Maryland Department of the Environment 
(MDE). Heavy-duty trucks, including buses, were included with an average share of 
7.46% for northbound and 6.87% for southbound directions typical to the considered area 
(Chou et al. 2010). Parameters used in the simulation runs were calibrated based on travel 
times obtained from field measurements. A description of the calibration effort associated 
with I-270 can be found in (Miller-Hooks et al. 2011). 
The VISSIM simulation software offers a COM (Component Object Model) (PTV 
2009) interface that permits flexibility in controlling various parameters of the simulation 
environment. The COM interface was used to create batch runs and lane blockage events 
developed to imitate lane closures due to work zones and incidents. The approach used to 
model the lane blockage events of work zones and incidents within the VISSIM platform 
is based on procedures developed in a prior work (Chou et al. 2010). While VISSIM 
permits direct modeling of such events through the introduction of a parking space with 
duration of application, the timing of such events is random. This alternative 
methodology involves the use of the “Add vehicle” function that exists within VISSIM’s 
COM interface. The function places a vehicle with zero speed at a specific location and 
time, and also removes the vehicle at a desired time. A reduced speed area is applied in 
the lane adjacent to the incident one-quarter mile upstream of the incident location. The 
work zone is assumed to be 2,500 feet in length with a set speed of 30 mph and reduced 
speed area along the length of the work zone. A speed limit reduction between 5 and 10 
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mph from the original speed limit is applied based on recommendations in (Chin et al. 
2002; SHA 2009). 
The VISSIM simulation platform allows the setting of a variety of parameters that 
govern driving behavior and vehicular interactions. Their specific settings affect travel 
time, delay, speed, acceleration and other estimates produced in each run. The 
appropriate value of each parameter depends on the particular characteristics of the 
roadway being modeled and aggressiveness of drivers in the area of study. This study 
involves a network of both arterial and freeway links; thus, parameter settings must be 
chosen to suit the particular link characteristics. Simulation of arterial roads involves 
modeling of frequent stop-and-go driving conditions due not only to congestion but 
traffic control devices. Moreover, maximum speed limitations along with frequent need 
for lane changing and turning affect driving behavior. Parameter values obtained in a 
prior calibration study using observed segment travel times conducted for a VISSIM 
model of I-270 (Miller-Hooks et al. 2011) are used herein for the freeway portion of the 
developed corridor model. Their values are given as follows. CC1: 0.9 second (default); 
CC2: 12 feet; CC4&5: ±1.4 mph; SDRF: 0.4; WTBD: 9999 seconds; and LBD: 800 (GP 
lanes), 800 (off-ramp/slip ramp), 400 (on-ramp), 600 (CD lane), and 1,000 meters (spur). 
In addition, the Wiedmann 99 model for car following is employed.  
For portions of the network involving arterial links, the Wiedmann 74 model was 
employed in which safety distance calculations included within the model capture 
nonlinear relationships that exist on arterials. Additionally, “look back” distances are 
smaller for arterials than freeways, and thus are set to 65.6-98.42 feet (20-30 meters) for 
arterials as compared with 656.16 feet (200 meters the VISSIM default) for freeways. For 
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the arterial portion of the network, the minimum “look ahead” distance is set to a default 
value of zero meters, allowing for adequate space for driving decisions. The average 
standstill distance is set to the default value of 6.56 feet. The additive and multiplicative 
portions of the safety distance factor are 2 and 3 feet, respectively. The desired speed for 
the main artery (MD-355) was set to be between 45 and 50 mph. For approaching local 
roads, based on data received from SHA, the desired speed was set to 22.5 mph. Traffic 
control, including stop signs and signals, were set up in all intersections of the arterial 
network as per actual operations. 
4.4 Vehicle Composition and Volume Change Impacts 
 
To assess the effects of changes in vehicle composition and total volume on emissions for 
the case study location, each experiment involved the setting of vehicular composition in 
terms of manufacture year, engine capacity, fuel type (conventional fuel vs. diesel), and 
total volume. These factors directly influence emissions and can be affected through 
incentives and policies. Each specific setting of composition and volume is referred to as 
a scenario. Data required to support the experiments, scenario development, results of 
simulation runs and development of a regression model for emissions estimation are 
described next. 
4.4.1 Simulation Data 
 
Data associated with vehicle composition were obtained for Montgomery County, 
Maryland for years 2005 and 2010 from the MDE. This data was provided in the form of 
a list of registered vehicles and their vehicle identification numbers (VINs). Each VIN 
was reviewed using AutoCheck, a commercial entity that provides detailed information 
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on any vehicle with a registered VIN. As obtaining information on every registered 
vehicle in the county would require years of effort, a stratified sampling technique was 
used to choose a representative sample from which the vehicle composition was 
determined. The sampling method considered the following categories: 0-3; 4-5; 6-7; 8-9; 
10-14; 15-19; 20+ years old, corresponding to manufacturing years: 2010-2007; 2006-
2005; 2004-2003; 2002-2001; 2000-1996; 1995-1991; 1990-1800. Based on guidelines 
given in (Survey Systems 2012), a total sample size of 500 vehicles was chosen. The 
number of randomly selected vehicles in each age category, i.e. the split of the 500 
samples over vehicle age, is shown in Table 4-1 for both study years. Note that 2010 is 
used as the benchmark year; thus, there are zero vehicles “less than 5 years old” for 2005 
vehicles.  




Quantity Share in Total Number of selected VINs by group 
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
0-3 2010-2007 0 183,201 0.00% 25.14% 0 126 
4-5 2006-2005 51,036 109,747 7.37% 15.05% 37 75 
6-7 2004-2003 126,356 112,065 18.25% 15.37% 91 77 
8-9 2002-2001 121,185 96,955 17.51% 13.30% 88 67 
10-14 2000-1996 226,557 150,422 32.73% 20.64% 164 103 
15-19 1995-1991 109,529 49,097 15.82% 6.74% 79 34 
20+ 1990- 57,519 27,354 8.31% 3.75% 42 19 
Total 692,182 728,841 100% 100% 501* 501* 
*extra vehicle due to rounding error 
 
Information on engine capacity, style, make, body shape, and year of manufacture 
were collected for all samples. Ideally, 172 combinations would be used to characterize 
the variety of vehicles registered in Montgomery County, as there are 172 combinations 
of engine style and make in the set of registered vehicles. These characteristics affect the 
fuel burn rate. However, such a large number of categories would be prohibitive for the 
VISSIM modeler. It is more typical to work with ten or fewer categories. Thus, an engine 
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capacity-based categorization approach was adopted. Specifically, engine capacities were 
divided into eight categories ranging from 1 to 8.99 liters. Figure 4-2 and 4-3 depict the 
distribution of engine capacity categories for the 501 samples in each year. The number 
of different engine capacities falling within each category is also noted. 
    
Figure 4-2: Distribution of engine capacities and number of engines by category 
 
4.4.2 Experimental Design 
 
The impact on on-road emissions from changes in vehicle composition in terms of engine 
capacity and increases in traffic volume in proportion to increases in vehicle ownership 
was studied through extensive simulation testing on the case study over a set of scenarios. 
Specification of each scenario entails the setting of two model elements:  the distribution 
of vehicles by engine capacity (composition) and total number of vehicles entering the 
network in the simulation period (traffic volume). The effects of changes to these 
elements were explored by comparing results across scenarios. The first set involves 
increases in total volume from base year 2005 to levels observed in 2010 and higher. A 
5.3% increase in total vehicle ownership arose between 2005 and 2010. Base year data 
were computed from the actual Montgomery County vehicle registration data described 
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in the previous section. Increases of between 0 and 20% in 5% increments were made. 
For any given percentage change, the increase is applied uniformly over the eight engine 
categories. Five design scenarios were considered for both freeway and arterial studies: 
(a) 2005 base data, (b) 2005 base data with 5% increase in traffic volume, (c) 2005 base 
data with 10% increase in volume, (d) 2005 base data with 20% increase in volume, and 
(e) 2010 base data.  
Within these experiments, input data, such as speed and acceleration at small time 
steps for each vehicle given vehicle characteristics, were produced through VISSIM. 
Ideally, modal parameters, like speed, will be input on a second-by-second basis, for each 
simulated vehicle, over the entirety of the network and simulation period. For this study, 
a typical data set produced was between 2 and 4 gigabytes in size. Even opening a file 
with such a large amount of data can be problematic. Thus, it was necessary to take steps 
to reduce the size of the output data set. In this effort, a methodology to collect modal 
parameters for link groups within the simulation network was developed. For the purpose 
of recording and reporting this data, the study area was divided into sections, consisting 
of groups of model links. The arterial network was divided into 12 link groups and the 
freeway network into 7 link groups. VISSIM runs were made separately for each link 
group, because VISSIM does not have the capability to generate separate output files for 




Figure 4-3: Engine capacity distributions by age groups in 2005 
 
In the runs, modal parameters were collected at 5-second increments (recording 
every 5
th
 data point). Each smaller data set associated with a link group was fed to 
ORSEEM, which produced emissions estimates. Preliminary runs to compare accuracy of 
emissions estimates that are computed from such a sampling method by time step 
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indicated a 0.4% loss in accuracy due to the use of 5-second increments. Once emissions 
estimates for the chosen time steps were obtained, total emissions were derived by 
scaling emission values by time step increment (i.e. multiplying the result by 5).  
After the simulation runs were conducted, a mapping of engine capacities to age 
group and tier level was required to produce emissions estimates from the simulation 
output. ORSEEM needs 12 categories of data for evaluation, namely: link number (based 
on micro-simulation model notation), time step (a number greater than zero, increment in 
which emissions estimates are calculated), vehicle type (LDV, LDT, LHD<=14K, 
LHD<=19.5K, MHD, HHD, urban bus), make year (<1995 to 2010), age group (0 - 3, 4 - 
5, 6 - 7, 8 - 9, 10 - 14, 15 - 19, 20 – 99 years), fuel type (gasoline, RFG, CNG, E10, E85, 
diesel, LSD, ULSD, B5, B20, B50), weight of vehicle, engine size (LDV(2.2 L), LDV 
hybrid (2.5 L), LDT (3.9 L), LDT hybrid (6 L), LHD<=14K (5.95 L), LHD<=19.5K & 
MHD (6.7 L), HHD (12.84 L), urban bus and urban bus hybrid (8.2 L)), speed (0-70 
mph), desired acceleration, hybrid information (percentage of total), and gradient.  
To complete this mapping, developed distributions of engine capacity by age 
group for both 2005 and 2010 data sets were used. These distributions were determined 
based on the sampled set of the vehicles described in Table 4-1. To illustrate, consider 
Figure 4-3 and an output file with data for 100,000 vehicles. 7.37% of the total vehicle 
population in 2005 fell within the 4-5 year age group (see Table 4-1). For the same age 
group and base year, the share of 2-2.99 L engine vehicles was calculated to be 17%. 
Thus, 17% of 7.37% vehicles would fall in age group 4-5 and of the 100,000 vehicles, 
1,253 vehicles have a 2-2.99L engine and are 4-5 years in age.  
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Each VISSIM run on the freeway and arterial portions of the corridor required 
approximately 5 and 7 minutes, respectively, on a Dell C750 personal computer with a 
3.10 gigahertz core i5-2000 processor, and 3.88 usable gigabytes of RAM, running a 64 
bit Windows 7 operating system. ORSEEM required nearly 27 hours to process the 
output from VISSIM on the same machine for a single scenario with one seed (i.e. 12 
runs for the arterial portion of the network and 7 runs for the freeway portion together). 
Additional time was required for pre-processing some of the VISSIM output to create the 
correspondence with categories needed in ORSEEM. 
4.4.3 Results 
 
Table 4-2. ORSEEM results for a freeway I-270 segment and arterial MD-355 
Scenario 
Total CO2e emissions in 
grams 
CO2e per vehicle per 
mile in grams 
CO2e per VMT in 
grams 
Freeway Arterial Freeway Arterial Freeway Arterial 
Base 2005 + 0% 54,724,819 17,786,342 1971 900 625 721 
Base 2005 + 5% 60,218,544 18,440,419 2090 911 662 734 
Base 2005 + 10% 62,326,869 19,229,943 2131 919 674 737 
Base 2005 + 20% 66,836,794 20,333,908 2133 951 679 774 
Base 2010 + 0% 51,076,119 15,402,411 1765 752 556 612 
 
For each scenario (comprised of link groups), total emissions given in terms of 
carbon dioxide equivalents, CO2e, taken over only the GHGs computed by ORSEEM 
were recorded as presented in Table 4-2. Results in Table 4-2 indicate that emissions 
increase better than linearly with increasing volume on the arterials and worse than 
linearly on the freeways. For example, a 5% increase in volume on the arterials resulted 
in a 3.67% increase in total emissions; whereas, the same increase resulted in a 10.03% 
increase in total emissions for freeways. As volume increases, the incremental change in 
emissions along both arterials and freeways diminished. A comparison between the 
2005+5% scenario (with total volume of 20,246) and 2010 base case (with total volume 
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of 20,489) was made to assess the impact of traffic composition change, while holding 
traffic volume essentially constant. The results indicate an emissions reduction of over 
15% can be expected for both arterials (16.47%) and freeways (15.18%) as a 
consequence of this change. 
These results do not account for throughput. As volume increased, speeds 
decreased resulting in greater emissions. An increase in emissions is expected under such 
conditions, because at the extreme ends of vehicular operating speeds, greater emissions 
are generated (Barth and Boriboonsomsin 2009), thereby increasing emissions rates per 
mile. To investigate the effects of volume and composition change, a comparison was 
made on both per vehicle and VMT bases. On a per vehicle basis, emissions were greater 
on the freeway than along the arterials. For both roadway classes, emissions per mile 
increased better than linearly with increasing volume. When comparing emissions by 
VMT, greater emissions were generated on the arterials as compared with the freeway. In 
general, this measure increased better than linearly with increasing traffic volume for 
both roadway classes. Generally, all measures improved with the more efficient 2010 
vehicle composition. Similar to findings for total emissions, in a comparison of 2005+5% 
with 2010 base case, emissions per VMT decreased by approximately 16% for both 
roadway types. Thus, the magnitude of emissions reduction due to vehicle technology 
improvements was quantified, providing numerical estimates to support policy decisions 





4.4.4 Multi-Regression Model Development for Traffic Volume and 
Composition Change 
 
Two multi-regression models of emissions in CO2e designed to capture the effects of 
traffic volume change on emissions were developed from the detailed output of the 
simulation runs involving millions of data points (for 1.66 million and 1.09 million data 
points for freeways and arterials, respectively) for the studied roadways. Each data point 
provided information on emissions associated with the movement of all vehicles in 5 
second time increments. A model was developed for arterials and another for freeways. 
The developed estimation models are intended to enable quick calculations for on-road 
traffic emissions. Such calculations can be used to estimate the effects of traffic volume, 
changes in vehicular composition (in terms of weight and engine capacity), average 
speed, acceleration, and roadway grade on emissions. These factors are known to be the 
main drivers of emission rates (Scienceonline 2012).  
 Calibration of the regression model was completed using SAS, a state-of-the-art 
statistical software package. The statistical importance of terms used in ORSEEM was 
investigated. The data used in model development for the freeway and arterial network 
consisted of the vehicular make year (MY), engine capacity/size (ES), speed of the 
vehicle at a given time instance (V), acceleration at the same time instance (A), roadway 
grade (G), and calculated value of emissions (E) for a particular vehicle at a given time 
instance. Nonnumeric inputs, like fuel type, were included in the analysis as categorical 
data. A surrogate, binary variable (H) was used to indicate whether or not each vehicle is 
a hybrid vehicle. The dependent variable in each multi-regression model is CO2e 




Freeway Multi-regression Function 
 
                                                         
                                               
                                           
                   
 
Arterial Multi-regression Function 
 
                                                         
                                               
                                                  
          
 
Application of these regression models requires input related to: MY, ES, V, A, 
H, and G. Plugging this information into the appropriate (arterial or freeway) model 
provides an estimate of emissions in CO2e generated by the vehicle at the given time 
instance. To evaluate the amount of emissions for a time interval, values for each time 
instance can be summed.  
A polynomial function with a power of five was found to provide a good fit for 
the data for both arterial and freeway emissions. The dataset on which each multi-
regression model was fitted is exceptionally large and thus concern associated with the 
use of a high power polynomial function and data over-fitting can be neglected (Agresti 
2009). Simulation time point, vehicle weight and various independent variables taken to a 
power were found to be insignificant. These terms were removed from the models. The 
effect of vehicle weight was captured through the vehicle engine size variable, which can 
be justified statistically (Agresti 2009).  
A power of five was chosen for the models based on a process that began with a 
linear model, and power terms were increased to the point where no significant 
improvement in R-squared value could be detected. R-square values are not used in the 
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assessment of polynomial models since their values can artificially be improved by 
increasing the power of the function. The change in R-square is a helpful measure as a 
stopping criterion for increase in degree of a function only. The mean square error 
resulting from the 5
th
 degree function is 1784.5 for freeways and 1072.2 for arterials. 
These values are acceptable, because they represent a ratio of mean squares and 
corresponding error degree of freedom resulting in satisfactory F value. Based on these 
values, the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are equal to zero was 
rejected. The results of tests, such as the F-test, show that the models provide a good fit to 
the data and the final chosen independent variables of the models are statistically 
significant. Additionally, residual plots support the choice of a polynomial form for the 
multi-regression model. The models were validated on an independent data set involving 
500 data points from three additional, similarly generated VISSIM runs. The difference in 
aggregate amount of emissions was approximately 5% for both models. Finally, a data 
partitioning approach was considered as an alternative; however, due to the shape of the 
plotted dataset, there was no partition that could provide a better fit than the chosen 
polynomial forms. Based on results of model validation and goodness-of-fit tests, the 
chosen explanatory variables were found to be suitable, variables were noted to be 
independent as per the Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation, and goodness-of-fit of the 
models was validated through a series of tests: Akaike Information Criterion, Mallow’s 
  , Bayesian Information Criterion, and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion.  
Earlier works by Ahn et al. (2002) and Yerramalla (2007) developed linear and 
polynomial regression functions to estimate emissions generated from on-road vehicles. 
The model developed by Ahn is based on instantaneous fuel consumption while 
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considering vehicle operational speed and acceleration. Acceleration is taken to be a 
polynomial function with power of 3. Yerramella used cruise speed to derive linear and 
later polynomial functions with powers of 2 and 3. Neither work captured the second-by-
second impact of vehicle operation on emissions estimates. The fuel consumption based 
model of Ahn employed the traffic simulation platform INTEGRATION and its 
embedded emissions estimation tool, which uses average modal parameters. Models 
proposed by Yerramalla estimate CO, HC, and NOx emissions using data from MOBILE 
6.2 and field measurements. Polynomial regression models with higher order were used 
in other works for similar analyses using independent variables of average fuel 
consumption and speed, again considering only one emission type from CO, HC and 
NOx (e.g., EPA 2005; Guensler et al. 1993; Stefanopoulou et al. 2008). 
4.5 Impact of Traffic Incidents and Work Zones  
4.5.1 The Experimental Data and Design for Traffic Incident and 
Work Zones  
 
Simulation runs were conducted to assess the impact of work zones resulting in single-
lane closures and shorter duration incidents similarly blocking one lane. In all runs, the 
traffic volume and vehicle composition were based on 2010 values. Each experimental 
run is defined by incident and work zone duration: 15, 30, 45 or 60 minutes. Work zones 
may last as long as days or weeks if not months, the effects of only as long as a one hour 
closure in morning rush hour were studied here.  
Because an incident of significant duration can impact traffic flow many miles 
upstream of the event, it was necessary to set the incident location at a point near the 
downstream end of the model. Thus, the incident location was set to arise 500 feet south 
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of the off-ramp to Montrose East for the Southbound portion of the model (see Figure 4-
1c). The work zone was located at the end of the Southbound lanes of the modeled 
roadway. 
This design involved eight scenarios and, thus, 168 simulation runs for incidents 
and work zones combined while considering seven link groups for analyzing the effect of 
incidents and work zones on the entire freeway network. Once the simulation runs were 
conducted, a mapping of engine capacities to age group and tier level was completed. 
This mapping associates the engine capacities from the sample with age groups from the 
larger, original data set. The generated data files were fed to ORSEEM for emissions 
calculation. Similar run times were required as in the vehicle volume and composition 
runs of Section 4-4. 
4.5.2 Results 
 
Total emissions estimates, again in terms of CO2e equivalents, from the simulation runs 
associated with incidents of varying duration and work zones over the study area are 
provided in Table 4-3. 
Emissions estimates associated with the blocking of a lane due to an incident or 
work zone were found in general to decrease with lane closure duration. This is 
counterintuitive, but can be explained. First, given original speed levels for this congested 
network, an increase in average speed due to the incident can reduce overall emissions. In 
these runs, average speeds of 34 and 35 mph were noted for the 60 minute incident and 
work zone freeway scenarios respectively. In contrast, where no lane closure exists (zero 
minute scenarios), the average speed was 25 mph. The optimal speed range for 
minimizing emissions generation is approximately 32 mph (Barth and Boriboonsomsin 
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2008; Rao et al. 2010; Unal et al. 2003). This nearly 10 mph increase in average speed 
arises from the increase in speed of vehicles just downstream of the rubbernecking area. 
Vehicles back up behind this area. Once passing the incident or workzone location, they 
can quickly attain desired speed levels. Second, while the average speed increased, the 
total throughput in the simulated hour decreased. Thus, one can expect total emissions for 
the time period to drop. Likewise, emissions decreased per VMT. Emissions rates per 
vehicle, however, generally increased with increasing incident or work zone duration, 
indicating that the total emissions that would be produced to serve the same number of 
vehicles as served under the no-lane blockage scenario will increase. A decrease in this 
rate was noted, however, where average speeds near 30 mph were attained, which is, 
again, consistent with theory from the literature (Barth and Boriboonsomsin 2009). 











Incident 51,076,119 49,004,221 46,486,317 49,343,474 47,140,041 




Incident 1765 1770 1679 1783 1703 




Incident 556 545 517 549 524 
Work Zone 556 549 526 543 542 
Total delay  hours 
Incident 680.771 690.036 711.655 719.994 723.47 
Work Zone 680.771 681.32 682.955 683.599 684.579 




3,193 2,642 2,642 2,642 2,718 
Left the 
Network 





3,193 2,642 2,642 2,642 2,698 
Left the 
Network 
25,699 25,078 25,078 25,078 25,022 
Total traveled distance 
in miles (VMT) 
Incident 91,835.69 89,938.36 89,938.35 89,938.31 89,898.08 
Work Zone 91,835.69 89,938.22 89,938.07 89,937.91 89,931.01 
 
A noticeable increase in emissions production from work zone events in 
comparison to incidents of comparable duration can be seen. This difference is largely 
due to the longer length of the lane blockage in the work zone event. Even larger 
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differences would be expected if stricter speed reductions near work zones were required 
and modeled. Note, too, that greater throughput is noted for the work zone as compared 
to incident events. Emissions, however, did not increase proportionately. 
These findings support potentially novel incentive options. In designing this 
study, it was assumed that work zones in general, including construction of buildings and 
other structures along the side of roadways that reduce capacity of adjacent traffic lanes, 
would lead to increased congestion and, therefore, increased emissions. Thus, policies 
could be designed that would assign costs associated with emissions abatement to 
construction project owners. However, under circumstances where average speeds 
approach optimal speed values for limiting emissions from on-road vehicular use, 
benefits of the work zone or incident may be derived. This would infer that incentives, 
rather than disincentives, might be offered to these firms if ideal speeds could be 
maintained as a consequence of the construction. It is standard to install reduced speed 
zones just prior to constructions zones. Speed reductions on the order of 5 to 10 miles per 
hour from the design speed are commonly suggested as noted earlier (Chin et al. 2002; 
Ruehr 2010, SHA 2009). This 5 to 10 miles per hour decrease in speed from the design 
speed rule may need to be revisited. Additionally, ORSEEM and developed regression 
models can provide the tools needed for evaluating the benefits of shifting work-day 
hours on emissions production and the potential return on investment from providing 





4.5.3 Multi-Regression Model Development for Traffic Incidents and 
Work Zones 
 
The two regression models developed for estimating per time increment carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions resulting from incident and work zone events are presented next. 
The relationship between dependent variable and explanatory variables for both models 
were found to be nonlinear, and a fifth degree polynomial regression was implemented 
for both based on a similar incremental experimental approach as used in the 
development of the models in section 4.4.4. The regression models for both incidents and 
work zones were developed for freeways only. In model validation on an independent 
data set generated through additional VISSIM runs and goodness-of-fit tests, the chosen 
explanatory variables were found to be suitable, variables were noted to be independent 
as per the Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation, and goodness-of-fit of the models was 
validated through a series of tests: Akaike Information Criterion, Mallow’s   , Bayesian 
Information Criterion, and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion. The final models 
are presented next in which BT refers to the duration of the lane blockage.  
Traffic Incident Emissions Estimation Model for Freeways  
 
                         
                                             
                                            
                                                 
                                            
            
 
Work Zone Emissions Estimation Model 
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These models were constructed on 3,835,825 and 4,804,895 data points for 
incident and work zone models, respectively. In validating the results on separate data, 
emissions estimates fell within 5-7% of ORSEEM-generated estimates. In comparison to 
related studies (e.g., Afotey 2008; Ahn et al. 2002; EPA 2005; Guensler et al. 1993; 
Stefanopoulou et al. 2008; Yerramalla 2007) in which regression models were developed 
for fuel consumption or a specific emission type, this combined modeling approach 
produced significantly improved estimation capability with practical utility, i.e. using 
easily obtainable input data.  
4.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter studies the effects on emissions due to traffic volume increases and 
composition changes for both arterials and freeways. Additionally, the impact of traffic 
incidents and work zones along freeways were analyzed. Estimates were made from 
numerical experiments on a case study involving a 7-mile stretch, with a total of 162 lane 
miles of a major Maryland corridor in close proximity to Washington, D.C. The potential 
utility of the models proposed herein in policy and incentive development to achieve 
emissions reduction goals related to on-road traffic are discussed, new potential policy 
directions are suggested, and findings from the numerical experiments are provided. 
Specifically, the results of the analysis indicate that vehicle composition greatly affects 
the amount of emissions, and significant potential for reaching emissions reduction goals 
exists through improvements in vehicle mix efficiencies within the traffic composition. 
Due to lower throughput as a consequence of an incident or work zone that reduces 
roadway capacity, emissions during the simulation period decreased. However, emissions 
rates per vehicle passing through the study segment during the incident or work zone time 
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period were found to generally rise. Thus, total emissions will generally increase when 
serving the same total number of vehicles. It was noted, however, that the lane blockage 
due to a work zone or incident could lead to an increase in average speed over the 
segment due to free flow conditions that result downstream of the event. When the 
average speed over the segment approached 30 mph, overall improvements in emissions 
output, even when accounting for all throughput to be served, were noted. This has 
interesting and non-intuitive regulatory repercussions. Additional runs would be required 
to study these events with a larger number of lanes blocked or shoulder-only blockages. 
Moreover, simulation runs for both incident and work zone cases were for a single 
location along the study segment stretch. Runs with varying locations for both cases may 
provide additional insights. 
Nonlinear multi-regression emissions estimation models were derived for vehicle 
volume, work zone and incident scenarios. The models were validated on a second set of 
data and were found to meet goodness-of-fit requirements. In all four models, 
improvement in model fit due to inclusion of an intercept and statistical conflict 
associated with removing intercepts from the models, were significant enough to warrant 
their inclusion despite the anomaly for the zero vehicle case. 
There are a number of limitations of this study, and hence the use of the 
developed regression models. For example, traffic volume increases of only up to 20% 
from the 2005 base year were considered. An increase of only 5.3% occurred between 
2005 and 2010. This, however, might be constraining in future years when traffic 
volumes may increase beyond the 20%, it is not likely to be a limiting factor for near-
term future analyses. Even though the models were developed based on millions of data 
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points, only one change in vehicle composition was tested. Systematic study of vehicular 
technology changes is required to draw more general conclusions. Findings given herein 
were developed from numerical experiments. Field tests would be needed to validate the 
findings and estimates generated through VISSIM and ORSEEM. Comprehensive field 
tests as would be required would be very difficult and expensive to conduct, however. 
This study employed a single corridor in a congested urban area. Actual, rather 
than general, signal timing plans and estimated turning percentages were employed. 
General findings obtained from the numerical experiments may apply only to locations 
with similar roadway geometry (including grade), traffic operations and vehicular mixes, 
and emissions estimates derived from the regression models should be applied 
accordingly. 
Despite these limitations, this chapter makes a significant contribution to the 
literature. In addition to providing insights from results of numerical experiments based 
on a detailed, calibrated model of a real corridor involving both freeway and arterials in 
the Washington, D.C. region, it provides multiple regression equations that can be 
employed on comparable roadways to estimate the emissions effects of a variety of 
inputs, thus, obviating the need for expensive and extensive computer runs. Model run 
results and regression equations were derived from second-by-second modal information 
from a range of vehicle technologies, thus, supplying more representative estimates and 
capturing emissions resulting from roadway geometry characteristics and driver behavior. 
Another advantage of the results and proposed models is that they were obtained using 
ORSEEM, which uses more accurate, updated EFs as compared with other available 
emissions tools used in prior related studies. ORSEEM also includes a wide range of 
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GHG emissions, and thus the findings and tools provided here incorporate multiple 
emission types. This allows detailed analyses associated with a vehicle composition that 
includes newer vehicular technologies. Power demand is explicitly considered in the 
creation of the regression models, yet the regression models do not require its direct input 
from the user. This provides a practical means for its consideration. Moreover, developed 
regression models are implementable, requiring input that is available in practice. Finally, 
few works have provided quantification tools for computing the implications of work 
zones, incidents and a shift in vehicle technology on total roadway emissions as is 






CHAPTER 5: ANALYZING CARBON PRICING EFFECTS 
ON GLOBAL NATURAL GAS MARKETS: SUPPLIERS’ 





The carbon policy impact on the natural gas industry has not been analyzed in detail. 
Thus, given the importance of this industry and climate change goals this chapter 
provides an analysis which will hopefully guide decision-makers for sustainable future 
for the industry. In particular this chapter examines what fraction of carbon taxes should 
be applied to various parts of the natural gas supply chain. Some findings include: the 
larger the fraction applied to the supply side can be either detrimental or beneficial to 










5.1 Introduction  
 
Global climate change is already a proven fact that has devastating consequences. 
Naturally occurring greenhouse gas emissions commonly expressed in terms of CO2e 
(carbon dioxide equivalents) are filtered by nature itself. Unfortunately, emission levels 
increase over time due to human activities and the excess amount of emissions contribute 
to global warming (IPCC 2001; Stern 2007; EPA 2012; NASA 2012). Climate change 
would not become an issue if the excess amount of emissions were successfully filtered 
by the surrounding environment. The impact of climate change is already obvious-rising 
sea levels, hurricanes and tornados, droughts or heavy rainfalls (NASA 2012). Therefore 
any measures and steps aimed at reducing the rate of climate change are of interest to 
many researchers and environmental agencies across the world. Natural gas is 
comparably a less emitting and low-cost fossil fuel making it a preferable alternative 
energy source or a bridging fuel between conventional fuels and renewable energy 
sources. It is expanding its market share due to its abundant reserves, technological 
achievements and environmental considerations thereby minimizing adverse impacts on 
the climate. 
Understanding the importance of reducing emissions and the impacts of climate 
change, many decision-makers and researchers joined efforts to develop short- and long-
term policies that would hold emitting industries responsible and accountable for their 
emissions (EPA 2007). These industries represent mainly large energy producers and 
consumers. Traditionally, a significant portion of energy demand has been satisfied 
mainly through the combustion of natural resources, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. 
Since natural gas is the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel and is more abundant 
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than oil or coal, it is considered to be the bridging fuel between future efficient renewable 
energy sources and traditional fossil fuels. The consumption of natural gas is growing 
worldwide (Figure 5-1). It has increased from 15% in 1965 to 24% in 2010, or 
equivalently from 23 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to 104 Tcf (MIT, 2010). The expansion of 
the natural gas market is determined not only by direct preferences of major consumers, 
such as electricity producers or cement and steel manufacturers, but also by gradual and 
steady technological changes. 
  
     
Figure 5-1: North American (left) and Total World (right) Natural Gas 
Consumption. 
Source: (EIA 2010a) 
 
Natural gas has the potential to be a widely traded energy source for consumers 
that have high energy demand but suffer from insufficient and expensive supplies. 
Forecasts indicate further growth in natural gas demand in North American, Eurasian and 
Middle Eastern energy markets (Figure 5-1) (AGA 2008; EIA 2010a; MIT 2010).  
Since natural gas is expanding its share in global energy markets, it becomes 
important to regulate emissions from this industry. Even though natural gas is cleaner 
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than other fossil fuels, its extraction and combustion still generate greenhouse gases 
contributing to global warming. The decision-making process aimed at building a cleaner 
environment is a challenging task and sometimes it becomes necessary to address 
problems of not only technical, but also of economic and political feasibility. 
To regulate the amount of emissions in specific industries, a number of policies 
and bills have been proposed in the U.S. and around the world. For instance, the proposed 
Waxman-Markey Climate Bill (H.R. 2454 2009), represented the trade part of the carbon 
cap-and-trade mechanism by imposing a cap on 85% of polluting industries, including 
electricity producers, oil refineries, natural gas suppliers, and energy-intensive industries 
(iron, steel, cement, paper manufacturers, etc.). Given such approach for industries, it is 
important to determine the most appropriate policies for implementing carbon taxation, 
cap and trade programs along with carbon permits and allowances. Developing and 
determining the efficiency of policy mechanisms is complicated when considering both 
the supply and the demand sides of the market.  
A number of studies addressed the issue of finding an optimal greenhouse gas tax 
used in carbon taxation policies. For instance, Baumol (1972) states that it is hard to 
measure the impact of any externality, and, hence, there is a need for further analysis to 
understand the impact of carbon policies, particularly for the natural gas sector. In this 
chapter, we discuss game theoretic approaches for the natural gas industry that can be 
indirectly applied for such analyses and help in assessing the impact of greenhouse gas 
taxes.  
There are various methods used to determine the amount of a greenhouse gas tax, 
and the social cost (considered as an inclusive cost of adverse impacts of carbon emission 
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on the society) of the carbon is one of them. The social cost of carbon per unit to be paid 
is calculated based on the damage caused by carbon emissions. The issue of carbon 
policies and price determination was studied previously by others. Yonal et al. (2007a) 
suggested that the cost of allowances (which can be transformed and used as a cost of 
carbon in cap and trade system) for carbon should be equal to the social cost of carbon. 
They also found that the social cost of carbon (the cost of the damage caused by carbon 
emissions) is uncertain and there is no single approach that may satisfy all industries 
(Yonal et al. 2007b). To determine the impact of the social damage from carbon 
emissions, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conducted a large-
scale analysis (IPCC 2001b) assessing the impact of carbon emissions on global 
temperature change and world gross domestic product, and then compared the outcome 
with the results of Stern (2007). Findings of these two analyses consistently suggest that 
carbon-caused damage estimates, as a percent of global (Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
are correlated with increases in global mean temperature. Scheffran and Pickl (2000) 
developed a game theoretic model for determining the cost of GHG emissions by 
country. In this study they used options of joint implementation to achieve the desired 
reduction levels. In an earlier work, Scheffran (1998) applied game theoretic modeling 
technique to analyze conditions for cooperation, stability and cost minimization in the 
energy sector and climate change problem. 
Climate-change research in relation to natural gas markets has also been 
previously analyzed. For instance Gabriel at al. (2000) explored the carbon stabilization 
programs in Canada to export natural gas to the U.S. They found that the impacts of 
stabilization programs vary by region even if such programs are applied to the same 
 141 
 
industry. Modeling approaches were used for analyzing North American carbon emission 
policies by Kanudia and Loulou (1998 a,b,c), where they analyzed energy planning by 
considering 150 energy sources through a stochastic approach, and also found advantages 
for using probabilistic modeling techniques over deterministic optimization modeling. It 
should be noted though that more realistic and industry-specific market structure 
representation is also important for accurate and conclusive results. Similar approaches 
along with the results can be found in Loulou et al. (1996), Loulou and Kanudia (1997, 
1998) and in Chung et al. (1997).  
Brown et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of the natural gas market/industry on 
carbon policy and found that natural gas has a big potential for being a preferred fuel 
under cap-and-trade or tax policies, although it would be more efficient if nuclear power 
and renewable power were kept limited, so the energy demand would be supplied by 
fossil fuels. Stern et al. (2006) also indicated the importance of using natural gas as an 
alternative to highly emitting fossil fuels to avoid long-term climate change impacts. At 
the same time the authors stated that the significant amount of emissions generated from 
natural gas industry, just from flaring related activities, represents about 30% of total 
global emissions. Even though all emission reduction techniques can be translated to per 
unit equivalent cost, the taxation of emissions was found to be an effective measure for 
emissions mitigation, providing greater price predictability (Stern et al. 2006; IAE 2006).  
Certain countries pioneered the way to adopt carbon mitigation mechanisms to 
meet the target emission reductions. A good example is the UK applying the Climate 
Change Levy, which was a revenue-neutral mechanism encouraging emissions reduction 
across different sectors, including the industrial sectors. Norway is another example that 
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introduced a carbon tax system in the early 1990s. The carbon tax mechanism in Norway 
covers much of its heavy industry as well as the transport sector. There are also other 
Scandinavian countries that implemented carbon taxation schemes. Norway left certain 
areas exempt from taxation, even though it was one of the early adopters of this system 
that covered nearly 60 percent of the energy-related CO2 emissions. This includes the 
natural gas and electricity sectors in addition to the cement industry, foreign shipping, 
and fisheries. Emissions taxation in Norway showed a significant increase in government 
revenue and according to Bruvoll and Larsen (2002) the revenue from taxation was 0.7% 
of the entire GDP in 1993, which reached to 1.7% in 2001. The corresponding CO2 
emissions reduction resulted from this action was 2.3% as of 1999. Observations 
indicated improvement in technology innovation in Norway (Stern et al. 2006).  
When the tax is applied directly to the amount of emissions from a facility/plant, 
the producer has an incentive in technology improvements if the general structure of the 
applied tax system can be differentiated from other application schemes (Pigou 1920). 
However, the implementation of a tax mechanism for the natural gas industry faced some 
difficulties due to a lack of information on competitiveness with foreign producers. Also, 
despite the fact that different fuels emit at different rates, the suggested tax structure was 
uniform over the variety of fuels. Even though Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark 
implemented carbon taxes in the early 1990s, they could not balance their approaches in 
coordinating tax policies internationally (Ekins and Barker 2001). 
The research in this chapter was funded by the Norwegian Research Council and 
seeks to fulfill the existing gaps in research and development of emissions taxation policy 
implementation for the natural gas industry. In contrast to existing approaches, this 
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research considers the impact of various carbon policies from both the suppliers’ and 
consumers’ perspective. We also compare our main results with a no-carbon policy 
scenario to show the impact of the suggested policies. The analyses were conducted 
through extension and improvement of the existing World Gas Model (WGM) (Gabriel et 
al. 2012) to account for environmental aspects in the natural gas market.  
This chapter examines internalization of carbon dioxide emissions costs from the 
supply and demand sides of the market in order to provide a model for the development 
of a robust policy for the natural gas industry. The World Gas Model (WGM) developed 
at the University of Maryland is suitably modified in order to perform this analysis.  
Particularly, the objective functions of players in WGM have been extended to account 
for carbon emissions related costs in the supply chain. Additionally a novel approach is 
applied to allow a proportional application of carbon costs both on the suppliers and 
consumers side of the market. It was found that depending on the place of carbon cost 
allocation on natural gas supply chain the loss of total surplus can be lessened. Therefore 
much better carbon policies can be developed for natural gas industry. It is also observed 
that to lower the adverse impact of carbon policy adoption on total surplus the policy 
should not be applied uniformly in different regions. To provide better results in terms of 
lowered loss of surplus the carbon costs need to be assigned to consumers or be shared 
between consumers and suppliers. In most scenarios it was noticed that when carbon cost 
is entirely applied only on suppliers the average wholesale prices increase significantly.  
This same adverse effect is also noticed on the corresponding decreasing production 
volumes. It is observed that depending on the time of carbon policy adoption total surplus 
can be higher if the tax is entirely collected from consumers. With varying years of 
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carbon policy adoption in different regions can make shared tax policy between suppliers 
and consumers more preferable and lessen the adverse impact on total surplus. 
5.2 The World Gas Model 
 
The WGM is a long-term, game-theoretic model of global gas markets with 
representation of Nash-Cournot market power based on the North American version of 
the model (Gabriel et al. 2005a,b) eventually extended to a global version (Gabriel et al. 
2012). For the United States, the forecasts presented in the Annual Energy Outlook (April 
2009 ARRA version) were used. For Europe, the PRIMES model (European Commission 
2008) was used which provided consumption and production projections for the EU27. 
For the rest of the world, the World Energy Outlook (WEO) (IEA 2008) was used. The 
WGM was then extensively calibrated to match these multiple sources for all 
countries/aggregated countries and years considered. WGM is capable of analyzing U.S. 
shale gas availability in addition to conventional natural gas sources (Gabriel et al. 2012). 
5.3 Practical Techniques to Reduce the Amount of Fuel-Based Emissions 
in the Environment 
 
Many emission reduction techniques had been suggested and implemented both in the 
U.S. and around the world. As such the cap-and-trade programs have been extensively 
considered. Emissions cap program supporters suggest restrictions on the amount of 
released emissions, while those inclined to carbon trade also support carbon credit trades. 
Some prefer to have a flat tax rate on the amount of emissions, while others prefer 
dynamic application of the tax. For an easier application of such policies as well as for 
better capturing total emissions, a carbon dioxide equivalent is commonly used to 
measure the amount of generated emissions. This approach allows carbon taxation, 
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allowances and caps to be applied to polluting sectors more easily. One of the important 
aspects of optimal carbon policy development is the avoidance of distortions in the 
market behavior. No matter where carbon policy is used, it is necessary to decide on the 
carbon price and its impact on the industry, since any policy eventually can be 
transformed into its equivalent money value and vice-versa. As such, carbon pricing 
either as a tax or as a price per unit emission is considered an efficient measure for 
environmental regulation enforcement. Even though carbon pricing is found to be an 
effective method for some industries, for others, including the natural gas sector, it still 
had not been thoroughly analyzed. The impact of carbon pricing or taxation might have 
severe results for some market players while for others there would still be an opportunity 
to operate and generate profits. Such impact usually depends on many factors including 
the size of the company, market power, demand levels and resource availability to name a 
few.  
In other terms, the taxation for environmental pollution is known as a negative 
externality or external costs. The negative impact of such taxation is the overall increased 
price for the consumer that may lessen the suppliers’ profits either by the tax partially 
being deducted from the profit margin of suppliers or by reducing the demand for goods 
by changing the consumer preference for a given product (Pigou 1920). This effect is true 
for any industry. If designed improperly, the environmental tax or more generally 
“negative externalities” may result in a market failure or relocation of businesses to 
places where such policies do not apply, which in its turn may lead to job losses. This 
form of tax is defined as Pigouvian tax in honor of the English economist Pigou, who 
first analyzed taxation of negative externalities. The impact of emissions taxation as a 
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Pigouvian tax is discussed in many areas of modern economics and illustrates that if the 
tax is applied to the amount of emissions generated by a facility/plant then there is an 
incentive for the producer to cut back on the supply quantities. The graphical 
representation of the impact of taxation on quantity and price is given in Figure 5-2. 
Depending on the tax policy or the suppliers’ preference the tax may or may not be 
transferred directly to the consumer in its entirety. For instance the producer may pay a 
larger portion of the tax if its pre-taxation profits allow for such a move. By taking a large 
share of the tax without increasing the price, the supplier may keep its market share and 
still be better off compared to transferring a large portion of the tax to the consumer and 
limiting its market demand via a higher price. This depends on the elasticity of demand 
and supply curves. Also, the taxation results to deadweight loss due to shifted supply and 
demand curves (see Figure 5-2). The deadweight loss is the inefficiency resulting from a 
tax or monopolistic pricing. The diagram in Figure 5-2 shows the deadweight loss as a 
triangle caused by a tax. By creating a difference between the before-tax price (Pbt) 
received by producers and the after-tax price (Pat) paid by consumers, the triangle of the 
deadweight loss is formed (the triangle formed from the after tax supply curve, the before 
tax demand curve and the vertical line corresponding to reduced quantity Qat) when a 
vertical line corresponding to Qat is drawn from the after tax equilibrium (the intersection 
point of before tax and the supply curve after tax). From this intersection point when the 
horizontal line is drawn the new equilibrium price can be found. The government secures 
the area labeled government revenue. The width of the rectangle for the government 
revenue is determined by the intersection of the Qat vertical line and the before tax supply 
curve. This revenue comes at the expense of the consumer surplus and producer surplus 
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that would have existed in the pre-taxation equilibrium. The triangle of the deadweight 
loss goes to no one. If the tax is applied to a supplier as a percentage of emissions per unit 
of produced good then there would be an incentive for the supplier to improve 
technologies. 
The effect of a tax incidence explains that depending on the elasticity of demand 
and/or supply either the consumer or the producer may bear the significant share of tax. It 
is thought though that in the long run, it is the consumer that is always affected due to 
taxation mechanisms. In general, when a tax is applied, some portion of the tax is 
deducted from the consumer surplus (the upper portion of the government revenue 
rectangle, divided by the before tax equilibrium price horizontal line) and the other 
portion by the producer surplus (the lower portion of the same rectangle) based on no tax 
option (Pbt). After the tax proportion is deducted by the government, the remaining 
triangles on the top and on the bottom left sides represent the new surpluses for the 
consumer and producer (Figure 5-2). Depending on the supply elasticity, the major 
portion of costs of negative externalities may be transferred from the supplier to the 
consumer. The opposite is also true, i.e. a larger portion of the tax can be applied to the 
producer and then be deducted from the producers’ revenues (including the producers’ 
surplus area in Figure 5-2). Such an approach is explained by a need to develop a carbon 
policy that targets multiple goals (Metcalf 2011), including emissions reduction and also 
satisfaction of market conditions when suppliers are interested in continuous investments, 





Figure 5-2: Graphical representation of tax application - the impact on demand and 
price (case of perfect competition) 
 
In the perfect competition the overall tax burden (the area of a rectangle for 
government revenue) will not be affected by a location change of tax application in the 
supply chain. The tax paid for a certain quantity of products would be the same if there is 
no change in the demand (i.e. consumers’ may have a non-linear preference for the good 
depending subject to price change) and supply curve elasticities of the product. If we 
consider the case where the tax is shifting the demand curve downwards by the amount of 
tax then we still form the same intersections of lines indicating that the government 
revenue stays the same. The following numerical example will make this concept clear. 
Let’s assume the before tax demand for gadgets is 100 units (Qbt) and the before tax price 
is $10.00 (Pbt). Let’s also assume that a $2.00 tax is imposed on gadgets thereby shifting 
the supply curve to a new after tax price $11.20 (Pat) and corresponding after tax quantity 
75 (Qat). The government revenue will be $150.00. Now if we consider the case where 
the demand curve is shifted downwards by a $2.00 tax, we notice that same quantity Qat 
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equals 75 units. This means that the size of the government revenue stays the same and is 
again equal to $150.00. 
This reasoning holds in case of perfect competition, considering a simplified 
market structure and assumptions for a single firm and a consumer. If we consider a non-
parallel shift of the demand or supply curves, and, hence, changes in elasticity, the 
assumption of the overall tax burden not being affected by a change in the tax payers 
might no longer hold. It would also be interesting to analyze the resulting changes in 
welfare, but this is out of the scope of the chapter. The WGM is formulated as a Nash-
Cournot market model, and therefore we analyze the effects of taxation on an 
oligopolistic market. 
5.4 Tax Impact on Price under Non-Perfect Competition 
 
Imposition of a tax on a non-perfectly competitive market may have even larger impacts 
than the actual amount of the tax. A good example is an oligopolistic market, the case of 
a few suppliers for a homogeneous product. A Nash-Cournot equilibrium model is a 
simple representation of such market. Nash-Cournot games are based on the original 
work of Cournot (1838), where the firms compete on quantities. For simplicity, assume 
two equally positioned firms competing over the quantity of supply in the market. Each 
firm makes its output decision by assuming that the opponent firm’s behavior is fixed. 
Finding a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is a production level where neither firm desires to 
deviate from what they are doing. The production levels are built through reaction 
functions of firms, indicating how one firm reacts on supply quantity changes of the other 
firm. In Nash-Cournot games, firms may exercise market power by adjusting the 
quantities of supply (Han and Liu 2011). In a Nash-Cournot model, when the rival firm 
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has already sold a certain quantity, the other firm acts as monopolist (Figure 5-3) for the 
remaining demand and sets its marginal revenue equal to its marginal cost. The response 
of a firm to its rival firms is observed through reaction functions. All rival firms in the 
market will react by the same approach and will get to the equilibrium point for price and 
quantity from the monopolistic perspective. The equilibrium is reached when firms have 
no after-the-fact regret for their decisions. Such approach leads to higher prices compared 
to perfectly competitive markets and less than the price of a monopolistic market.  
To maximize profits the monopolist always produces in an elastic region of a 
demand curve, which is when marginal cost is positive, that is when the elasticity ɛϵ(-∞;-
1]. Therefore it is able to decrease the quantity and increase the price, and, consequently, 
increase its profits. This is illustrated in Figure 5-3, which presents the reaction of a firm 
in a Nash-Cournot game to its rival firm’s decision, where the rival firm covers 50 units 
of the market demand and the demand curve shifts back (left) by 50 units. In this case, 
the monopolistic approach produces 20 units and the marginal revenue of reduced 
demand is set equal to marginal costs of $10. In the monopolistic approach, the slope of 





Figure 5-3: Oligopolistic Market – Firm’s response to its Rival Firm’s decision on 
supply quantities 
 
In the case of the oligopolistic market, the tax effect will be different compared to 
it in perfect competition. For instance, addition of one dollar tax on a product price in a 
non-perfectly competitive market can be larger than the tax margin itself. A simple 
inverse demand function illustrating the tax incident can be represented as: p(Q)=Q
1/ɛ
. 





, and from here the marginal revenue (MR)=(1+1/ɛ)×Q
1/ɛ
. 
Suppose that the marginal cost of a product is MC(Q)=c, which after the tax becomes 
MC(Q)=c+δ. By making MR=MC we get (1+1/ɛ)×Q
1/ɛ
=c+σ and solving for Q we get 
Q=((c+σ)/(1+1/ɛ)) 
ɛ
. We find the corresponding price using the inverse demand function 
to be p=(c+σ)/(1+1/ɛ). From this function it is clear that depending on the tax (σ) the 
impact might be larger or smaller than the value of the tax. To observe the change in the 
price from change in the tax, we take the derivative of the price with respect to the tax: 
dp/dσ =1/(1+1/ɛ). The numerical example makes this statement clearer. If we consider ɛ 
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=-2.5, then dp/dσ =1/(1-0.4)=1.667, and, therefore, one dollar tax induces a 1.667 dollar 
increase in price. In other instances, only a portion of the tax may be transferred to the 
consumer. Similar observations can be made from the results of scenarios discussed in 
this research and analyzed by WGM, considering multiple players and countries that 
eventually achieve equilibrium.  
The next section provides the details of the extended WGM formulation. 
5.5 Problem and Formulation 
 
We make some assumptions in the original WGM formulation that will allow the analysis 
of the impact of carbon policies on the natural gas market. This is done by proportionally 
transferring the direct assignment of a carbon cost from suppliers to consumers. The 
revised WGM formulation includes changes in the objective functions of the various 
market agents. The details of the original WGM formulation are described in Gabriel et 
al. (2012) and the country-node mapping along with KKT conditions of the various 
players also available in Gabriel et al. (2012) are presented in Appendix 5-A. 
5.5.1 The Problem 
 
Policy makers apply carbon taxes, cap and trade programs and emission allowances to 
limit or reduce the amount of GHG emissions. In most cases, these policies can be 
expressed in terms of a monetary value per unit of emissions and act as incentives or 
disincentives for both producers and large energy consumers inducing a switch to cleaner 
energy sources or improved technologies. As illustrated in Section 5.4, under non-perfect 
competition the carbon pricing can have significant negative impact on the price and 
consequently as shown in case studies on some market players. Therefore, there is a need 
to develop a model that can support proportional assignment of carbon costs, and, hence, 
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allow the development of more desirable carbon policies (either from a consumers’ or 
suppliers’ perspective). The existing decision-support models do not provide analysis 
options for assessing the effectiveness of carbon pricing on the natural gas industry. We 
allocate carbon emissions to players in WGM based on their shares in the total supply. 
Specifically, 27% of 0.37 metric tons per thousand cubic meters of natural gas emissions 
were allocated to production, 12% to processing, 28% to transmission, 24% to 
distribution, and 9% to storage related pollution of the supply chain players. The 
emissions from the final consumption of 2.39 metric tons per thousand cubic meters of 
natural gas were also applied to producers, storage operators and traders as part of the gas 
supply chain that delivers natural gas to its users through the marketer (EIA 1998; 
INGAA 2000). 
This modification of the standard WGM allows for inclusion of carbon costs per 
ton corresponding to the desired carbon policy. The approach implemented in this chapter 
is different from existing techniques by means of assigning carbon costs simultaneously 
to the suppliers and the consumers in varying proportions depending on the modeler’s 
choice. In contrast to perfectly competitive markets, consideration of the WGM structure 
as a Nash-Cournot game provides non-intuitive outcomes depending on the given 
parameters per policy scenario and the equilibrium point. The next section provides the 
details of formulation and explains what is added to the model to account for carbon 
emissions. 
5.5.2 The Formulation 
 
The formulation presents the details for each player in WGM. The market-clearing 





For consistency with the original formulation of WGM, the terms for carbon emissions 
and carbon costs used in the extension follow the same structure. For instance, market 
player indices are the first letters of their full names. For example,        are the total 
sales of a market agent of type  . Also,         are the sales of an agent of type   to 
an agent of type   and          are the purchases of an agent of type   from agents of 
type  . Country nodes are denoted by indices from the set  , and subsets of nodes where 
a player   is present, by     ; to denote individual nodes in this set, we write     . To 
denote the subset of agents   present at node  , a      is used; for individual set 
elements,      was used. Units used in the model are provided in more detail in 
Appendix 5-A. 
In general, the following terms are used: market prices  , inverse demand 
function     , shadow prices of constraints in lower case Greek symbols with 
superscripts representing the relevant player type (describing the player in the supply side 
of the market, such as producers, traders, transmission system operators, storage 
operators and marketers), and subscripts representing the players, nodes, seasons and 
years (e.g.,     
 , the dual of the producer      capacity constraint for producer   in year 
  and season  ). 
The following are the sets used in the original model formulation (Gabriel et al. 
2012): 
a A   Gas transportation arcs, e.g., {NNED_GER, LNOR_FRA, RGER_GER}13 
                                                 
13
 The first letter indicates the type of arc; combinations of three letters denote the region or country name. 
NNED_GER represents a pipeline from the Netherlands to Germany; LNOR_FRA is an LNG shipping arc 
from the Norwegian liquefaction node to the regasification node of France and RGER_GER the arc from 
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d D   Demand seasons, e.g., {low, high} 
p P   Producers, e.g., {P_NOR, P_RUW, P_RUE}
14
 
m M  Years, e.g., {2005, 2010, 2015, 2020} 
n N   Model nodes15, e.g., {N_NOR, N_RUW} 
The complete list of notation is provided in Appendix 5-A. 
5.5.4 Producer’s Problem 
 
The first player in the natural gas supply chain is the producer that extracts the gas (either 
onshore or off-shore) and after processing makes it available to the trader (i.e. the 
producer’s marketing arm dedicated only to a particular producer). It is assumed that all 
the production costs are included in the model by the given production function. This is a 
simplification of reality in which the actual costs may be fairly complicated to compute 
and may not have desirable mathematical properties such as convexity or differentiability 
with respect to quantities produced.  
The formulation presents a discounted profit maximization problem for the 
producer  , where profits are represented as the difference between sales         
  and 
production and investment costs. Cash flows in year   are discounted by a factor of   . 
Since sale rates are per day and may differ by season, those are multiplied by the number 
of days in the season  . Also,      .     
    denotes the carbon cost per ton of CO2e for 
                                                                                                                                                 
the German regasification node to the German country node. NNIG_LNG denotes the arc from the country 
node Nigeria to the Nigerian liquefaction node. 
14
 Indicating the producers in Norway, Russia West and East and in other countries 
15
 Model nodes represent geographical regions in the world (see Appendix 5-A). They can be defined 
flexibly in the model data set. Due to the limited relevance and impact of countries that only produce and 
consume small amounts, several countries have been grouped with neighboring ones and are represented in 
the model data set on an aggregate level. For some countries the opposite is true: their consumption or 
production is so high, and the geographical distances so large, that a division of the countries in several 
regions is warranted.  
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the producer   in year  . The factor     is the carbon emissions factor associated with 
the production process per unit of natural gas. The superscript of this factor changes for 
other players in the supply chain (i.e. for traders or storage operators). To account for the 
proportional application of carbon costs along the supply chain, the term   is included as 
the weight per node. Here  is a value in [0, 1]. 
The objective function of the producer’s problem, with carbon costs applied to 
both the supply side and the consumer side is: 
   
        
  
∑   {∑      [(       
           
       )        
     
 (        
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 (     )    
            
     ]}                                           
In this function, the price        
 is multiplied by the         
  and summed up 
over days. Similarly, the costs    
 (        
 ) are deducted from revenues, where the 
difference is the profit that is being maximized. The new added terms for carbon costs are 
        
        which represents the proportion of carbon cost being assigned to the 
consumer. Here the term     
    is multiplied by     the carbon emissions factor    . 
When these terms are multiplied by the amount of sales, we get the cost of carbon 
corresponding to the traded amount of gas. When the carbon cost is transferred to the 
producer and deducted from its revenues, the term         is used together with 
    
            
      and then is subtracted from the revenues. Finally, we find the 
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total discounted profits by multiplying all terms by the number of days per high and low 
seasons, and sum over time periods. 
Before the modification, the objective function for the producer’s problem 
without consideration of carbon costs in WGM was given as: 
   
        
  
∑   {∑               
          
     
 (        
 )    }                                    
The producers’ and other players’ constraints were not modified, but are shown for 
completeness. 
The sales are restricted to the maximum production capacity 
P
pmPR , which can vary over 
time:  
  . . ,
PP PR
pmpdm pdms t SALES PR d m     (5-2) 
Due to reserve limitations and regulatory requirements, the total production of natural gas 




m M d D
days SALES PH m 
 
   (5-3) 
Lastly, sales must be nonnegative: 
 0 ,
P







5.5.5 Trader’s Problem 
 
The trader buys gas from its producer, and resells it to its marketer through the 
transmission system, which eventually delivers natural gas to the final user or consumer. 
In WGM, carbon costs related to the transmission of traded natural gas (through 
transmission system) are partially applied to the trader’s problem, since the transmission 
system operator is modeled using arcs in between nodes. This excludes application of 
country or region specific carbon costs to that player. The other portion of the 
transmission system related emissions is applied to the storage operator.  
Profit maximization of the trader is based on the amount of gas sold to marketers 
(         
 ), gas purchasing costs and the costs that represent regulated transmission 
fees     
     
 plus a congestion fee     
 , to transport the gas (        
 ) (which is the 
amount of gas flowing between the origin and destination linked by arc a) over high 
pressure pipelines and LNG vessels. The parameter    
        represents the market 
power of the trader and is exerted at a consumption node, with 0 representing perfectly 
competitive behavior and 1 representing perfect Nash-Cournot oligopolistic behavior. 
Values between 0 and 1 indicate that some market power is exerted by the trader, but 
diluted relative to Cournot competition. The expression     
     
           
      
   
is a weighted combination of market prices resulting from the inverse demand function 
    
     and a perfectly competitive market-clearing wholesale price     
 . The price 
term     
     
           
      
   in the trader’s problem gets affected due to the 
inclusion of the carbon cost term          
                
        
        
             
           in the market-clearing conditions presented at the end 
of the formulation section. Here, the additional portion of carbon terms is transferred to 
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the consumer as the total price per unit of traded natural gas. The trader also decides how 
much gas to inject         
   and extract         
   from storage and therefore, acts as 
a player interacting with all other players. The injection costs represent the sum of the 
regulated fee and congestion rate       
      
      
   while the extraction costs are 
represented only by the congestion rate (     
  ). Thus, trader t will have the following 
objective function:  
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Constraints of the trader’s problem are from Gabriel et al. (2012). More specifically, 












tndm a tadm tndm
a a n
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tndm tadm tndm tndm
a a n
PURCH loss FLOW XTR










In each annual storage cycle, the total extracted volumes must equal the loss-corrected 
injection volumes: 
       1 , , ,
T T S
s d tsdm d tsdm tsdm
d D d D
loss days INJ days XTR n s S N t d m 
 
      (5-7) 
Traders must meet contractual obligations,         
    modeled as follows:  
                                                 
16
 Pipeline losses are accounted for in this mass-balance equation; in contrast, the storage loss-rate is 
accounted for in the storage-cycle constraint, equation (5-7). 
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  , ,T T Ttadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d m    (5-8) 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 0 , ,
T
tndmSALES n d m   (5-9) 
 0 , ,TtndmPURCH n d m   (5-10) 
 0 , ,TtadmFLOW a d m   (5-11) 
 0 , ,
T
tndmINJ n d m   (5-12) 
 0 , ,
T
tndmXTR n d m   (5-13) 
Note: the inverse demand curve     
     is presented later.  
The next section describes the transmission system operator, who is responsible 
for assigning available capacities to the traders needing transport capacity for exporting 
gas, and for expansions of the international transportation capacities. The international 
high pressure pipelines as well as the various steps of the LNG supply chain are 
represented as arcs with appropriate costs, losses and capacities. The underlying 
assumption is that all transportation infrastructure agents are price-taking players. 
5.5.6 Transmission System Operator’s Problem 
 
The transmission system is formulated as a set of connections (arcs) between nodes 
representing countries or regions, which make it impossible to apply carbon costs specific 
to a country or region to the TSO. This obstacle could have been avoided if the TSO’s 
problem was reformulated using nodes. In fact, the initial formulation of WGM used 
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nodes for TSO’s problem formulation, but due to computational efficiencies it was 
reformulated using arcs. To account for effects of emissions related to the transmission 
system, the emission quantities were proportionally added to the trader and the storage 
system operator.  
The TSO provides an economic mechanism to efficiently allocate international 
transport capacity to traders. It maximizes the discounted profit resulting from selling arc 
capacity to traders          
   minus investment costs for capacity expansions     
  . 
Regulators base the maximum infrastructure usage charges (regulated fees) on the long-
term marginal costs, which are the operating and maintenance costs plus a margin to earn 
a return on investment. In the WGM, a simplified assumption is made that the regulated 
fees collected from the traders equal the costs; therefore the profit margin is equal to the 
congestion fee      
  . Note that these congestion fees are not paid in actuality, but 
merely facilitate the efficient allocation of a scarce capacity in the model. The following 
is the objective function for the TSO followed by the set of constraints as given in 





A A A A
m d adm adm am am
SALES
m M d D a a






     (5-14) 
The assigned capacity is restricted by the available capacity. Available arc capacity at arc 
a is the sum of the initial arc capacity     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
   and capacity expansions in the previous 












SALES CAP a d m 

     (5-15) 
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There may be budgetary or other limits to the yearly capacity expansions: 
  ,A A Aam am ama m      (5-16) 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 0
A
admSALES   (5-17) 
 0Aam   (5-18) 
The storage operator problem is presented next, which in comparison to other players has 
carbon emissions associated with two stages of operation, namely injection and 
extraction. 
5.5.7 Storage Operator’s Problem 
 
The storage operator maximizes the discounted profit resulting from selling injection 
capacity          
    and extraction volumes          
    to traders. In equilibrium, the 
rates for          
    and          
    must be equal to the aggregate injection and 
extraction rates (loses are captured as described in constraints (5-6) and (5-7) in the 
trader’s problem and in footnote 4). Similarly to the TSOs’ problem, a starting point that 
the regulator or a private company sets is selected as a maximum capacity usage fee 
based on the long-term marginal costs. Depending on the country the capacity usage fee 
can be assigned either by the regulator, where the system belongs to the regulator as 
government or a private company. This simplified assumption is due to the fact that the 
regulated fees collected from the traders equal the operating costs, and, therefore, in the 
model the profit margin is equal to the congestion fees for injection      
    and extraction 
     
   . Besides the regulated tariffs for injection and extraction, costs may be accrued to 
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expand capacities for injection, extraction and total working gas:     
     
      
     
   
   
     
   , where (   ) as in other player’s problems is the corresponding capacity 
expansion costs in units of thousand dollars per million cubic meters.  
During the injection and extraction processes of natural gas into and out of 
storage some technological stages and flaring result into a certain amount of emissions 
per unit of processed gas. To capture the economic effect of these emissions in the 
Storage Operator’s problem the terms          
          for injection and      
    
          for extraction related processes were added to the objective function. The 
values related to carbon emission terms are discussed in Section 5.1 and also can be 
found in EIA (1998) and INGAA (2000). Similar to the other players’ problems here 
again the carbon cost is added proportionally to the price or subtracted from the revenues 
of the storage operator. When applying carbon costs only the emissions corresponding to 
the sold amount of gas is considered. The effects of emissions from gas storage in low 
season are considered in the next extraction in the high season following the low season 
extraction. 
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Constraints of the storage operator’s problem are provided below without any 
change from the original formulation of WGM (Gabriel et al. 2012). The injection rate in 
any season is restricted by the injection capacity given as in (5-20). Injection capacities 





 ) must be 
added to the initial capacity (
S
sINJ ) to determine the total capacity. Equation (5-21) 
provides the limits to extraction from storage and condition (5-22) represents the working 
gas limitations. 






SALES CAP m d 
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




sd sdm sm sm
d D m m
days SALES WG m 
 
      (5-22) 
The limitations to capacity expansions are modeled as the following: 
 
 
 SI SI SIsm sm smm      
(5-23) 
  SX SX SXsm sm smm      (5-24) 
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  SW SW SWsm sm smm      (5-25) 
Since there are losses in storage facilities similar to transmission processes, the 
mass balance for each storage facility (the storage cycle constraint) considers losses 
which are dealt with equation (5-7).  
Similar to other players’ problems here also all variables are nonnegative: 
 0 , 
SI
sdmSALES m d  (5-26) 
 0 , 
SX
sdmSALES m d  (5-27) 
 0
SI
sm m    (5-28) 
 0
SX
sm m    (5-29) 
 0
SW
sm m    (5-30) 
5.5.8 Marketer’s Problem 
 
The last participant in of the natural gas supply chain in the WGM is the marketer. The 
marketer is responsible for delivery of natural gas to consumers. It buys natural gas from 
traders and sells it to all consumers in various sectors. The main sectors included in 
WGM are industrial, residential and commercial users. Since the purpose of WGM was 
not to analyze the marketers’ interaction with each user in detail for each country the 
marketer’s problem is not formulated as a profit-maximizing player. This also helped in 
computational efficiency of the WGM due to decreased number of variables, because in 
contrast to optimization problems the consumption is represented as an inverse demand 
 167 
 
curve. To allow the effect of carbon costs to be transferred to the Trader’s problem as 
part of the equilibrium price the inverse demand function is given as:  
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In the marketers problem     
  is the price that appears in the Trader’s problem to 
maximize profits. To make sure that from proportional allocation of carbon costs the 
share of other players is not deducted from the Trader’s profits (when the cost is applied 
to the consumers) the final transfer of the cost to the consumer is achieved through (5-
31). In this function the carbon costs from producers, traders and storage operators along 
with the corresponding   values representing the carbon costs are added to the price.  
As in the case of the other players, the original form of market-clearing condition is also 
presented and was given as (5-31’) 
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The following are the market-clearing conditions. These conditions for all gas 
markets under consideration are not changed from the original formulation given in 
Gabriel et al. (2012) other than the market-clearing conditions for the marketer, which 
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supplies price information to the trader and therefore includes additions of carbon costs 
from all players.  
Market-clearing between producers and traders: 
 
  ( ) , ,P T Ppdm tn p dm n p dm
t p
SALES PURCH p d m    (5-32) 
Market-clearing for storage injection capacity and volumes: 
  
 , ,SI T SIsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES INJ s d m 

   (5-33) 
Market-clearing for storage extraction capacity and volumes: 
  
 , ,SX T SXsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES XTR s d m 

   (5-34) 
Market-clearing between the TSO and the traders for arc capacity and flows: 
 , ,A T Aadm tadm adm
t
SALES FLOW a d m    (5-35) 
The next section presents the case study analyzed to assess the impact of carbon policies 
when applied to suppliers and on consumers proportionally. 
5.6 Study Design 
 
The extended model, particularly the modification of the objective functions of 
the players and the market-clearing conditions of the marketer in equations (5-1), (5-5), 
(5-19), (5-31) permits the evaluation of the impact of carbon policies. This is due by 
proportionally applying the carbon cost along the supply chain as a flat rate not 
responsive to quantity changes in the amount of traded natural gas. The applied approach 
for inclusion of carbon costs directly into the model formulation rather than the 
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adjustment of inverse demand curves in response to tax addition is found to be more 
accurate. This is even more important for the game-theoretic structure of the model where 
the addition of the carbon tax may or may not affect the equilibrium price of the traded 
natural gas, and therefore make the adjustment even more difficult. The adjustment of the 
inverse demand curve parameters would not be practical for each policy scenario since 
the impact on the natural gas market had not been analyzed in other studies and therefore 
reference factors for inverse demand curve adjustment might not be readily available. 
The approach applied in this chapter is also considered to be more practical since the 
original formulation of WGM already has a well calibrated inverse demand function 
parameters to represent the global natural gas market. Since for any decision-maker it is 
important to evaluate the impact of proposed policies compared to the reference state of 
the market the given formulation allows a proportional addition of emissions tax on 
players in the WGM by country/region and by specific time periods.  
5.6.1 Hypotheses 
 
The natural gas market may change its behavior due to many external factors. Carbon 
emission restricting regulations are thought to be one of those factors. Until now the 
impact of such policies on the natural gas market is not exactly clear as discussed in 
Section 5.1. As a result of the case study we will try to answer the following question: 
 Does a carbon tax have the same economic effect depending on where it is 
applied in the natural gas supply chain? 
The following study consists of using and evaluating two carbon policy scenarios 
conducted as part of the LinkS (CIER, 2012) project in that used the Global Change 
Assessment Model (GCAM), a multi-industry general equilibrium model developed by 
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the Joint Global Change Research Institute (GCAM 2012). The set of cases in this study 
consist of Base Case, 650ppm Case, and 20-20-20 Case. 650ppm and 20-20-20 Cases 
have specific requirements for carbon emissions concentration in the atmosphere and 
accordingly suggest application of different carbon costs per country/region and per time 
period compared to Base Case where no carbon cost is considered.  
5.6.2 Base Case (named as 650ppm-0CO2 and 20-20-20-0CO2) 
 
The Base Case represents the natural gas market without inclusion of carbon costs. The 
WGM as given in Gabriel et al. (2012) is calibrated according to the databases presented 
in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1. Assumptions for Base Case 







Rest of the World 
Production 
Rest of the World 
Alaska 
Pipeline  
AK LNG  
Export Terminal 
Base AEO 2009 April ARRA Update 
EC Trends  






The inclusion of this case allows comparison of effects from suggested natural 
gas-related carbon policies.  
5.6.3 650ppm Case 
 
The 650ppm Case differs from the Base Case (named as 650ppm-0CO2) by inclusion of 
carbon policy requirements. The requirement of this policy assumes a limitation of 
pollution levels in the atmosphere to 650 parts per million (650 ppm) by 2095, which is 
considered as a relaxed requirement compared to more aggressive policies such as the 
European 20-20-20 Case. The corresponding carbon costs for this case are obtained from 
the LinkS project from resulting GCAM runs (Table 5-2) and used as input data.  
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Table 5-2. Costs of Carbon Dioxide Equivalents per metric ton in U.S. Dollars 
(2005) for 650ppm 
Region 
Considered Time Periods 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 
Africa - - - - - - - - - 14.12 35.70 64.75 
Australia/NZ - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Canada - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
China - - - - - 10.76 16.97 24.15 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Eastern Europe - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Former Soviet Union - - - - - 10.76 16.97 24.15 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
India - - - - - 10.76 16.97 24.15 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Japan - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 14.12 35.70 64.75 
Latin America - - - - - 10.76 16.97 24.15 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Middle East - - - - - - - - - 14.12 35.70 64.75 
Southeast Asia - - - - - - - - - 14.12 35.70 64.75 
USA - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
Western Europe - - 7.54 10.22 12.91 15.60 21.22 26.84 32.46 44.12 55.79 67.45 
 
The data in Table 5-2 are comparably low from carbon costs proposed for the 
stricter 20-20-20 Case. Nevertheless the costs in Table 5-2 come on-line earlier than the 
20-20-20 Case and hence provide interesting economic insights described in the 
numerical results and analyses section. Also, it should be noted that the carbon prices for 
the last time periods under the 650 ppm Case become more consistent over the different 
regions in the world.  
5.6.4 The 20-20-20 Case    
 
Similar to 650ppm Case, the 20-20-20 case differs from the Base Case (named as 20-20-
20-0CO2) by enforcement of carbon costs which were obtained again from GCAM output 
(LinkS project). This case includes the European Climate Policy that requires Europe to 
achieve a 20%  carbon emissions reduction by 2020 below 1990 levels, 20% energy 
efficiency, 20% renewable energy supply and 10% of transportation energy efficiency by 
2020. What is new versus the conventional 20-20-20 policy is that in the LinkS project, 
this policy is extended to the rest of the world and not just Europe (the conventional 
case). The conventional case was designed as model for the rest of the world showing 
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that such emissions reductions are possible. In this 20-20-20 Case scenario, the 
requirements are much stricter. This policy is designed to limit the global warming 
temperature to 2
o
C compared to pre-industrial levels. The expansion of this policy 
assumes that 80 to 95% of developed countries should participate in implementing this 
policy for reaching the overall goal. The Table 5-3 presents the detailed requirements for 
the 20-20-20 policy scenario for various countries/regions by certain time periods. The 
carbon cost values for 20-20-20 policy case are presented in Table 5-4.    
Table 5-3. The timing of implementation of the 20-20-20 policy in different countries 









































-//- -//- -//- 
*-//- Indicates no policy comes on-line at given year 
 
In particular, Table 5-3 presents the emissions reduction and technological 
improvement targets by country/region applied to GCAM to generate the data for carbon 
costs given in Table 5-4. Specifically, the policy goals are first applied to Western and 
Eastern Europe where 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 20% of energy 
efficiency improvement, 20% share of supply by renewables in total energy demand and 
10% of transport efficiency is expected by 2020. For the next two 15-year time intervals, 
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further stricter requirements are enforced. The other countries/regions of the world 
become participants in this policy later in the time horizon, but some others including 
part of the developing world does not face any carbon emission related restrictions until 
after 2050. 
Table 5-4. Costs of Carbon Dioxide Equivalents per metric ton in U.S. Dollars 
(2005) for 20-20-20 
Region 
Considered Time Periods 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 
Africa - - - - - - - - - - - 64.20 
Australia/NZ - - - - - 68.94 74.50 77.32 90.91 105.57 127.83 171.20 
Canada - - - - - 67.45 59.64 51.83 50.24 52.78 66.95 104.58 
China - - - - - 55.56 65.42 68.09 66.91 67.37 67.09 64.95 
Eastern Europe - - 50.49 60.52 65.81 65.31 63.10 58.44 50.39 43.46 40.93 51.90 
Former Soviet Union - - - - - - - - 22.08 22.71 26.39 32.25 
India - - - - - - - - 113.67 103.19 91.06 83.39 
Japan* - - - - - 1.08 - - 0.55 - 6.19 1.66 
Korea - - - - - - - - - - - 5.57 
Latin America - - - - - - - - 90.83 98.47 103.46 139.66 
Middle East - - - - - - - - - - - 53.74 
Southeast Asia - - - - - - - - - - - 61.67 
USA - - - - - 39.84 44.27 45.33 42.79 45.11 50.37 78.46 
Western Europe - - 43.45 52.53 57.93 59.35 61.30 60.20 51.01 50.06 47.11 43.99 
* The fluctuating carbon costs for Japan from zero to non-zero values until 2055 is explained due to 
reached equilibrium in GCAM as a necessity. 
 
In Table 5-4 for regions that does not have any carbon requirement by 2050 the 
carbon costs start from 2060. The effect from this last-term costs is not analyzed with 
WGM since it reports results in five year increments and only until 2050 (but considers 
time periods until 2060), due to the end of the time horizon effect when the results from 
the last two periods (2055 and 2060) are dropped.  
For each country/region in the considered scenarios where the carbon cost is 
applicable, a set of weights had been used for a range analysis to compare the impact of 
proportional assignment of carbon costs on market behavior. Weights changed from 0 to 
1 in 0.1 increments indicating switching of carbon costs from suppliers to consumers. 
The next section presents the findings of this study. 
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5.7 Numerical Results and Analyses 
5.7.1 Overview 
 
This section presents the results of the case study. In particular, we show that the carbon 
cost policy implementation may significantly affect the equilibrium prices and quantities 
in the natural gas market depending on where it is applied in the natural gas supply chain. 
Changes in the average wholesale prices together with production and consumption 
levels due to a shifted equilibrium become more noticeable when the carbon costs from 
carbon policies get relatively high. The proportional assignment of carbon costs is found 
to be helpful for designing better policies depending on whether it is from suppliers’ or 
consumers’ perspective. If the tax can be applied equally to the supply chain, prices 
remain relatively unchanged. This fact was observed for the U.S., Germany and Russia. 
The reason these three countries were picked was to compare the carbon policy effects 
across the different market structures. The U.S. in the WGM is a perfectly competitive 
market that is self-sufficient. Germany has relatively little of its own supply of natural 
gas and has a mixture of perfectly and imperfectly competitive suppliers. Lastly, Russia 
represents a supply-rich producer with significant market power. Some non-intuitive 
changes also occur in regions where the carbon policy was not adopted by the time 
considered for comparison. In fact, it is found that the early adopters of carbon policies 
may not be the most adversely affected regions.  
5.7.2 Scientific Hypotheses  
 




5.7.3 Does a carbon tax have the same economic effect depending on where it 
is applied in the natural gas supply chain? 
 
From economic theory (Osborn 1997) it is known that depending on the market structure 
the impact of taxation may be either easy or difficult to answer. Possible answers for 
various markets are summarized in Table 5-5.  
Table 5-5. Market structure and corresponding possible impact from tax addition 
Market Type Notes 
Tax on the 
Supply Side 









Multiple  fuels 
with some level of 
substitution 
Shifts the supply 
curve upwards by 
the amount of tax 
Shifts the demand 
curve downwards 





based on the level 
of substitution 
and supply curve 
upwards by the 






For the market it 






Shifts the supply 
curve upwards by 
the amount of tax 
Shifts the demand 
curve downwards 
















either one type of 




impact on price 
can be higher 
than the tax 
May shift the 
demand curve 
downwards by the 
amount of tax, 
depends on the 
fuel types 
A mixed reaction: 






The impact is 
negative since 
monopolist can 
assert a strong 
market power and 











and get to 
equilibrium.  
Not known a 
priori  
Not known a 
priori 
Not known a 
priori 
Not known a 
priori 
 
From Figure 5-2 in the case of perfect competition for a product with some level 
of substitution the demand curve can be shifted downwards subject to the marginal rate of 
substitution if the tax is applied to the consumer. If the tax is applied to the supplier then 
prices increase due to the supply curve shift corresponding to the amount of tax. When 
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the shared tax is applied again the same amount of tax is being collected. Due to the 
elasticity of supply and demand curves the tax portion may be either deducted from 
consumer’s surplus or from producer’s surplus.  
If the product is homogeneous then there is no effect of marginal rate of 
substitution and therefore the tax addition would be directly reflected on the equilibrium 
prices and quantities indifferently on whom and by what proportions it is applied. Figure 
5-2 can be again considered for given comparison where even if we keep the slopes of the 
curves constant any aggregate shift of demand and supply curves would lead to the same 
equilibrium price.  
Monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures can be pictured as given in 
Figure 5-3. Figure 5-3 represents the existence of two rival firms where after exclusion of 
the supply quantities from the total demand one of the rival firms decides on its 
production quantities as a single firm. As discussed in Section 5-3 the impact on price in 
this case is due to the inverse demand elasticity.  
The technique exercised in this research may help in answering the questions not 
addressed in Table 5-5, specifically in the last row. Even though the model developed 
answers some of the unknown items from Table 5-5 there are some complications. In 
particular, the inverse demand function parameters for each node have different values. 
Due to those differences the market response to a given policy is not consistent among 
regions and countries. Another complication is related to the timing when each region 
adopts the carbon policy. Additionally, there is a potential of having multiple solutions in 
the model making the comparisons of results against the Base Case harder.  
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To measure the effect of the impact from carbon policies on the natural gas 
market the following metrics are used: the consumer and producer surpluses and average 
wholesale prices. Before presenting the specifics for the U.S. it is important to realize the 
global impact of carbon policy implementation on the natural gas markets. As such the 
average wholesale price changes in 2015 and 2050 for all regions for 650ppm Case 
scenarios are presented in Figure 5-4. 
From Table 5-2 it is known that only few regions adopt the proposed 650ppm 
carbon policy by 2015. Moreover, by 2015 the cost, for regions adopting the policy, is 
relatively low. In contrast, by 2050 all regions have this policy adopted and therefore the 
impact of carbon costs is much more noticeable compared to 2015. The numerical values 
for the presented cases and scenarios are given in Table 5-B1 in the Appendix 5-B.  
 
 




                                                 
17
 _0CO2 indicates a no carbon cost case.  
  0 is when the carbon cost is subtracted from the suppliers’ revenues directly, when it is   1 then the 




Similarly, the results from the 20-20-20 Case are depicted in Figure 5-5. We can 
observe the impact of carbon costs on the natural gas market. Under this case the only 
region adopting carbon policy by 2015 is Europe (Table 5-3). In the 20-20-20 Case most 
of the regions have that carbon policy adopted by 2050. It is found that in certain regions 
such as Russia that adopt the 20-20-20 carbon policy later than the 650ppm carbon policy 
huge gains are possible. For example in the 20-20-20 Case the losses in total surplus are 
only 10 to 17% of what they would be under the 650ppm Case. However this result is not 
uniform across countries and policies.  
 
 
Figure 5-5: Average Wholesale Prices in 2015 and 2050 $/KCM ($2005) (20-20-20 
Case) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Section 5.4, the impact of such carbon cost applications may vary from region to region and from case to 
case due to non-perfect competition and the elasticity of inverse demand functions.  
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5.7.4 Analyses for the U.S. 
 
More specific details for market change comparisons for both cases are presented in 
Figure 5-6 for years 2015 to 2050 for the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 5-6: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 
BCM/Y in the U.S. (650ppm Case) (right) 
 
In particular, Figure 5-6 shows the change in average wholesale price and 
production levels in the U.S. from 2015 (as a first year of carbon policy adoption in at 
least one region) to 2050 (the time horizon for which the results of the model are 
reported).  
Numerical results of these cases are presented in Table 5-6.  
 
Table 5-6. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in the U.S. (650ppm 
Case) 
Year 
$/KCM ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 650ppm Case Scenario 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 214.12 228.22 227.43 225.12 453.40 435.83 448.79 461.33 
2020 225.99 244.47 238.89 233.63 453.67 431.59 449.75 467.48 
2025 229.72 248.20 242.75 234.39 455.38 436.56 458.05 480.01 
2030 240.29 265.26 256.33 245.79 457.45 433.19 461.67 488.07 
2035 238.60 280.51 264.94 252.34 421.90 390.05 421.31 453.20 
2040 250.86 297.94 282.20 265.74 401.06 368.86 401.09 435.00 
2045 256.36 319.26 296.94 277.14 405.31 369.74 406.38 444.32 




From the above information the loss in consumer surplus when comparing the 
impact of carbon policy results due to a no carbon policy case through proportional 
allocation of carbon costs between suppliers and consumers is given in Table 5-7. The 
loss of consumer surplus is given in Figure 5-7 and is equal to the total surface given by 
B plus C. To compute the loss of consumer surplus one can take the equilibrium price 
and quantity differences between scenarios and find the difference of the consumer 
surpluses (same as the sum of area B plus C). 
 
    
 
 
   
    
     
    
   
 
Figure 5-7: Loss of Consumer Surplus as the area of B+C. 
 
Table 5-7. Loss of Consumer Surplus in the U.S. from the carbon cost allocation 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 6.27 6.00 5.03 
2020 8.18  5.83 3.52 
2025 8.24 5.95 2.18 
2030 11.12 7.37 2.60 
2035 17.01 11.11 6.01 
2040 18.12 12.57 6.22 
2045 24.38 16.47 8.83 




The table shows to have the least loss of consumer surplus it is preferable from 
policy perspective to apply the carbon cost to the consumers. This happens because of the 
oligopolistic structure of the market where the rival firms operate in the elastic region of 
the demand curve and therefore the impact from the tax might be higher. Table 5-8 
presents the total production costs in each considered time period. Conversely as shown 
in Table 5-9 the producers do better, but only at smaller amount if the 100% of the tax is 
applied to the consumers. Lastly, the loss of the total surplus is minimized using the same 
approach to carbon tax allocation as shown in Table 5-10.  
Table 5-8. Total Production Costs in the U.S. x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 48.18 49.59 49.46 49.20 
2020 49.27 51.33 51.14 50.76 
2025 53.25 56.71 56.50 56.16 
2030 57.74 62.35 61.76 60.51 
2035 56.00 60.85 60.01 58.83 
2040 56.67 62.24 61.59 60.66 
2045 60.44 67.09 66.68 65.52 
2050 62.81 73.25 72.53 69.90 
 
From the information in Table 5-6 and 5-8 the loss of producer surplus is 
computed and presented in Table 5-9.  
 
Table 5-9. Loss of Producer Surplus in the U.S. x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 3.35 1.78 0.18 
2020 4.57 2.30 0.01 
2025 5.78 2.93 0.03 
2030 7.89 3.47 1.06 
2035 9.45 4.09 1.28 
2040 10.55 4.91 0.78 
2045 12.53 6.08 0.70 




The corresponding total loss in surplus is the sum of the losses of producer and 
consumer surpluses given in Table 5-10: 
Table 5-10. Total Loss of Surplus in the U.S. x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 9.62 7.78 5.21 
2020 12.75 8.13 3.53 
2025 14.03 8.88 2.21 
2030 19.01 10.84 3.66 
2035 26.46 15.19 7.29 
2040 28.68 17.48 7.00 
2045 36.90 22.55 9.53 
2050 49.33 29.28 13.33 
 
The results of Table 5-10 indicate for the U.S. in 650ppm Case the worst option 
of policy implementation would be if the tax is applied on the suppliers. The best case 
would be if the tax is imposed on consumers. This is due to the fact that in the 
oligopolistic market similar to the monopolistic market discussed in Section 5.4 the rival 
firms operate in the elastic region of the inverse demand curve. 
The market structure in the U.S is modeled as a perfect competition although 
within the model the market also interacts with other players from other regions. As an 
example of a region that exerts market power on the market the impact of carbon policy 
adoption in Europe is considered next.  
5.7.5 Analyses for Germany 
 
Germany is selected for detailed analysis due to its geographic location and market 
structure. Specifically, it does not have much natural gas, and is highly dependent on 
Russian supplies as opposed to the U.S. which is more self-sufficient. First we present the 
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Figure 5-8: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 
BCM/Y in Germany (650ppm Case) (right) 
 
Table 5-11. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in Germany 
(650ppm Case) 
Year 
$/KCM ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 650ppm Case Scenario 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 290.28 291.53 291.83 289.93 21.21 21.16 21.18 21.19 
2020 313.50 311.02 310.29 311.71 17.86 17.78 17.82 17.84 
2025 327.04 323.90 322.06 322.11 17.48 17.27 17.35 17.42 
2030 342.46 348.37 355.61 361.01 14.86 14.61 14.76 14.83 
2035 338.18 376.10 384.95 383.83 14.80 14.28 14.55 14.72 
2040 347.34 387.04 391.62 390.18 14.74 14.06 14.40 14.67 
2045 369.18 412.38 408.89 420.31 14.72 13.97 14.39 14.67 
2050 385.69 447.66 439.25 452.28 14.65 13.76 14.36 14.69 
 
Similar to the U.S. case the loss of consumer surplus is computed and is given in 
Table 5-12. The loss in consumer surplus is equal to the total surface given by B plus C 






Table 5-12. Loss of Consumer Surplus in Germany 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
2020 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
2025 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 
2030 0.09 0.19 0.28 
2035 0.55 0.69 0.67 
2040 0.57 0.65 0.63 
2045 0.62 0.58 0.75 
2050 0.88 0.78 0.98 
*(-) means gains in the surplus. 
 
The production costs of producers in Germany are given in Table 5-13. 
Table 5-13. Total Production Costs in Germany x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 3.01 3.15 3.08 3.01 
2020 2.73 2.88 2.80 2.73 
2025 2.88 3.03 2.95 2.86 
2030 2.64 2.78 2.71 2.62 
2035 2.82 2.97 2.89 2.80 
2040 3.02 3.19 3.11 3.00 
2045 3.24 3.45 3.37 3.23 
2050 3.47 3.77 3.67 3.49 
 
From the information in Table 5-11 and 5-13 the loss of producer surplus is 
computed and presented in Table 5-14.  
Table 5-14. Loss of Producer Surplus in Germany x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.145 0.073 0.000 
2020 0.163 0.080 0.001 
2025 0.192 0.094 0.006 
2030 0.193 0.094 0.008 
2035 0.250 0.122 0.009 
2040 0.315 0.159 0.006 
2045 0.385 0.198 0.004 




The corresponding total loss is the sum of the producer and consumer losses given 
in Table 5-15: 
 
Table 5-15. Total Loss of Surplus in Germany x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.171 0.105 -0.007 
2020 0.119 0.023 -0.031 
2025 0.138 0.007 -0.080 
2030 0.280 0.288 0.283 
2035 0.802 0.808 0.683 
2040 0.887 0.804 0.636 
2045 1.005 0.776 0.756 
2050 1.410 1.056 0.985 
 
These results indicate that for Germany in the 650ppm Case the best option for 
carbon policy adoption would be if the tax is dynamically adjusted between consumers 
and producers from one time period to another. As an example it might be better to apply 
the entire tax on consumers in 2015 then on suppliers in 2030. Due to such strategy the 
total loss of surplus can be lessened. One reason for this dynamic result might be the 
combination of the elastic range of inverse demand curve where the rival firms operate 
and get to equilibrium. From an oligopolistic market perspective a firm can maximize its 
revenues up to the point where the unit elasticity on the inverse demand curve is negative 
1 (Figure 5-9). This means that when rival firms are in the market for profit maximization 
and they have no incentive to deviate from equilibrium price and quantity the equilibrium 
is reached. The equilibrium can be reached by adjusting the quantity and prices in the 
elastic region (from negative infinity to negative 1elasticity) and as presented in Section 
5.4 the impact of taxation can be even higher than the tax itself. By allocating the tax on 
the supplier and considering the flexibility of each firm for is production levels the 




Figure 5-9: The inverse demand curve for a firm in an oligopolistic market 
 
Results for Germany are also affected due to the mixed structure of the market 
where some part is subject to the market power from suppliers (e.g., Russia and Norway) 
and some not. The consideration of a mixed structure creates additional difficulty in 
understanding the exact cause of the change but in this case some firms are price-takers, 
while others set the price from an oligopolistic perspective. The decisions made by rival 
firms that also set the price consequently affect the supply decisions of price-taker firms.  
For Germany actual gains in consumer surplus versus the no carbon policy scenario 
occurred in 2020 and 2025 contrary to the U.S. This can be explained since the German 
suppliers are not affected by the carbon policy adoption as indicated in Table 5-14. The 
weight Ω influences somewhat the loss in consumer surplus as shown in Table 5-12. 
Once all nations have adopted the carbon policy by 2050 the impact on consumer surplus 
is minimized by allocation of carbon cost when Ω is 50% as shown in Figure 5-10. From 
consumers perspective the best carbon tax allocation is for 50/50 case until after 2030 
then it is best apply the tax on the supplier. From Figure 5-10 we observe that when the 
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650ppm carbon policy is adopted in Germany a difference in loss in consumer surplus is 
already noticeable from the start. In fact the policy impact is in favor of consumers in 
years 2020 and 2025 where the loss in consumer surplus is negative meaning that the 
consumer surplus is larger. In 2030 when the German consumers bear 100 percent of the 
tax they lose more in surplus versus when they share the tax equally with producers. In 
fact for 2030 the best for consumer surplus is to have producers to pay 100 percent of the 
tax.  
Why does this happen? For 2030 for Germany the following logic prevails. First, 
due in part to producers paying 100 percent of the tax with resulting higher production 
cost the production for German producers is lowest among carbon policy scenarios (see 
Figure 5-8). Also, at the same time producers (via their traders) from other countries 
ramp up to compensate (Figure 5-10). Some of these producers presumably have lower 
production costs due to non-adoption of carbon policies resulting in the lowest average 
wholesale prices for all the carbon cost allocation scenarios. Lower prices leads to higher 
consumer surplus. Other years are different such as 2050. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Loss of consumer surplus from carbon cost allocation through Ω along 
the supply chain (left) and daily sales by traders in Germany million cubic meters 
per day (right) 
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5.7.6 Analyses for Russia 
 
Next we analyze the market dynamics for Russia. Average wholesale prices and 
production volumes in Russia are presented in Figure 5-11. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 
BCM/Y in Russia (650ppm Case) (right) 
 
 
Table 5-16. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in Russia (650ppm 
Case) 
Year 
$/KCM ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 650ppm Case Scenario 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 74.15 74.40 74.43 74.44 616.79 616.96 617.58 618.20 
2020 77.69 78.09 78.03 77.91 676.94 677.58 677.93 678.02 
2025 84.28 85.25 85.19 85.01 691.40 692.92 693.06 693.14 
2030 87.54 102.02 103.29 105.87 693.25 617.41 670.40 715.69 
2035 93.46 118.44 121.49 129.78 685.02 576.86 666.91 730.74 
2040 94.03 127.50 125.48 133.24 633.55 516.29 642.10 719.42 
2045 93.69 136.44 128.03 133.11 596.73 471.24 624.12 709.82 
2050 93.32 154.98 135.40 134.71 536.99 388.77 586.92 698.25 
 
The loss of consumer surplus is computed for the Russian region as well and is 









Table 5-17. Loss of Consumer Surplus in Russia 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.15 0.17 0.18 
2020 0.27 0.23 0.15 
2025 0.67 0.63 0.51 
2030 9.49 10.74 12.91 
2035 15.76 18.95 25.71 
2040 19.24 20.06 26.52 
2045 22.83 20.96 25.75 
2050 28.54 23.65 25.56 
 
In Russia the loss of consumer surplus increases dramatically starting in 2030 
which according to Table 5-2 is when the carbon policy is adopted. From the loss of 
consumer surplus perspective the policy should be adjusted almost in every time period 
(Table 5-20) similar to the case of Germany (Figure 5-10). The production costs in 
Russia are given in Table 5-18. 
Table 5-18. Total Production Costs in Russia x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 
2015 31.32 31.39 31.47 31.32 
2020 37.46 37.55 37.59 37.49 
2025 41.67 41.82 41.86 41.79 
2030 45.18 46.95 47.44 45.78 
2035 48.34 53.74 53.20 51.15 
2040 47.48 56.74 56.22 50.53 
2045 47.34 59.69 58.92 50.47 
2050 44.86 62.00 61.92 47.42 
 
From the information in Table 5-17 and 5-18 the loss of producer surplus is 






Table 5-19. Loss of Producer Surplus in Russia x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
x10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.060 0.105 0.076 
2020 0.051 0.073 0.027 
2025 0.058 0.089 0.009 
2030 7.121 3.811 0.847 
2035 14.258 6.217 0.401 
2040 20.093 8.041 3.183 
2045 25.281 9.200 5.373 
2050 35.155 12.348 9.649 
 
The corresponding total loss is the sum of the producers and consumers losses 
given in Table 5-20: 
Table 5-20. Total Loss of Surplus in Russia x$10^9 (650ppm Case) 
Year 
x10^9 $ ($2005) 650ppm Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) 
vs. 650ppm 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost (Ω0_0CO2) vs. 
650ppm 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.214 0.278 0.255 
2020 0.322 0.304 0.176 
2025 0.730 0.719 0.515 
2030 16.610 14.549 13.759 
2035 30.019 25.164 26.111 
2040 39.336 28.101 29.708 
2045 48.109 30.162 31.125 
2050 63.696 35.995 35.212 
 
The results of Table 5-20 indicate that for Russia to lessen the loss of total surplus 
the consumers should bear the brunt of the carbon tax starting in 2030 corresponding to 
the time period when Russia adopts the carbon policy. In 2045 and 2050 the total surplus 
is significantly higher when both consumers and suppliers are equally share the tax, or 
only consumers take the carbon tax. One possible explanation for this dynamic carbon 
policy is the simultaneous adjustment of the marginal cost curve and the inverse demand 
curve where the change in slopes may result in a smaller deadweight loss as discussed in 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 for perfectly and non-perfectly competitive markets. 
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We first present the results for the U.S. and then compare them with results for Germany 
and Russia. The average wholesale prices and the production levels for the U.S. are given 
in Figure 5-12. 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 
BCM/Y in the U.S. (20-20-20 Case) (right) 
 
In 2030 the U.S. adopts the 20-20-20 carbon tax policy. Producers paying the 
greater share of the tax results in proportionally higher prices and lower production 
(Figure 5-12). Consequently, the consumers paying 100 percent of the tax results in the 
highest consumer surplus (Table 5-22).  
Why might this happen? One of the possible reasons for this is the amplified 





Table 5-21. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in the U.S. (20-20-20 
Case) 
Year 
$/KCM ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 20-20-20 Case Scenario 
202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 
2015 214.12 211.68 216.28 219.91 453.40 453.69 457.24 460.42 
2020 225.99 225.63 225.49 228.40 453.67 458.20 459.12 458.90 
2025 229.72 230.09 229.54 234.73 455.38 459.18 461.23 460.88 
2030 240.29 305.36 287.98 272.72 457.45 394.61 463.19 531.55 
2035 238.60 320.44 295.82 267.38 421.90 358.67 419.93 487.60 
2040 250.86 332.15 305.47 276.29 401.06 337.51 395.54 454.09 
2045 256.36 341.97 317.22 283.96 405.31 387.15 433.37 478.59 
2050 268.21 352.54 326.21 299.37 395.11 380.81 425.98 464.13 
 
The loss of consumer surplus is computed for the U.S. and is given in Table 5-22.  
Table 5-22. Loss of Consumer Surplus in the U.S. 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 -1.11 0.98 2.65 
2020 -0.16 -0.23 1.10 
2025 0.17 -0.08 2.30 
2030 27.72 21.95 16.04 
2035 31.94 24.08 13.09 
2040 30.02 21.75 10.87 
2045 33.92 25.52 12.20 
2050 32.72 23.81 13.39 
 
Before 2030 when the U.S. adopts the carbon policy the Ω value is almost 
negligible. Then in 2030 highest consumer surplus (smallest loss) is to put the entire tax 
on the consumers (Table 5-22). A similar phenomenon occurs for the total surplus (Table 
5-25) since the producer surplus is small. Also, the total surplus is highest for Germany 
(Table 5-24) and Russia (Table 5-25) when consumers pay the entire tax. This fact is 
again explained with the same approach as for the U.S. and as discussed in Sections 5.3 




The production cost and loss of producer’s surplus for the U.S. are given in 
Appendix 5-C (Table 5-C1 and 5-C2). The corresponding total loss is the sum of the 
producers and consumers losses given in Table 5-23. 
Table 5-23. Total Loss of Surplus in the U.S. x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 -0.60 1.35 2.88 
2020 0.06 -0.13 1.22 
2025 0.51 0.07 2.34 
2030 46.58 26.51 18.14 
2035 50.07 29.34 14.68 
2040 47.76 26.26 11.94 
2045 50.56 33.40 13.84 
2050 50.03 32.03 14.93 
 
The supplemental details for Germany and Russia including the average 
wholesale prices, production levels, production costs along with loss of consumer and 
producer surpluses can be found in Appendix 5-C in Figures 5-C1 and 5-C2 as well as in 
Tables 5-C3 to 5-C10. 
Table 5-24. Total Loss of Surplus in Germany x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.911 0.593 0.136 
2020 1.019 0.567 0.075 
2025 1.068 0.607 0.100 
2030 0.940 0.585 0.180 
2035 1.009 0.636 0.333 
2040 0.916 0.679 0.256 
2045 1.366 1.193 1.057 





Table 5-25. Total Loss of Surplus in Russia x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.931 0.827 0.908 
2020 1.092 0.980 1.148 
2025 1.372 1.239 1.254 
2030 1.604 1.519 1.589 
2035 1.001 0.767 0.940 
2040 0.951 0.662 1.032 
2045 31.995 22.716 19.907 
2050 33.608 19.184 15.326 
 
Russia significantly benefits from the 20-20-20 policy due to a later adoption 
(2045) than the 650ppm Case (2030). This has far-reaching policy implications for 
Russia to adopting 20-20-20 policy than 650ppm policy. 
The addition of carbon costs to the WGM allows more flexibility in its 
applications and also provides a platform for a more flexible carbon policy development 
for the natural gas industry. The potential beneficiaries of this work are the government 
agencies and private consulting companies that are involved in a policy development or 
decision-making practice. 
5.8 Future Work 
 
The future work related to carbon policy impact analysis, specifically on natural gas, may 
include addition of a new player into the WGM as a Carbon Trader, which will try to 
maximize profits from the market subject to the amount of generated emissions from both 
suppliers and consumers. This player can also help in the development of an emission 
policy, where its carbon costs variables may suggest certain values to help reaching given 
goals, such as limiting the amount of emissions from the supply chain and the 
consumption of natural gas. Additional work/scenarios can be implemented with an 
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application of proportional assignment techniques of emissions cost in WGM for 
assessing the effects in different countries. Such analyses may be of interest to many 
national and international agencies that try to evaluate the impact of emissions policies in 
international trade. For instance, it may help in evaluation of trade volumes for exports 
from the U.S. to Europe or to Asia, which when considering the low cost of U.S. supply 
may initiate profitable contractual agreements.   
Appendix 5-A 
 
Table 5-A. Mapping of Nodes, Countries, Sub Regions and Regions in WGM 
Node Country Sub region Region 
 
Node Country Sub region Region 
ALG Algeria AfrNorth Africa 
 
NED Netherlands NoNL Europe 
NIG Angola AfrWest Africa 
 
NOR Norway NoNL Europe 
ALG Egypt AfrNorth Africa 
 
POL Poland EurOther Europe 
NIG Equatorial Guinea AfrWest Africa 
 
SPA Portugal EurSouthWest Europe 
ALG Libya AfrNorth Africa 
 
ROM Romania EurOther Europe 
ALG Morocco AfrNorth Africa 
 
POL SlovakRepublic EurOther Europe 
NIG Mozambique AfrWest Africa 
 
ITA Slovenia EurOther Europe 
NIG Nigeria AfrWest Africa 
 
SPA Spain EurSouthWest Europe 
NIG South Africa AfrWest Africa 
 
POL Sweden EurOther Europe 
ALG Tunisia AfrNorth Africa 
 
GER Switzerland EurOther Europe 
AUS Australia Australia AsiaPacific 
 
TRK Turkey Turkey Europe 
CHN Birma AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
UKD UnitedKingdom UK Eire Europe 
IDO Brunei AsPacGECF AsiaPacific 
 
QAT Iran MidEastGECF MiddleEast 
CHN China AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
YMN Kuwait MidEastOther MiddleEast 
IDA India AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
YMN Oman MidEastOther MiddleEast 
IDO Indonesia AsPacGECF AsiaPacific 
 
QAT Qatar MidEastGECF MiddleEast 
JAP Japan JPKor AsiaPacific 
 
YMN SaudiArabia MidEastOther MiddleEast 
IDO Malaysia AsPacGECF AsiaPacific 
 
YMN UAE MidEastOther MiddleEast 
AUS New Zealand Australia AsiaPacific 
 
YMN Yemen MidEastOther MiddleEast 
IDA Pakistan AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
CAE Canada-East CAN NorthAmerica 
CHN Singapore AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
CAW Canada-West CAN NorthAmerica 
JAP SouthKorea JPKor AsiaPacific 
 
MEX Mexico USAMex NorthAmerica 
CHN Taiwan AsPacOther AsiaPacific 
 
ULS USA Alaska USAMex NorthAmerica 






KZK Armenia Caspian Caspian 
 
US3 USA East NCentral USAMex NorthAmerica 
KZK Azerbaijan Caspian Caspian 
 
US6 USA East SCentral USAMex NorthAmerica 
KZK Georgia Caspian Caspian 
 
US2 USA Middle Atlantic USAMex NorthAmerica 
KZK Kazakhstan Caspian Caspian 
 
US8 USA Mountain USAMex NorthAmerica 
KZK Turkmenistan Caspian Caspian 
 
US1 USA New England USAMex NorthAmerica 
KZK Uzbekistan Caspian Caspian 
 
US9 USA Pacific USAMex NorthAmerica 
UKR Belarus UkrBelarus Eurasia 
 
US5 USA South Atlantic USAMex NorthAmerica 
UKR Ukraine UkrBelarus Eurasia 
 
US4 USA West N Central USAMex NorthAmerica 
GER Austria EurOther Europe 
 
US7 USA West S Central USAMex NorthAmerica 
POL BalticRegion EurOther Europe 
 






RUL Russia-Sakhalin RusEast Russia 
ROM Bulgaria EurOther Europe 
 
RUW Russia-Volga-Uralsk RusWest Russia 
GER CzechRepublic EurOther Europe 
 
RUW Russia-West RusWest Russia 
GER Denmark EurOther Europe 
 
BRA Argentina LatinEast SouthAmerica 
POL Finland EurOther Europe 
 
TRI Bolivia LatinGECF SouthAmerica 
FRA France EurSouthWest Europe 
 
BRA Brazil LatinEast SouthAmerica 
GER Germany EurOther Europe 
 
CHL Chile LatinWest SouthAmerica 
ROM Greece EurOther Europe 
 
CHL Ecuador LatinWest SouthAmerica 
ROM Hungary EurOther Europe 
 
CHL Peru LatinWest SouthAmerica 
UKD Ireland UK Eire Europe 
 
TRI Trinidad & Tobago LatinNonGECF SouthAmerica 
ITA Italy EurSouthWest Europe 
 
TRI Venezuela LatinGECF SouthAmerica 
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The Original Formulation of WGM in Complete Form 
 
This Appendix presents the optimization problems and market-clearing conditions that 
constitute the World Gas Model. The modeled market agents include producers (P), 
traders (T), liquefiers (L), LNG shipment, regasifiers (R), transmission system operator, 
storage operators (S), marketers (M) and several consumption sectors (K1, K2, K3).  
Producers sell gas to their trading arms. Traders ship gas to consumer markets, 
domestically via distribution networks, or internationally via high pressure pipeline 
networks or LNG terminals, ships and regasifiers in other countries. Traders make use of 
storage services to balance their flows among seasons.  
Nomenclature 
This subsection lists the symbols used.  
Sets 
a A   Gas transportation arcs, e.g., {NNED_GER, LNOR_FRA, RGER_GER}18 
d D   Demand seasons, e.g., {low, high} 
p P   Producers, e.g., {P_NOR, P_RUW, P_RUE} 
m M  Years, e.g., {2005, 2010, 2015, 2020} 
n N   Model nodes19, e.g., {N_NOR, N_RUW} 
s S   Storage facilities, e.g., {S_NED, S_GER} 
t T   Traders, e.g., {T_NOR, T_RUS} 
                                                 
18
 The first letter indicates the type of arc; combinations of three letters denote the region or country name. 
NNED_GER represents a pipeline from the Netherlands to Germany; LNOR_FRA is an LNG shipping arc 
from the Norwegian liquefaction node to the regasification node of France and RGER_GER the arc from 
the German regasification node to the German country node. NNIG_LNG denotes the arc from the country 
node Nigeria to the Nigerian liquefaction node. 
19
 Model nodes represent geographical regions in the world. They can be defined flexibly in the model data 
set. Due to the limited relevance and impact of countries that only produce and consume small amounts, 
several countries have been grouped with neighboring ones and are represented in the model data set on an 
aggregate level. For some countries the opposite is true: their consumption or production is so high, and the 
geographical distances so large, that a division of the countries in several regions is warranted.  
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 a n   Inward arcs 
 a n   Outward arcs 
For subsets of nodes where a player x is present, we use N(x). To refer to 
individual nodes in this set, we write n(x). Similarly, to denote the subset of agents X 
present at node n, we use: X(n), (e.g., T(n) are the traders with access to node n); and to 
refer to individual set elements of this set, we write x(n). 








smb   Storage injection capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SX
smb   Storage extraction capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SW
smb   Storage working gas capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
(.)Ppmc   Production costs (k$/mcm) 
A




smCAP   Storage injection capacity (mcm/d)  
SX
smCAP  Storage extraction capacity (mcm/d)  
T
tadmCON  Contractual supply obligation (mcm/d) 
C
tn   Level of market power exerted by trader in a market,  0,1
C
tn  ; 
  0 is perfectly competitive, 1 is fully Cournot. 
ddays   Number of days in season, e.g., dayslow=183 
                                                 
20
 Units of measurement for costs are thousands of USD$ (k$) and for volumes million cubic meters (per 
day) (mcm/d). 
21




am   Upper bound of arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
sm   Upper bound of storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
sm   Upper bound of storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW
sm   Upper bound of storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm) 
m   Discount rate in year,  0,1m   
W
ndmINT   Intercept of inverse demand curve (mcm/d) 
aloss   Loss rate of gas in transport arc,  0,1al   
sloss    Loss rate of gas storage injection,  0,1sl   
P
pmPR   Daily production capacity (mcm/d) 
P
pPH   Total producible reserves in time horizon (mcm) 
W
ndmSLP   Slope of inverse demand curve (mcm/d/k$) 
,A reg
adm   Regulated fee for arc usage (k$/mcm) 
,SI reg
sdm   Regulated fee for storage injection (k$/mcm) 
S
smWG   Storage working gas capacity (mcm/d)  
 
Variables (all variables are taken to be nonnegative) 
A
am   Arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
snm   Storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
snm   Storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW
snm   Storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
T
tadmFLOW  Arc flow by trader (mcm/d) 
T




tndmPURCH  Quantity bought from producer by trader (mcm/d) 
A
admSALES  Pipeline capacity assigned to trader (mcm/d) 
P
pdmSALES  Quantity sold by producer to traders (mcm/d) 
SI
sdmSALES  Storage injection capacity assigned for use to traders (mcm/d)  
SX
sdmSALES  Storage extraction capacity assigned for use to traders (mcm/d) 
T
tndmSALES  Quantity sold to end-user markets by trader (mcm/d) 
T
tndmXTR  Quantity extracted from storage by trader (mcm/d) 
When presenting restrictions in the formulations below, Greek symbols in parentheses 




, 0    dual variables to capacity restrictions 
free   dual variables to mass balance constraints 
0    dual variables to capacity expansion limitations 
free   duals to market-clearing conditions for sold and bought quantities 
free   duals market-clearing conditions for capacity assignment and usage. 
In what follows, we describe the representation of the producer and other players. 
Producer Problem 
A producer p is modeled as maximizing his discounted profits, which are the result of 
revenues from sales P
pdm
SALES minus production costs. Cash flows in year m are 
discounted with a factor
m . Since sales-rates are per day and may differ by season, the 
                                                 
22
 KKT: Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions  
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sales-rates and production costs are multiplied by the number of days in the season:  
ddays . 
( )max ( )P
pdm
P P P P
m d n p dm pdm pm pdm
SALES
m M d D
days SALES c SALES 
 
     (A. 1) 
The sales-rate is restricted by a production capacity 
P
pmPR  (that can vary by year):  
  . . ,
PP PR
pmpdm pdms t SALES PR d m     (A. 2) 
Due to reserve limitations or governmental restrictions the aggregate production over all 




m M d D
days SALES PH m 
 
   
(A. 3) 
Lastly, the sales-rate must be nonnegative: 
 0 ,
P
pdmSALES d m   (A. 4) 
The KKT conditions for the producer and all other agents can be found at the end of this 
Appendix. The market player described in the following sub-section is the trader. 
Trader Problem  
The trader maximizes profits resulting from selling gas to marketers ( T
tndmSALES ), net of 
the gas purchasing costs and the costs: a regulated fee A,regadm  plus a congestion fee 
A
adm , to 
transport the gas ( T
tadmFLOW ) over high pressure pipelines a. The parameter  0,1
C
tn   
indicates the level of market power exerted by a trader at a consumption node, with 0 
representing perfect competitive behavior and 1 representing perfect Nash-Cournot 
oligopolistic behavior. Values between 0 and 1 indicate that we assume that some market 
power is exerted by the trader, but diluted relative to Cournot competition. The 
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expression   (1 )C W C Wtn ndm tn ndm       can be viewed as a weighted average of market 
prices resulting from the inverse demand function  Wndm   and a perfectly competitive 
market-clearing wholesale price W
ndm . The trader also decides how much gas to inject in 
and extract from storage. The costs for injection are a regulated fee and a congestion rate; 
costs for extraction are a congestion rate only. Thus, trader t is modeled as solving the 
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In each yearly storage cycle the total extracted volumes must equal the loss-corrected 
injection volumes: 
       1 , , ,
T T S
s d tsdm d tsdm tsdm
d D d D
loss days INJ days XTR n s S N t d m 
 
      
(A. 7) 
Some traders have contractual obligations, that can be modeled as follows:
24
  
                                                 
23
 Pipeline losses are accounted for in this mass-balance equation; in contrast the storage loss-rate is 
accounted for in the storage-cycle constraint, equation (A. 7). 
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  , ,T T Ttadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d m    (A. 8) 
All other constraints are nonnegativity of variables: 
 0 , ,
T
tndmSALES n d m   (A. 9) 
 0 , ,TtndmPURCH n d m   (A. 10) 
 0 , ,TtadmFLOW a d m   (A. 11) 
 0 , ,
T
tndmINJ n d m   (A. 12) 
 0 , ,
T
tndmXTR n d m   (A. 13) 
The inverse demand curve  Wndm   is presented later.  
The next section describes the transmission system operator, who is responsible for 
assigning available capacities to the traders needing transport capacity for exporting gas; 
and for expansions of the international transportation capacities. The international high 
pressure pipelines as well as the various steps of the LNG supply chain are represented as 
arcs with appropriate costs, losses and capacities. The underlying assumption is that all 
transportation infrastructure agents are regulated players. 
Transmission system operator problem 
The transmission system operator (TSO) provides an economic mechanism to efficiently 
allocate international transport capacity to traders. The TSO maximizes the discounted 
profit resulting from selling arc capacity to traders A
admSALES  minus investment costs for 
capacity expansions Aam . Loosely speaking, regulators base the maximum infrastructure 
usage charges (regulated fees) on the long-term marginal costs, i.e. the operating and 
maintenance costs plus a margin to earn a return on investment. In the model we make 





the simplified assumption that the regulated fees collected from the traders are to equal 
the costs; therefore the profit margin is equal to the congestion fee A
adm . Note that these 
congestion fees are not paid in actuality, but merely facilitate the efficient allocation of a 





A A A A
m d adm adm am am
SALES
m M d D a a






     
(A. 14) 
The assigned capacity is restricted by the available capacity. Available arc capacity at arc 
a is the sum of the initial arc capacity 
A













SALES CAP a d m 

     
(A. 15) 
There may be budgetary or other limits to the yearly capacity expansions: 
  ,A A Aam am ama m      (A. 16) 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 0
A
admSALES   (A. 17) 
 0Aam   (A. 18) 
The following presents the storage operator problem. 
Storage Operator Problem  
The storage operator provides an economic mechanism to efficiently allocate storage 
capacity to traders. The storage operator maximizes the discounted profit resulting from 
selling injection capacity SIsdmSALES  and extraction capacity 
SX
sdmSALES  to traders. In 
equilibrium the capacity sales-rates SIsdmSALES  and 
SX
sdmSALES must be equal to the 
aggregate injection and extraction rates. Similarly as for the TSO, we take as a starting 
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point that the regulator sets a maximum capacity usage fee based on the long-term 
marginal costs. Our simplified assumption is that the regulated fees collected from the 
traders equal the operating costs and therefore in the model the profit margin is equal to 
the congestion fees for injection SIsdm  and extraction
SX
sdm
. Note that these congestion fees 
are not paid in actuality, cf. the pipeline congestion fees. Besides the regulated tariffs for 
injection and extraction, costs may be accrued to expand capacities for injection, 
extraction and total working gas: SI SI SX SX SW SW











SI SI SX SX
sdm sdm sdm sdm
m d SI SI SX SX SW SWSALES











       
   
(A. 19) 
The aggregate injection rate in any season is restricted by the injection capacity (5-20). 






  must be added to the initial capacity 
S
sINJ to determine the total capacity. 
Equation (5-21) provides the limits to extraction from storage and condition (5-22) 
represents the working gas limitations. 






SALES CAP m d 

     (A. 20) 






SALES CAP m d 





sd sdm sm sm
d D m m
days SALES WG m 
 
      (A. 22) 
The limitations to allowable capacity expansions are modeled as follows: 
  SI SI SIsm sm smm      (A. 23) 
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  SX SX SXsm sm smm      (A. 24) 
  SW SW SWsm sm smm      (A. 25) 
Note that mass balance for each storage facility (the storage cycle constraint) including 
accounting for losses, is dealt with (for each separate trader) in equation (A. 7).  
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative: 
 0 , 
SI
sdmSALES m d  (A. 26) 
 0 , 
SX
sdmSALES m d  (A. 27) 
 0
SI
sm m    (A. 28) 
 0
SX
sm m    (A. 29) 
 0
SW
sm m    (A. 30) 
Market-Clearing Conditions 
The following are the market-clearing conditions that tie the various optimization 
problems together into one equilibrium problem. 
Market-clearing between producers and traders: 
 
  ( ) , ,P T Ppdm tn p dm n p dm
t p
SALES PURCH p d m    (A. 31) 
Market-clearing for storage injection capacity and volumes: 
  
 , ,SI T SIsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES INJ s d m 

   
(A. 32) 
Market-clearing for storage extraction capacity and volumes: 
  
 , ,SX T SXsdm tsdm sdm
t T N s
SALES XTR s d m 

   
(A. 33) 
Market-clearing between the TSO and the traders for arc capacity and flows: 
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 , ,A T Aadm tadm adm
t
SALES FLOW a d m    
(A. 34) 
The clearing of the final demand is represented as the inverse demand curve: 
    , ,W W W W T Wndm ndm ndm ndm tndm ndm
t
INT SLP SALES n d m         
(A. 35) 
 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions 
In the KKT’s the left-hand sides (relative to the  -sign) are the equations, the right-hand 
sides the variables. Most primal variables are denoted as normal words in capitals, except 
written as Greek symbols. 
KKT conditions for the producer’s problem 





c SALESP PR PH P
m d n p dm pdm d pdm pdmSALES
days days SALES d m   


         (A. 36) 
0 0, ,
P P PR
pm pdm pdmPR SALES d m      
(A. 37) 
0 0P PHp d pdm pdm
m M d D
PH days SALES 
 
     (A. 38) 




0 0, , ,
(1 )
C W T
t n ndm tndm T T
d m tndm tndmC W C W
t n ndm t n ndm
SLP SALES





     




 0 0, ( ( )), ,
P T T
d m ndm tndm tndmdays PURCH n N p t d m         (A. 40) 
   ,0 1 0, ,SI reg SI T S Td m ndm ndm tndm n d tnm tdnmdays loss days INJ n m             (A. 41) 
 0 0, ,
SX T S T
d m ndm tndm d tnm tndmdays days XTR n m          (A. 42) 
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 
  






    0 1 , , , , ,T T Ss d tsdm d tsdm tsm
d d
loss days INJ days XTR free n s S N t d m       
(A. 45) 
 0 0, , ,
T T T
tadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d m      (A. 46)  
KKT conditions for the transmission system operator’s problem 
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KKT conditions for storage operator’s problem 
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Market-clearing conditions 
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The combination of all the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the market-clearing 
conditions and inverse demand curves form the MCP. All minimization objective 
functions are convex and differentiable and all feasible regions are polyhedral, thus, the 





Table 5-B1. Average Wholesale Prices for 650ppm Case and 20-20-20 Case 
Region Year 
$/KCM ($2005) Case Scenarios 
650_Ω0_0CO2 650_Ω0 650_Ω50 650_Ω100 202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 
AFRICA 
2015 46.98 47.92 47.89 47.93 46.98 47.42 47.36 47.32 
2050 62.16 80.54 73.1 66.77 62.16 63.44 63.06 62.98 
ASPACIF 
2015 148.87 149.59 149.74 149.7 148.87 148.23 148.58 148.76 
2050 205.84 240.61 230.11 229.53 205.84 245.48 232.48 224.89 
CHINA 
2015 101.26 101.26 101.98 102.72 101.26 101.26 101.26 101.26 
2050 256.49 315.74 302.2 315.36 256.49 300.55 288.04 259.86 
EUROPE 
2015 189.98 192.58 192.7 193.02 189.98 189.91 190.08 190.17 
2050 257.81 291.02 285.74 283.85 257.81 285.64 278.83 274.33 
FRSVTUN 
2015 109.51 109.9 109.98 110.04 109.51 109.43 109.44 109.45 
2050 149.72 202.04 191.96 198.95 149.72 170.79 167.09 167.03 
MIDEAST 
2015 61.29 61.37 61.43 61.5 61.29 61.34 61.26 61.21 
2050 85.53 90.93 89.34 98.45 85.53 79.35 79.4 87.95 
NRTH_AM 
2015 151.89 158.85 158.11 162.36 151.89 150.29 152.58 151.62 
2050 192.35 242.45 224.23 209.32 192.35 231.74 217.39 201.71 
STH_AM 
2015 201.71 207.01 207.13 207.04 201.71 201.35 201.54 201.66 
2050 203.56 249.65 239 217.75 203.56 258.41 241.21 218.65 
 
Appendix 5-C 
Table 5-C1. Total Production Costs in the U.S. x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
20-20-20_Ω0_0CO2 20-20-20_Ω0 20-20-20_Ω50 20-20-20_Ω100 
2015 48.18 48.72 48.22 49.16 
2020 49.27 49.98 49.96 49.95 
2025 53.25 54.04 54.09 53.95 
2030 57.74 67.27 63.05 69.36 
2035 56.00 64.27 60.98 66.42 
2040 56.67 63.91 60.38 65.30 
2045 60.44 73.99 72.77 73.14 
2050 62.81 77.53 76.25 75.45 
 
Table 5-C2. Loss of Producer Surplus in the U.S. x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.51 0.36 0.23 
2020 0.22 0.10 0.12 
2025 0.34 0.15 0.05 
2030 18.86 4.56 2.11 
2035 18.13 5.26 1.59 
2040 17.74 4.51 1.07 
2045 16.64 7.88 1.64 






Figure 5-C1: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 
BCM/Y in Germany (20-20-20 Case) (right) 
 
Table 5-C3. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in Germany (20-20-
20 Case) 
Year $/KCM ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 20-20-20 Case Scenario 
202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 
2015 290.28 297.93 299.02 296.64 21.21 19.71 20.98 21.19 
2020 313.50 329.45 322.17 317.63 17.86 16.10 17.59 17.84 
2025 327.04 345.86 337.16 332.53 17.48 14.82 17.04 17.46 
2030 342.46 363.39 356.90 354.28 14.86 12.46 14.48 14.86 
2035 338.18 368.27 357.31 360.51 14.80 11.18 14.06 14.79 
2040 347.34 374.05 371.01 364.57 14.74 10.71 13.81 14.72 
2045 369.18 424.47 428.85 440.55 14.72 13.38 14.42 14.76 
2050 385.69 442.59 442.17 443.98 14.65 13.39 14.34 14.70 
 
Table 5-C4. Loss of Consumer Surplus in Germany 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.16 0.18 0.13 
2020 0.27 0.15 0.07 
2025 0.30 0.17 0.10 
2030 0.29 0.21 0.18 
2035 0.39 0.28 0.33 
2040 0.34 0.34 0.25 
2045 0.78 0.87 1.05 




Table 5-C5. Total Production Costs in Germany x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
20-20-20_Ω0_0CO2 20-20-20_Ω0 20-20-20_Ω50 20-20-20_Ω100 
2015 3.01 3.52 3.38 3.01 
2020 2.73 3.17 3.10 2.73 
2025 2.88 3.14 3.23 2.87 
2030 2.64 2.81 2.94 2.63 
2035 2.82 2.66 3.03 2.82 
2040 3.02 2.68 3.16 3.01 
2045 3.24 3.51 3.50 3.26 
2050 3.47 3.72 3.71 3.49 
 
Table 5-C6. Loss of Producer Surplus in Germany x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.754 0.409 0.001 
2020 0.748 0.413 0.001 
2025 0.764 0.432 0.004 
2030 0.654 0.374 0.004 
2035 0.618 0.360 0.002 
2040 0.576 0.342 0.002 
2045 0.589 0.324 0.005 





Figure 5-C2: Average Wholesale Prices $/KCM ($2005) (left) and Production in 




Table 5-C7. Average Wholesale Prices and Production Volumes in Russia (20-20-20 
Case) 
Year 
$/KCM ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios Production in BCM/Y 20-20-20 Case Scenario 
202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 202020_Ω0_0CO2 202020_Ω0 202020_Ω50 202020_Ω100 
2015 74.15 75.57 75.29 75.27 616.79 623.43 622.16 622.07 
2020 77.69 79.29 78.97 78.99 676.94 682.71 681.21 680.76 
2025 84.28 86.24 85.88 85.69 691.40 697.34 696.13 695.60 
2030 87.54 89.76 89.45 89.31 693.25 702.81 701.44 700.93 
2035 93.46 94.75 94.40 94.25 685.02 693.25 690.98 690.13 
2040 94.03 95.05 94.78 94.58 633.55 643.98 640.78 638.35 
2045 93.69 123.64 119.23 121.94 596.73 530.19 625.07 684.74 





Table 5-C8. Loss of Consumer Surplus in Russia 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 0% to consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 50% to consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.88 0.71 0.69 
2020 1.09 0.87 0.88 
2025 1.36 1.11 0.98 
2030 1.55 1.33 1.23 
2035 0.89 0.65 0.54 
2040 0.65 0.48 0.35 
2045 16.88 15.60 18.10 





Table 5-C9. Total Production Costs in Russia x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
x$10^9  ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
20-20-20_Ω0_0CO2 20-20-20_Ω0 20-20-20_Ω50 20-20-20_Ω100 
2015 31.32 31.71 31.72 31.80 
2020 37.46 37.77 37.81 37.94 
2025 41.67 42.04 42.09 42.20 
2030 45.18 45.86 45.90 46.04 
2035 48.34 48.81 48.88 49.10 
2040 47.48 47.96 48.21 48.52 
2045 47.34 56.29 56.86 52.39 






Table 5-C10. Loss of Producer Surplus in Russia x$10^9 (20-20-20 Case) 
Year 
10^9 $ ($2005) 20-20-20 Case Scenarios 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 0% to 
consumers 
(Ω0) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-
20-20 50% to 
consumers 
(Ω50) 
No Carbon Cost 
(Ω0_0CO2) vs. 20-20-
20 100% to consumers  
(Ω100) 
2015 0.050 0.121 0.214 
2020 0.004 0.111 0.266 
2025 0.011 0.129 0.277 
2030 0.055 0.187 0.355 
2035 0.112 0.120 0.397 
2040 0.299 0.184 0.682 
2045 15.120 7.114 1.806 









Problems related to global climate change and resource scarcity are main concerns for a 
society trying to build a sustainable infrastructure. These problems are targeted from 
many perspectives, including government-enforced policies and regulations that call for 
energy efficiency and transportation efficiency to build a sustainable infrastructure. Even 
though the directions for improvement are defined, the methods and techniques for 
reaching these specified goals are not yet well developed. Decision-makers do not have 
sufficient and accurate models to evaluate the impact of proposed carbon policies 
supporting sustainable infrastructure.  
In this dissertation an interdisciplinary approach is used with the aim of analyzing 
programs geared at reducing emissions and costs, and determining optimal allocation of 
resources along with profit maximization by developing and employing optimization, 
regression and game-theoretic models for three strategically important industries. 
Specifically, this dissertation addresses specific problems and provides tools to support 
informed decision-making in the construction, energy and transportation industries. 
Decisions made in any of these industries are complementary to each other and can be 
directed toward the common goal of building a sustainable infrastructure. The set of 
developed models can aid in carbon policy developments and evaluations in these 
industries.  
In each of these industries, specific problems were identified related to 
sustainability and emissions minimization. Specifically, it was noticed that for the 
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construction industry to be more sustainable and emit less, the contractors must either 
replace the old construction equipment or retrofit existing equipment pieces, since the old 
equipment fleets are major sources of environmental pollution. Unfortunately, both 
options are expensive, and, therefore, the identified objective was to minimize emissions 
from construction equipment, while satisfying all task-specific requirements for 
construction projects in a cost-efficient way. This problem was addressed in a novel 
mixed integer program. The program aids in the construction equipment selection process 
that simultaneously satisfies all the necessary conditions of cost and emission 
minimization. The model can also aid in bid preparation for construction projects given 
increasing public sentiment for “green” construction The output of the model is a list of 
construction equipment to be used for project activities at a given time interval. The 
model is helpful both to the private sector and government agencies interested in cost and 
emissions minimization from construction projects. 
In the energy sector, the identified problems are for the natural gas industry that 
when solved successfully can contribute to informed decision-making towards 
sustainable development. The first problem identified in this area is the complexity 
related to the decisions for supply network capacity expansion and investment. Natural 
gas demand is increasing, which also assumes more supply requiring reconstruction of 
the existing natural gas supply infrastructure. It is very costly to invest in energy supply 
networks and, together with the issue of security of supplies, the decisions for such 
investments become more difficult and are highly strategic. The decisions made for 
energy supply networks are affected by the market structure where some market 
representatives have a leader position and others act as followers. The bi-level 
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mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints was developed. The objective 
function of the leader’s profit maximization problem considers issues pertaining to both 
construction related costs and environmental pollution. Feedback from the model allows 
for more informed negotiations between suppliers and consumers, and, therefore, can be 
used for planning sustainable development benefiting society. This model can be used by 
both the private sector and government agencies for supply network expansion decisions 
and financing, in addition to defining specific aspects of contractual agreements between 
suppliers and consumers.   
Not only in the U.S., but also around the world, owners of vehicles used in on-
road transportation is purchasing to environmentally friendlier vehicle models. In this 
process, new technologies are being developed. Hybrid vehicles that use renewable 
energy sources in combination with fossil fuels, including natural gas, are thus entering 
the market. In many instances, the integration of these vehicles employing new 
technologies is supported by government incentives and policies, but the improvement in 
terms of reduced emissions due to these vehicles in everyday usage has not been 
quantified. The expected improvement in the amount of emissions is mostly based on 
laboratory tests or scientifically calculated values, but the collective effect of an increase 
in these vehicles in the vehicle mix in conjunction with driving conditions has not been 
analyzed in detail. These details may allow for specific policy or incentive 
recommendations towards a more sustainable transportation system. Given the mix of 
vehicles in the vehicle composition, the impact of new technology vehicles on the amount 
of emissions can vary from ideal conditions. The impact of road type and driving 
conditions together with vehicle specifics need to be considered for more accurate or 
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representative results (compared to idealistic single vehicle performance testing). Since it 
is time consuming and costly to model and simulate each and every possible incentive 
and policy assessing the cost effectiveness of investments (supporting the integration of 
new vehicular technologies), a set of regression models was developed to aid in 
predicting the impact of newer and alternative technology vehicles on the amount of 
emissions on freeways and arterial roads. These models would help in policy 
development, determining the level of incentive that might be warranted, incentivizing 
consumers to purchase newer technology vehicles, and would also help in reaching 
certain goals for emission minimization from on-road traffic. Similarly, these models can 
be used by private organizations and companies or by government agencies responsible 
for developing incentives that aim at lowering emissions from on-road traffic.  
Given the expected increase in the usage of natural gas and the importance of 
understanding the impact of carbon policies on the natural gas industry, a novel technique 
was developed allowing such assessments. This part of the dissertation extends 
previously developed natural gas industry model (called World Gas Model) at the 
University of Maryland. The extension was done through a practical reformulation of 
objective functions, allowing the assignment of carbon costs to both suppliers and 
consumers simultaneously. This technique enables development of a whole range of new 
carbon policies for the natural gas industry. It is found that for some regions in the world 
there is a potential for carbon policy adoption without significantly affecting the 
equilibrium average wholesale prices or quantities. The impact on loss of consumer’s and 
producer’s surplus can be improved through a proper allocation of carbon costs along the 
supply chain of natural gas. Previously, detailed impact analyses of carbon policies along 
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the gas supply chain were not generally available. The applied formulation enables the 
analyses of carbon cost effects on natural gas markets. Such analyses can be conducted 
either by the private sector or by governments that will decide on the sufficient 
magnitude of restrictions and costs or application of carbon policies to support emissions 
minimization related to the natural gas market. 
The value added of this research is the development of more accurate feedback 
for informed decision-making and policy development, focusing on sustainable 
infrastructure in specific industries. This is done through an efficient formulation of 
problems by considering industry-specific details that cover engineering, economic and 
environmental aspects of sustainable practices. As such, the engineering aspects 
considered in the construction model are included in the optimization problem. The 
developed mixed integer model is flexible enough to be applied practically to any 
construction project. In the case of natural gas industry, the earlier models did not use a 
two-level MPEC problem structure for the natural gas supply network expansion 
problems. The model developed in this dissertation allows for better representation of the 
natural gas market than one-level models and also builds a relationship with construction 
industry and the environment. The on-road traffic emission estimation models are 
structured as polynomial functions that consider vehicle-specific parameters and road 
gradient that in a combined function allow analyses in on-road traffic emission 
estimation. Finally, the WGM extension that captures carbon cost analyses are 
implemented through a technique that allows proportional application of carbon costs not 
previously used in a setting. 
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6.2 Assumptions, Shortcomings and Extensions 
 
The developed models and case studies are based on certain assumptions and, therefore, 
have some shortcomings. In particular, the construction equipment selection model is 
well structured, but some linearity assumptions were made for overall productivity 
considerations of equipment pieces. For the case study on the actual ICC project, the 
entire data for construction tasks was not provided in every specific detail due to 
confidentiality. This difficulty was overcome by using some scientific estimation and 
practical judgment to compute values for specific tasks from contractor-provided 
aggregate quarterly data. Also, equipment cycle times and, thus, the amount of work each 
piece of available equipment could complete in a given day were estimated from 
equipment specifications assuming 75% “duty days” and eight-hour workdays. The 
amount of work to be completed in each work category was calculated from provided 
total work estimates, prior knowledge of construction processes, categories of equipment 
assigned to tasks, and equipment productivity.  
 In the natural gas supply network expansion model, the assumption of linear 
inverse demand function was made for computational- and formulation-related purposes. 
This assumption was a deviation from reality, because the linear approach is a simplified 
representation of almost any market. For the case study, some assumptions were made in 
terms of identifying the reasonable set of parameters of the inverse demand functions 
including the slope and intercept values, because real world data for those parameters for 
a natural gas supply network expansion were not available. Specifically, the slope and the 
intercept for the Chinese natural gas demand function were based on a data available for 
only a few regions and do not represent the entire country’s response to price change. 
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Similar assumptions were also made for the demand elasticity of supply capacity 
expansions in China. Due to a lack of information the cost estimations for supply 
capacity expansions were made based on Russian values and adjusted with the data from 
the U. S. Census Bureau.   
The on-road transportation emission estimation models also have some 
assumptions and limitations in terms of accuracy and applicability. These models were 
developed based on estimated data obtained from ORSEEM. The set of runs were limited 
to freeway and arterial networks within a specific set of parameters, making the models 
useful for conditions observed on specified roadways. There are a number of limitations 
in this study and, hence, in the use of the developed regression models. For example, 
traffic volume increases by up to 20% from the 2005 base year levels. Moreover, an 
increase of only 5.3% was assumed between 2005 and 2010. This might constrain the 
traffic volumes in future years, as an increase by more than 20% could be possible. 
However, it is not likely to be a limiting factor for near-term future analyses. Even 
though the models were developed using millions of data points, only one change in 
vehicle composition was tested. Systematic study of vehicular technology changes is 
required to draw more general conclusions. Findings given herein were developed from 
numerical experiments. Field tests would be needed to validate the findings and estimates 
generated through VISSIM and ORSEEM. Comprehensive field tests would be required, 
which are very difficult and expensive to conduct. 
Finally, some assumptions were made regarding the carbon policy analyses in the 
natural gas industry. Specifically, it was assumed that per ton carbon costs in suggested 
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policies were known. If a modeler desires to make a suggestion for a new policy, the 
model would not be able to provide information on the equilibrium prices of carbon.  
An interesting extension to the construction equipment selection model might be 
the inclusion of a human factor as an iterative optimization process in the productivity of 
construction processes, using the available set of construction equipment. Another 
extension could be the consideration of a learning curve expressed as a function of 
productivity improvement, if the model is used for repetitive projects. To support 
applications with large numbers of equipment pieces, the proposed tools can be 
embedded within a decision-support framework where other aspects of construction 
activities, including the design and technological differences affecting the amount of 
emissions, can be analyzed. 
Improvements are also possible for the natural gas supply network expansion 
model. To improve the formulation, the security of the supply factor giving the consumer 
a choice of being dependent on any supplier (already considered in the model) can be 
endogenized. This approach would allow the model to determine the dependences from 
suppliers and suggest preferable actions for contractual negotiations. Additionally, the 
values for resource availability can be endogenized as a function of technological 
advancements, which will allow dynamic, endogenized availability of resources subject 
to technology.  
A possible extension of on-road traffic emission estimation models can be further 
tuning of regression parameters through extra simulation runs for other types of roads. 
The selected set of parameters in the models can also be adjusted. However, the existing 
parameters were found to be representative of vehicle-related emissions.  
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There are also some interesting possibilities for the extension of the WGM model, 
such as endogenizing the weights for proportional assignment of carbon costs to the 
suppliers and consumers. Such extension would require addition of a new player in the 
WGM model. The dual variables of certain players’ constraints could be considered in 
the current extended forms of the objective functions accounting for carbon costs. 
Otherwise, the inclusion of weights (as a new set of endogenous variables) would create 
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